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This dissertation examines contentions in academic literature that a 'planning model of EIA' 
is a promising means by which to support sustainable development in developing countries. 
The planning model structures EIA as a participatory and value-laden planning process, 
linked to political planning and decision-making processes, embracing uncertainty, and 
incorporating multiple ways of knowing about environmental/social impacts. This contrasts 
with the \echnical model of EIA': a rational/technical product, using scientific techniques and 
skilled technicians to predict and quantify environmental and social impacts. 
Research was carried out in Viet Nam, using a comparative case study approach. 
Development-aid EIA capacity-building programmes were used as case studies (n=9). Cross-
case analysis was used to distill patterns, processes and outcomes common to the cases. The 
research employed a range of data gathering and analytical methods, including: collection of 
secondary sources, historical analysis, contents analysis, key informant interviewing (n=64) 
and direct observation. 
In only five years of effort, development aid programmes have helped to transform the role 
of EIA in Viet Nam. From a training and awareness raising tool, EIA has become an 
officially mandated process beginning to influence the design of new projects and the wider 
Vietnamese development planning process. However, these programmes have a confusingly 
high degree of variation in EIA models promoted, ranging from a 'strong technical model' to 
a 'moderate planning model'. 
The planning model of EIA was not a strong influence when Viet Nam first implemented its 
EIA process, nor has such a model been fully promoted by development aid capacity-
building programmes. These programmes have had only limited success in promoting some 
elements of the planning model of EIA, including: EIA beyond project levels; longer-term 
EIA processes and impact monitoring, and; awareness of the need to broaden assessment 
beyond biophysical impacts. A number of areas of change are critical if aid ~~encies wish to 
promote a more complete planning model. 
The dissertation concludes with a call for development aid agencies to reposition EIA 
capacity-building programmes as a deliberate attempt to transform aspects of the 
development planning contexts of developing countries, rather than to merely strengthen EIA 
and planning capacities within an unsustainable development planning process. 
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Chapter One 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Developing countries around the world have responded to international calls for 
sustainable development, in part, by turning to environmental planning procedures first 
pioneered in industrialised countries. Following the example of the majority of industrialised 
countries, many developing countries have begun to adopt planning procedures known as 
"environmental impact assessment" (EIA) in effons to reduce the negative environmental and 
social impacts of development. The reasons for this movement are complex, involving such 
factors as: pressure from environmental groups; conditions attached to and programmes 
provided by development aid agencies; increased environmental awareness in developing 
countries; improved standards of practice by private investors, and; the desire by developing 
country planners to emulate the planning innovations of developed countries. Of these factors 
~owev~:. the most important impetus for the adoption of EIA in developing countries has 
undoubtedly bt~en the influence of development aidl agencies, influence which often persists 
for many years tnrough EIA capacity-building programmes. 
I There are two main ways in which the presence of development aid can stimulate the establishment of EIA within a 
developing country: 
l l Development Aid Programming: Non-repayable development aid programmes or grants for the establishment and 
strengthening of EIA within a country - provided mainly by multilateral (grants only). bilateral. or NGO development 
aid programmes. 
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Environmental impact assessment is seen in the literature as a generally positive 
addition to the development planning frameworks of developing countries: it is an "effective 
tool" (Ahmad and Sammy 1985, vi) which ensures that the negative environmental and social 
impacts of development can be predicted, evaluated and mitigated, and thus, "kept to a 
minimum" (Biswas and Geping 1987, x). Although there are examples of EIA practice in 
which the gulf between the proposed development and expressed local needs is so wide that 
the act of conducting an EIA may be "a ritualistic sham" (Jiggins 1995, 57), most authors 
view EIA as providing an important step forward toward planning processes which routinely 
incorporate a sustainable development perspective. As Berger (1994, 64) has suggested: 
"Experience world-wide, in developed as well as developing countries, has shown that by 
factoring in and allowing for human and environmental considerations at the outset, projects 
can be improved substantially". Regardless of the project-specific outcomes of EIA activities, 
the institutionalisation of EIA within development planning processes can also confer 
important environmental awareness-raising benefits that transcend individual projects and 
contribute broadly to the achievement of sustainable development ideals. Such heightened 
awareness extends to a diverse group of development proponents, government bureaucrats, 
and local community members and political decision-makers, each of whom are sensitised to 
the need to expand the range of concern from the purely technical or economic, to ecological 
and social concerns. Perhaps most importantly, EIA is a pragmatic, workable means of 
counteracting the lack of environmental perspective found in the development planning 
processes of many developing countries (Lim 1985). 
2> Loans With Conditions or Covenants: Repayable development aid loans for major projects or programmes. provided 
mainly by multilateral development banks, usually stipulate that an EIA must be conducted as part of the loan or 
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However, what is most important is not whether EIA is present in a particular 
country, but rather, whether it is structured and positioned well enough within the overall 
development planning framework to reduce the negative impacts of development. Often EIA 
is formally required under a developing country's legislation yet is marginalised, of poor 
quality, elitist or technocratic, initiated too late, is manipulated by vested interests, or is 
largely ignored in the development planning decision-making structure. This is particularly 
troublesome since EIA can often be the prime, and sometimes only, avenue through which 
development proposals are reviewed for adverse environmental or social impacts (Doberstein 
1998). 
Notwithstanding the general agreement about the benefits of EIA for developing 
countries, the most appropriate and effective procedural model for EIA remains a hotly 
debated and critical research issue. Much of the literature supporting the transfer of EIA to 
developing countries is based on perceptions that EIA has been successful in achieving its 
goals2 in a developed country context, and that these successes can be replicated in differing 
political and developmental contexts. EIA represents a transfer of 'planning culture', which at 
times and in some contexts, may not be appropriate. Furthermore, much of this literature 
does not acknowledge the potential for different forms or 'models' of EIA to be introduced 
into developing countries. 
programme approval process. , 
-Generally. the goals ofEIA are to: 
a) reduce the negative environmental and social impacts that a particular development project. plan or policy causes. 
and; 
b) increase the amount of public participation. input and control in development decision-making. 
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1.1 Conceptual framework: EIA models 
I distilled two opposing models of EIA from the literature reviewed in Chapter Two. I 
refer to these throughout as the "technical model of EIA" (after Boothroyd and Rees 1984, 1) 
and what I call the "planning model of EIA" (after Boothroyd and Rees 1984, and Spaling 
and Smit 1993). Table 1.1 summarises the main differences between the technical and 
planning models ofEIA, organised around seven themes commonly found in EIA literature: 
Table 1.1: DiiTerin Assum tions and Structures: Technical vs. Plannin Model of EIA 
TECHNICAL MODEL PLANNING MODEL 
RationaVtechnical product 
and input to technocratic 
planning. 
Microscale: (projects). 
Predictive capacity allows 
the rational selection of the 
best' development project. 
Discrete, "one-shot" part of 
the overall project cycle. 
Persuasion, education and 
consultation as a short-
term component near the 
end of EIA studies. 
Rational Comprehensive 
Plannin 
Consultative and participatory 
politicaVplanning process 
Macroscale<->Microscale (policies, 
regional and cumulative assessments, 
projects). 
Multiple perspective (i.e., indigenous 
knowledge, values, and opinions co-
exist with scientifically-derived 
knowledge) 
Accurate prediction of complex 
system behaviour is impossible, 
therefore, uncertainty, precaution and 
adaptation should be a central 
organising feature of EIA. 
Continuing planning process 
emphasising experimentation, 
adaptation, monitoring, learning and 
redesign 
Shared decision-making, public 
involvement in EIA studies, delegated 
authority or self-determination 
beginning at the earliest possible 
stage and continuing throughout the 
life of the EIA process. 
Mixed scanning, transactive planning 
and advocac lannin 
These seven themes comprise a conceptual framework which usefully describes and defines 
two opposing models of EIA. This framework was used throughout the research to 
5 
characterise EIA systems, and the contributions of EIA capacity-building programmes in 
changing or strengthening EIA systems. Each of the seven themes may be placed on a 
continuum in which the technical and planning models represent the extremes or continuum 
endpoints, and in most cases, neither extreme would be expected to occur in its entirety. 
Thus, most EIA processes would tend to exhibit a mixture of technical model and planning 
model attributes, with each of the seven themes falling somewhere along a continuum 
between a full \echnical' or 'planning' model. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
There are growing indications in the environmental impact assessment literature that, 
particularly at a conceptual/theoretical level, a planning model of EIA shows promise for 
supporting the sustainable development goals of developing countries3. However, to date 
there has been little empirical evidence to suggest that this message has been influential when 
developing countries first attempt to design or implement EIA processes. Following the 
example set by developed countries, most developing countries have adopted a form of EIA 
which most closely matches a technical, rather than planning, model of EIA. Furthermore, 
although development aid4 programmes carrying out EIA capacity building may transform 
developing countries' EIA processes over time toward the planning model, there has been 
surprisingly little empirical research on the approaches promoted by such programmes. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether capacity-building programmes conducted by development 
3 In ecological tenns. it is understood that patterns of consumption in most developing countries are already more 
sustainable than developed (highly consumptive) countries. However. many developing countries. including VietNam. 
establish 'sustainable development goals' to provide focus for waste reduction. resource use efficiency and population 
growth reduction programmes. 
4 The literature uses the following tenns more or less synonymously: "foreign aid"; "aid": "development assistance". and; 
"development aid". The term "development aid" was used throughout most of the dissertation except where direct quotations 
use other tenns. 
6 
aid agencies have contributed to greater acceptance of the planning model over time. I have 
found no empirical studies showing that a planning model of EIA guides either indigenous 
efforts by developing country governments to design and implement EIA, or the EIA 
capacity-building programmes of development aid agencies. Although the literature suggests 
that the planning model has not been influential in developing countries, there have been no 
empirical studies exploring the EIA capacity-building efforts of 'outsiders', who presumably 
have a wider scope of knowledge of the history, strengths and weaknesses of various EIA 
models than do domestic agencies in developing countries. 
1.3 Theoretical Questions 
Two linked questions guided the research: 
l. Why has the planning model of EIA not provided guidance for developing countries 
during the period when environmental impact assessment is first adopted? 
2. In what manner, and to what extent, do EIA capacity-building programmes conducted 
by development aid agencies contribute toward greater or lesser acceptance of the 
planning model of EIA in developing countries? 
1.4 Study Purpose 
The overall purpose of my study is to contribute to academic and practical knowledge 
of environmental planning in developing countries. In particular, l explore the role of 
development aid programming in building capacity for environmental planning, with a view 
toward formulating practical policy guidelines for EIA capacity-building in developing 
countries. The study originates in the criticism, analysis and suggested reforms that have 
emerged from twenty-five years of international EIA theory and practice. 
More specifically, the purpose of the study is to: 
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• contribute to understanding of the model of EIA being promoted by 
development aid agencies, and the historical, institutional and cultural factors 
affecting this choice; 
• to determine, both empirically and logically, the implications of EIA model 
choice by development aid agencies on the development planning processes of 
developing countries, and; 
• to identify ways in which development aid efforts pertaining to EIA can assist 
developing countries to achieve goals of sustainability, good governance and 
equity. 
1.5 Research Method • Case Study 
1.5.1 Case Study Research 
Case study research has been typified in research methods literature as striving 
towards a relatively holistic understanding of cultural "systems of action" ranging from small 
cliques and groups to entire communities or societies. What constitutes a study "case" is the 
system of action under investigation (Feagin et. al. 1991, 152). In the research carried out for 
this dissertation, a total of nine EIA capacity-building programmes served as the systems of 
action or 'cases' investigated. Case study research has been described as a useful strategy in 
exploratory attempts to describe and explain complex. social phenomena (Yin 1989, Hamel 
et. al. 1993), and when the focus is on a "contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context" (Yin 1989, 13). Case study research can range from studies of single cases to studies 
and comparison of multiple cases. Research focusing on single case studies is typically multi-
faceted and detailed (Feagin et. al. 1991), although subject to limitations of generalisability 
beyond the case under investigation. By contrast, comparative case study research seeks 
pi!tterns that cut across cases, and trades-off depth and detail for greater generalisability and 
explanatory insight (Miles and Huberman 1994). This study adopts this latter, comparative, 
inductive approach. Research validity and generalisability are bolstered through the use of 
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standard social science triangulation techniques, and careful description of the cases and 
settings within which the research is conducted (Fielding and Fielding 1986, Marshall and 
Rossman 1989, Feagin et. al. 1991). 
1.5.2 Research Framework: Country-Specific Comparative Case Studies 
I use a country-specific, comparative case study approach to examine the model of 
EIA emerging in one developing country, and to trace the influence of development aid 
agencies on this model. Following an extensive literature review and a series of informal 
discussions with development aid officials, I selected Viet Nam: 
1. The country is in the formative stage of adopting EIA. making it easier to 
trace the decision-making processes and reasoning behind the initial choice 
of EIA procedures; 
2. The country is involved in attempts to strengthen existing EIA procedures. 
so there is ample opinion and discussion of both deficiencies in the initial 
model, and on desirable changes; 
3. The country has significant governmental policy commitments to the 
incorporation of environmental considerations in development planning. 
thus, EIA has a considerable level of official support. 
Preliminary field research in December 1994 confirmed the suitability of this choice. 
1.5.3 VietNam as a Country Case Study 
Due to its tumultuous recent development history, VietNam has only recently been 
able to direct serious attention to the environmental and social impacts of development. 
Unlike many other counterpart nations in Southeast Asia, Viet Nam added environmental 
impact assessment to its formal planning structure only recently. Although hopes are high 
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among government and development aid agencies that EIA will play a significant role in 
movement toward sustainable development, current capacity to implement EIA is limited. 
As compared to other countries around the world, Viet Nam may be typified as a 
country featuring many serious environmental and resource degradation problems linked to 
poverty, and an extremely high (and increasing) population density, but very low levels of 
per capita resource consumption and waste output. In 1993, approximately 50% of 
Vietnamese households did not meet basic needs' criteria (a World Bank family income 
measure designed to assess whether families could afford basic levels of food, healthcare, 
education, transportation and other basic needs costs (Hainsworth 1999)). Thus, many 
Vietnamese households are forced to seek additional 'free' supports through collectively 
damaging activities such as fuelwood collection, fishing and hunting, or cultivation of park 
or marginal lands. Unlike industrialised countries where a transition to ecological 
sustainability hinges on the need to reduce current levels of economic activity (with 
associated unsustainable rates of resource consumption, throughput and waste output), Viet 
Nam's long-term ecological sustainability depends on the need to increase current levels of 
development activity to a point where poverty-linked environmental degradation is greatly 
reduced. Such an increase however, requires that close attention is paid to a myriad of 
sustainability concerns: that resources are used efficiently in the development process. that 
development efforts concentrate on those individuals in greatest need, that development 
levels do not overshoot the country's natural capital base, and that developments designed to 
alleviate environmental and resource use pressures do not inadvertently cause additional 
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pressures. Practices such as environmental impact assessment have a potentially crucial role 
to play in structuring and guiding VietNam's future development. 
VietNam is currently in its final year of a ten-year sustainable development strategy 
entitled the National Plan for Environment and Sustainable Development 1991-2000. Within 
this plan, the development and implementation of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
was seen by the Vietnamese Government as one of its "highest priorities" (SRVIUNDP 1991, 
20) in the reform of the government's legislative, policy and planning framework. Following 
the 1992 creation of the Vietnamese National Environment Agency (NEA, a central 
environmental authority to administer and implement EIA), Viet Nam formally ratified its 
Environmental Law which specified the need for EIA in project planning. Provisional EIA 
guidelines were adopted in the country shortly thereafter. These guidelines consisted of a 
limited, site- and project-specific technical approach to EIA which was required of virtually 
all regional development plans and development projects. Subsequent history has shown 
however, that many development plans and projects in VietNam have proceeded without any 
environmental assessment whatsoever (Informant #59 1998). 
This problem of limited EIA implementation has largely been attributed to a lack of 
the requisite knowledge, skills and resources, and thus, EIA capacity-building is seen by 
government and development aid agencies as crucial to VietNam's ability to move toward 
sustainable development. In response, numerous EIA capacity-building projects have been 
designed, conceptualised and/or funded by bilateral, multilateral or non-governmental 
development aid organisations working in Viet Nam. Although domestic (initiated and 
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carried out by Vietnamese agencies or individuals) capacity-building programmes have also 
taken place, these programmes were of greatest importance in the 1980s (see Table 3.1), 
prior to the resumption of international aid to Viet Nam. Such programmes were poorly 
documented, and were often comprised of an informal 'interest group' carrying out capacity-
building activities when time and resources permitted (Informant #30 1995). Since these 
programmes had largely ceased by the time research was initiated, they were excluded from 
the study. Thus, research on the EIA model emerging in VietNam must necessanly include a 
consideration of the role that foreign development aid programmes play. Development aid 
programmes which attempt to build EIA capacity were therefore selected as specific case 
studies for the research. 
1.5.4 Case Study Selection: EIA Capacity-Building Programmes in Viet Nam 
I conducted lO months of field research in three separate trips to Viet Nam: a two-
month preliminary trip to Hanoi from December 1994 to January 1995, and two subsequent 
intensive research trips from October 1997 to March 1998 (Hanoi), and from June 1998 to 
August 1998 (Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City). 
I analysed nine EIA capacity-building programmes in VietNam. Cross-case analyses 
were conducted in order to distill patterns, processes and outcomes common to the cases 
studied. This cross-case analysis was useful in revealing the extent to which similar models 
of EIA were promoted by development aid agencies and in determining whether the planning 
model of EIA was applied through the capacity-building actions of development aid 
agencies. 
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The capacity-building programmes examined ranged from central government-level 
programmes carried out largely by foreign consultants, to initiatives funded by aid agencies 
but carried out almost entirely by Vietnamese nationals through Vietnamese academic 
institutes. Some of the cases were assessed from an historical perspective (i.e. for those 
programmes already finished by the time research began) and others from a contemporary or 
'in process' perspective (i.e. for those programmes still in operation during the research). The 
latter allowed a wider range of inquiry, including direct interviews with actively engaged 
development aid personnel and their Vietnamese counterparts. Comparison with previously 
completed programmes provided an understanding of how aid programming has changed 
over the short history of EIA in Viet Nam. 
The programmes studied, listed chronologically by year of initiation, are: 
• 1994-Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) "VietNam/Canada 
Sustainable Economic Development (VISED)" project. 
• 1995-Asian Development Bank "VietNam: strengthening environmental planning and 
EIA capabilities" project. 
• 1995-United Nations Development Programme, "Capacity 21-Phase I. Strengthening 
national capacities to integrate the environment into investment decisions". 
• 1996-Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) "Vietnam-Canada 
environmental programme ( VCEP )". 
• 1996- Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) "Policy Implementation 
Assistance Project ( PIAP )". 
• 1997-European Union project on "Capacity Building for Environmental Management in 
Vietnam". 
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• 1997-United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)IInternational Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) "Regional workshop on capacity building in EIA and the 
trialling of the UNEP EIA resource manuaf'. 
• 1998-Netherlands Embassy "EIA Capability Strengthening Programme" 
• 1998-United Nations Deveiopment Programme (UNDP) "Capacity 21-Phase If' 
This diversity of EIA capacity-building represented a wide range of implementing agencies 
and implementation styles (i.e., two programmes were staffed by UN employees, four 
programmes were staffed by hired consultants, two programmes were staffed by academic 
consultants, and one programme was staffed by members of an international NGO and 
independent academic consultants). 
1.5.5 Study Questions and Objectives 
1.5.5.1 Study Questions 
The two questions identified in section 1.3 guided Viet Nam case study research: 
1. Why has the planning model of EIA not provided guidance for developing countries 
during the period when environmental impact assessment is first adopted? 
2. In what manner, and to what extent, do EIA capacity-building programmes conducted 
by development aid agencies contribute toward greater or lesser acceptance of the 
planning model of EIA in developing countries? 
1.5.5.2 Study Objectives 
Four VietNam-specific research objectives were derived from the research questions: 
Objective One: 
To describe and explain the way in which the Vietnamese development planning context 
affected the initial choice of EIA model, and to identify factors contributing to a 
preference for a technical approach and inhibiting adoption of a planning approach. 
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Objective Two: 
To document and describe the conceptual model(s) underlying EIA capacity-building 
programmes operating in Viet Nam. 
Objective Three: 
To determine the aims of, rationale for, response to and outcomes of ElA capacity-
building programmes carried out by development aid agencies in Viet Nam. 
Objective Four: 
To develop specific policy guidelines on capacity-building programming which can lead 
to greater acceptance of the planning model of EIA in Viet Nam and other similar 
development contexts. 
1.5.6 Data Collection and Analysis 
I used several data collection and analytical methods, including: collection and 
analysis of secondary sources, key informant interviews, direct observation, historical 
analysis, and content analysis. This section reviews each of these methods in tum. 
1.5.6.1 Secondary Sources 
A range of secondary data sources related to EIA capacity-building in Viet Nam was 
obtained while in-country. In VietNam, many of these data are housed in the libraries and 
private collections of multilateral and bilateral development aid agencies, in international and 
Vietnamese consulting offices, in Vietnamese government offices and academic institutes, 
and in international NGO offices. Typically, potential repositories of secondary data were 
identified during informal interviews with aid agency, NGO or Vietnamese government 
officials. Secondary data sources included: books; journal, newspaper and magazine articles; 
Internet-based materials, and most importantly; "grey literature" (the unpublished reports 
issued by foreign and Vietnamese government agencies, development aid agencies, research 
institutes and consulting firms). Secondary data sources were selected on the basis of the 
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extent to which they dealt with environmental planning, EIA and capacity-building in Viet 
Nam. 
1.5.6.2 Unstandardised Key Informant Interviewing 
Babbie (1989, 270) describes unstandardised interviewing as "interaction between an 
interviewer and respondent in which the interviewer has a general plan of inquiry but not a 
specific set of questions that must be asked in particular words and in a particular order". In 
the unstandardised interview, interviewers "develop, adapt, and generate questions and 
follow-up probes appropriate to the given situation and the central purpose of the 
investigation" (Berg 1995, 32). The main benefit of unstandardised interviewing is its 
usefulness in exploratory research where it is assumed that the interviewer does not know 
beforehand all the pertinent questions and thus, cannot predetermine fully a list of questions 
to ask (Berg 1995, 32): it is a flexible interview approach which can react and build upon 
unexpected but valuable information emerging during field research. 
I used unstandardised key informant interviews as my main source of data about EIA 
models and the role development aid agencies have played in the emergence and reform of 
EIA in Viet Nam. I first began identifying potential key informants during my first field 
research season, December 1994 to January 1995, during which initial interviews were 
conducted with thirty individuals in the Hanoi development aid, academic and NGO 
community (see Appendix 2). I spoke to approximately ten of these individuals again during 
subsequent field seasons, mainly in order to solicit names of potential key informants. 
Additional key informants were identified using a "snowball sample" method: key 
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informants are asked to name additional useful key informants until such time as no new 
recommendations are forthcoming (Babbie 1989, 268). In addition, I asked my host institute 
in Viet Nam, The National Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities (NCSSH), to 
contribute names of possible interviewees. My eventual key informant sample size was n=64 
(see Appendix 2), although I spoke to an additional 25 individuals and decided they were 
unsuitable due to their lack of knowledge about EIA capacity-building. I interviewed key 
informants both internal and external to my EIA capacity-building case studies, 
predominantly from one of the following categories: 
• Expatriate development aid agency officials; 
• Vietnamese government officials; 
• Vietnamese academics (particularly those with interests in environmental and 
sustainable development planning); 
• Expatriate international non-governmental organisation staff (particularly those 
with interests in the environment and impact assessment), and; 
• Expatriate international consulting firm staff involved in environmental protection 
activities in Viet Nam. 
Most key informants were located in Hanoi (n=49), reflecting its importance as the centre of 
government, a site of numerous academic institutions involved in EIA, and the centre for 
development aid activity in Viet Nam. I conducted other key informant interviews with 
individuals based in Ho Chi Minh City (n=4) or countries other than VietNam (n=ll). Of 
the 64 interviewees, approximately one third were Vietnamese nationals (n=23) while the 
remainder were expatriates with working experience and knowledge of Viet Nam ranging 
from 'minimal' to 'extensive'. All unstandardised interviews were recorded and transcribed, or 
transcribed directly. 
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To counterbalance skepticism about the replicability and validity of unstandardised 
interviewing, I generated a set of question "themes" corresponding to Research Objectives l-
4 (see Appendix l). These served as a general list from which questions were drawn during 
each interview. These themes were adjusted throughout the course of the research as new 
themes emerged from the commentary provided by key informants. Such an approach 
reflects my understanding of the benefits of combining an etic analysis (an imposed frame of 
reference) with an emic analysis (working within the frame of reference of those being 
studied) (Fielding and Fielding 1986). 
I .5.6.3 Direct Observation (Participant Observation) 
Direct observation is a useful component of research which, in addition to being a 
source of data, can assist in the theory-building activities that are the hallmarks of good field 
research (Babbie 1989). I used direct observation in a number of ways: 
• To observe development projects important to understanding the history of EIA in Viet 
Nam (e.g. Hoa Binh dam); 
• To observe development projects subjected to, and subsequently approved, under Viet 
Nam's environmental impact assessment requirements (e.g. Hanel electronics 
manufacturing plant, Tan Thuan export processing zone and Ho Chi Minh Port); 
• To observe development projects excluded from the EIA process by EIA regulations (e.g. 
the small-scale but collectively numerous and extensive tourism developments ringing Ha 
Long bay); 
• To participate in and observe EIA capacity-building activities carried out by development 
aid agencies (e.g. workshops, training sessions and field training activities). 
The overall purpose of including direct observation as a data collection method was to gain a 
personal awareness and understanding of the types of development(s) included and excluded 
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in the Vietnamese EIA process. I recorded my observations through field notes, photos, and 
sketch maps. The direct observation of development projects and capacity-building activities 
proved to be a fertile source of additional key informant interview questions and 
conversation themes. 
1.5.6.4 Historical Analysis; 
Any attempt to conduct research on current policy instruments such as EIA requires 
at least a "modest review of immediately preceding events" since "current policies can only 
be fully understood by examining their evolution" (Pal 1987, 29). In this study, I used 
historical analysis to trace the special context in which EIA emerged in Viet Nam and the 
contribution this has made to the design of EIA procedures. The historical overview also 
revealed the early need for EIA capacity-building in VietNam, and helped explain the role of 
EIA capacity-building programmes in influencing the EIA model that is evolving in the 
country. 
Historical analysis is defined as "a study of the relationships among issues that have 
influenced the past, continue to influence the present, and will certainly affect the future" 
(Berg 1995, 162). Its major contribution lies in its ability to establish a research baseline or 
background of historical facts upon which current research can be built (Babbie 1989, 
Marshall and Rossman 1989). Historical analysis of multiple cases helps to verify 
observations: if several historical sources point to the same conclusions. confidence in the 
research is increased (Babbie 1989). In the interest of placing bounds on the research, I 
concentrated my analysis on the period following 1986 when the Doi Moi or "renovation" 
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strategy of national development was first introduced in Viet Nam. The history of this period 
revealed the actors (individuals, agencies, institutions), significant events, and key 
developments that have affected the model of EIA currently in use in Viet Nam 
I used both primary and secondary data in the historical analysis. Primary data were 
generated from key informant interviews, while secondary data were derived from the 
sources mentioned previously. There has been an explosion of development aid programmes 
in Viet Nam, so there is presently a wealth of English-language documentation summarising 
the past and present state of the Vietnamese environment, social conditions, and development 
planning institutions. T~ese documents were key sources for my historical analysis. 
1.5.6.5 Content Analysis 
Content analysis can be defined as the systematic empirical description of the 
intentions, problem definition, goals and instruments contained within artifacts of social 
communication (after Pal 1987, Berg 1995). One may apply content analysis to virtually any 
form of communication (Babbie 1989) but the analysis should be based upon an explicit 
sampling frame or "analytical criteria" developed beforehand. The most common output from 
content analysis is descriptive statistical data (i.e. the relative proportions and frequencies of 
various themes found within the communication) which are useful in corroborating or 
challenging other research results. Although content analysis is usually considered a 
quantitative research method, it may range from narrowly-defined quantification (i.e. 
counting the frequency with which specific words or phrases appear) to a more broadly-
conceived approach combining quantitative and qualitative methods (i.e. determining the 
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presence or absence of themes, topics, or symbols related to analytical criteria). I used 
content analysis of the latter form throughout the study. 
In order to reflect "best practice" (Babbie 1989, Berg 1995), I analysed both 'manifest' 
content (words or themes which are obviously present) and latent' content (themes and topics 
which are found to be present through an interpretative reading of the material). The 
analytical criteria used are presented in Chapter Four (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). I derived these 
criteria from the seven themes identified in Table l.l. After an initial pilot-test on one project 
document, I modified the criteria used in the final analytical framework. 
I applied content analysis to a total of 16 development aid agency programme 
documents (including design documents, activity reports, workshop reports, and post-project 
assessments) produced by the 9 EIA capacity-building programmes. In each of 16 
documents, I identified and analysed commentary pertaining to the model of EIA being 
promoted by EIA capacity-building projects. All commentary which did not pertain to EIA 
models was ignored. Documents ranged in length from 8 pages to over 700 pages5. Each 
sentence of EIA-related commentary was considered to be a single 'recording unit' for 
content analysis purposes. For example, one sentence from the VCEP project inception 
document indicated the project would assist in strengthening "tracking the EIA reports for 
new projects ... " (ESSNSNC Lavalin 1996a, 2-45 ) and was marked down in the content 
analysis sheets as an example of promotion of EIA at a project level (rather than at 
5 After commentary which did not pertain to EIA models was excluded the 700+ page document was reduced to 131 pages 
of analysed texL 
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programme or policy levels). Difficulties encountered in the use of content analysis for this 
study included: 
• documents analysed were of differing length, specificity and purpose (thus, there was no 
standardised unit of analysis); 
• the necessary subjectivity of content analysis designed to tap latent' content reduces 
potential replicability; 
• capacity-building programmes often changed between design and implementation stages 
(affecting the actual content of the programme and the model of EIA promoted); 
1.6 Study Scope and Applications 
This research was conducted entirely in one country, Viet Nam. I examine the 
historical antecedents to EIA in the country, the initial implementation of EIA, and the more 
recent addition of EIA capacity-building programmes conducted by development aid 
agencies. Because the research is situated in the particular cultural, temporal and political 
context of Viet Nam, some of the conclusions drawn from the research may have limited 
relevance outside the country. However, since development aid agencies typically apply a 
fairly standard programme format across a number of developing countries, [ am able to 
draw a number of conclusions and policy guidelines that transcend the VietNam context, and 
may be generalisable to other developing countries. 
This analysis draws extensively on only one developing country's experience with 
environmental impact assessment. My findings may therefore have limited applicability and 
generalisability beyond Viet Nam's borders to other developing countries with similar 
developmental contexts. However, the implications and conclusions drawn from the research 
are most directly applicable to VietNam alone. The research was also limited by the time 
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and resources available to the researcher: when these limitations combine with observations 
of the proliferation and complexity of EIA capacity-building programmes in Viet Nam, 
omissions and misinterpretations are inevitable. The research was carried out over a five-year 
period of particular dynamism in the country's EIA implementation, 1994-1998, and research 
results are therefore unlikely to be replicable five or ten years from now. Lastly, the sources 
of data used in the research (secondary sources, interviews, participant observation) were 
limited to those available in English. Valuable Vietnamese-language commentary was 
undoubtedly left out of consideration. However, the researcher was constantly impressed by 
the English language capabilities demonstrated by Vietnamese key informants or their 
translators6, and thus, language limitations were not judged to be of major concern. 
1.7 Links Between Research Objectives and Research Methods 
L. The first research objective ("To describe and explain the way in which the Vietnamese 
development planning context affected the initial choice of EIA model ") was achieved 
primarily through the historical analysis of secondary data, although additional insight was 
also gained through the use of unstandardised interviews. 
2. The second research objective ("To document and describe the conceptual model(s) 
underlying EIA capacity-building programmes operating in Viet Nam ") was achieved 
primarily through analysis of secondary data sources generated by EIA capacity-building 
programmes. This was augmented in some cases by data from direct observation. 
6 Initially the researcher had anticipated employing a Vietnamese local to assist with translation and interpretation during 
key informant interviews. However. in every case. the key informant was either sufficiently skilled and comfortable 
speaking English or provided their own translator. English language competency was suggested by one key informant as a 
crucial means by which Vietnamese institutions ensure successful interactions with development aid agencies and increase 
their share of financial aid. 
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3. The third research objective ("To determine the aims of, rationale for, response to and 
outcomes of EIA capacity-building programmes carried out by development aid agencies in 
VietNam") was achieved primarily through the use of unstandardised interviewing. and to a 
lesser extent, through the use of content analysis applied to secondary data sources. 
4. The fourth research objective ("To develop specific policy guidelines on capacity-building 
programming which can lead to greater acceptance of the planning model of EIA in Viet 
Nam and other similar development contexts") was achieved through the analysis of research 
results from all research methods. 
1.8 Ethical Considerations 
The main ethical considerations of this research were concentrated in the key 
informant interview phase since other research methods involved either secondary data 
already in the public domain or unobtrusive observation. Key informants were highly 
educated Vietnamese or expatriate academics, government officials or development agency 
staff, and thus, informed consent was obtained verbally or in writing as was deemed 
culturally appropriate. All key informant interviews conformed to the University of British 
Columbia and SSHRC Ethical Review guidelines: key informants were informed of the 
research topic when they were first contacted (key informants were given a verbal or written 
explanation of the research before each interview request), and all interview subjects were 
given the opportunity to consent to or decline interviews. In a few instances key informants 
specifically asked that their names not be linked to their comments or opinions, and all 
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informants were assured that names and other identifying features (e.g. specific job titles or 
specific job levels linked to institution names) would be deleted from all research 
publications, conference presentations and this dissertation. Following submission of the 
final research document, an executive summary will be produced and mailed to a range of 
key informants in Viet Nam. 
1.9 Dissertation overview 
Chapter Two traces the range of perspectives found in academic literature on EIA in 
developing countries. The first part of the chapter reviews selected literature on 
environmental impact assessment, concentrating on that which: traces the history and spread 
of EIA to developing countries; evaluates the successes and failures of EIA 'as practised' 
internationally; addresses the question "what conceptual model of EIA is most appropriate 
for developing countries?", or; examines the experience to date with EIA capacity-building. 
Divergence of opinion is identified around seven major themes, and the argument is made 
that these themes usefully describe two opposing conceptual models of EIA. the "technical" 
and "planning" models. The overall purpose of the chapter is to establish an analytical 
framework for research on EIA capacity-building programmes in Viet Nam. 
Chapter Three introduces the context within with environmental impact assessment 
currently operates in Viet Nam. Viet Nam's development planning challenges are 
summarised, and a historical analysis of the development and implementation of EIA in Viet 
Nam (and the model of EIA practiced to date) is presented. The transition of EIA's 
emergence from academic concept to implemented reality is traced, and the limitations of 
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VietNam's current process are outlined. The chapter then introduces a series of nine EIA 
capacity-building programmes sponsored by development aid in the country since 1994. 
Chapter Four presents results from the analysis of three main bodies of data 
gathered during the course of field research: 1) key informant interviews; 2) documents 
issued by development aid agency EIA capacity-building programmes, and; 3) participant 
observation of EIA capacity-building programme activities. Research results are organised 
around the seven themes which comprise the analytical framework identified in Chapter 
Two. Factors influencing the model of EIA promoted by capacity-building programmes are 
then identified, and the positive and negative responses to such programmes by Vietnamese 
counterparts are explored. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main research 
findings. 
Chapter Five is a discussion and interpretation of the research results presented in 
Chapter Four, and where appropriate, links back to the body of academic literature traced in 
Chapter Two. The chapter opens with a discussion of the influence and successes EIA 
capacity-building programmes have had in Viet Nam. This is followed by discussion of 
'unmet needs', or the capacity-building yet to be undertaken in order to stimulate the 
emergence of a planning model of EIA. The chapter then traces the 'roots of resistance' to a 
planning model in both development aid agencies and Vietnamese counterparts. The chapter 
confronts the question of whether the model of EIA promoted by aid agencies is likely to 
assist the Vietnamese government in achieving its 1992 UNCED sustainable development 
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goals. The chapter closes with a discussion of whether research results are specific to Viet 
Nam or applicable more widely to other developing countries. 
Chapter Six highlights the implications of the research, which are grouped into three 
main categories: L) implications for the VietNam government; 2) academic implications, and 
3) implications for development aid agencies. The chapter concludes with the presentation of 
guidelines for EIA capacity-building programmes in developing countries, which are 
designed to assist aid agencies in promoting a more complete 'planning model of EIA' in Viet 
Nam and other developing countries. The chapter ends with a call for aid agencies to 
reconceptualise EIA capacity-building as a means to transform the development planning 
processes of developing countries, and in doing so, position EIA as a means by which to 
stimulate sustainable development. 
Chapter Two 
CHAPTER TWO· THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
2.1 Origin of EIA in Developed Countries 
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Environmental impact assessment emerged out of the United States where it was first 
recognised that development planning procedures failed to account for adverse 
environmental externalities of development. Thus, the so-called 'rational/comprehensive' 
style of planning then in vogue was recognised as being less-than-comprehensive in practice, 
casting the rationality of decisions into doubt (House 1976, Rodgers 1976, Hundloe et. al. 
1990, Smith 1993, Ortolano and Shepherd 1995, Vanclay and Bronstein 1995). As part of the 
US National Environmental Protection Act (US-NEPA) of 1969, EIA was cast as an action-
forcing mechanism by which government agencies could "ascertain the probable 
environmental consequences of their actions" (Caldwell 1989a, lO) and so these could be 
"modified or redirected" toward more benign alternatives. The basic purpose of EIA under 
US-NEP A was to "broaden and strengthen the role of foresight in governmental planning and 
decision making" (Caldwell 1989b, 7). Assessment was to be conducted primarily through 
the "data and interpretations derived from science" and would, as a secondary benefit, 
systematise "public planning in a democratic society" (Caldwell 1989a, 26). 
The development of EIA under US-NEP A is best seen as a context- and time-specific 
response to problems identified within one country's development planning context, namely, 
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the United States in the late 1960's. Out of this context, the design of EIA was influenced by 
rational planning theory, reductionist and linear cause-effect thinking, existing approaches to 
technology assessment, risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis (Caldwell l989b), the rise 
in public environmental awareness and activism, the wording of the US Constitution, and the 
US tendency to rely on litigation to determine the meaning of laws. One example of the 
influence of 'context' is related to the dominant planning approach in vogue at the time EIA 
emerged. ln the years leading up to the emergence of US-NEPA, government had become 
staffed with an ever-expanding range of technical experts advising decision-makers on 
increasingly complex development schemes. The predominant attitude about development 
planning was that it was largely a technical exercise, requiring technical expertise to provide 
technical solutions (McAllister 1990). Although the late 1960's saw a backlash to this form of 
planning and a rise in calls for citizen involvement, technocratic planning approaches 
nonetheless held the dominant position within the US society and heavily influenced the 
form of EIA that emerged under US-NEP A. 
Although difficult to describe exhaustively, the developmental and planning context 
within which EIA first emerged would include: a democratic society with an independent 
judiciary, rising public concern for environmental and social justice issues, large resource 
'hinterlands' punctuated by a highly urbanised society, one of the most economically 
prosperous societies in the world, a sophisticated environmental monitoring and data 
manipulation capacity, and, a society in which there was an expanding faith in the capacity 
for scientific/technical forms of planning. Out of this context, EIA emerged as a rational, 
technical planning tool employing the assumptions and procedures of science while 
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providing for new. albeit limited, avenues for public involvement in public sector decision-
making. 
Although EIA emerged out of the specific political, legal, bureaucratic and 
developmental context of the United States circa the late 1960s, the same basic model was 
used by a host of industrialised nations, states and provinces as they rushed to "express their 
imitative approval" (Rees and Davis 1978, 601). This model, the technical model of EIA, 
structured EIA as: 1) a technical product and information input to rational planning 
(Hutchings 1978); 2) a reactive analysis of proposed development projects (Canter 1977, 
Boothroyd and Rees 1984, Rees 1988); 3) an application of scientific ecological knowledge 
to decision-making (Beanlands and Duinker 1983), and: 4) a predictive tool accurate enough 
to allow the rational selection of the best of a series of project or locational alternatives 
(Maclaren and Whitney 1985, Maragos and Carpenter 1990). Under the technical model of 
EIA, the focus is on the technical 'product> rather than the planning process within which EIA 
operates (Boothroyd and Rees 1984). 
2.2 The Spread of EIA to Developing Countries and Role of Development Aid 
Environmental impact assessment might have been confined to industrialised nations 
but for the pressure of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) concerned with the 
environmental and social impacts of development aid programmes. NGO concerns led to a 
successful US court challenge in 1975 which forced the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to comply with US-NEPA requirements even though USAID's area 
of operations was almost exclusively outside the United States (Printz 1978, Robinson 1992, 
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Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). By the late 1970s, non-governmental organisations had 
pressured many other bilateral and multilateral development aid agencies to adopt 
increasingly formal environmental and social reviews of proposed aid programmes. Other 
bilateral development aid agencies around the world were forced to adhere to their country's 
EIA requirements extra-territorially. In 1983, NGOs from developed and developing 
countries launched a coordinated effort to stimulate additional policy, operations and lending 
reforms among development aid agencies, particularly the World Bank (Haeuber 1992). 
Major responses by aid agencies to this effort have been the creation of environmental 
departments, direct lending for environment-themed aid projects, and the development and 
use of EIA procedures for aid programmes worldwide (Haeuber 1992, World Bank 1996). 
The examination of development aid projects for likely impacts on the environment is now 
" 
standard practice among most aid agencies (World Bank 1996). 
At the same time that development aid agencies began subjecting their own projects 
to EIA, the agencies found a new policy mandate: to assist developing countries in 
establishing and strengthening the capacity to conduct environmental impact assessment. In 
1976, USAID adopted the official policy goal of assisting developing countries in 
"strengthening their appreciation and ability to evaluate potential environmental effects of 
their development strategies and projects" (Printz 1978, 47), and a similar goal was 
eventually adopted as an amendment to the US Foreign Assistance Act (Welles 1995). The 
late 1980s saw major swings in policy on the part of the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank and bilateral donors toward sustainability initiatives such as EIA (MacAndrews 1994). 
The UNDP's Environmental Strategy and Action Plan set out the goal of enhancing the 
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"institutional and managerial capacity of developing countries to formulate and implement 
policies that promote sustainable development" (Malik 1995, 97). Several European bilateral 
aid agencies adopted the mandate of "enlarging the capacities of the developing countries to 
cope with their own environmental problems", particularly through impact assessment 
(Simonis 1990, 130). Similarly, shortly after the World Bank established its own NEPA-style 
operational directive on environmental assessment (World Bank l99la, World Bank 1991b, 
World Bank l99lc), an internal environmental review stated the need for the World Bank 
programming " ... to strengthen borrowers' capacity to conduct effective environmental 
assessments" (World Bank 1992, 15). The Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) has incorporated EIA into its internal programming since the late 1980's (Robinson 
1992), and in the 1990s, has begun to include EIA capacity-building into its foreign aid 
programming. By 1994, The Asian Development Bank had funded over 210 institutional 
strengthening and technical aid projects related to environmental management, some 
specifically related to EIA capacity-building, and this trend has continued to the present 
(ADB 1994a, Haigler-Bailly 1996). 
These activities notwithstanding, it is worthwhile e~amining further how EIA has (or 
has not) meshed with the development planning conte~ts found in developing countries. It is 
argued here that the poor results from initial attempts to implement EIA in developing 
countries (i.e. the lack of significant reductions in negative environmental or social impacts 
of development), has created the rationale for subsequent development aid capacity-building 
programmes. This idea is explored in the following sections. 
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2.2.1 Development Planning Context as an Influence on EIA 
Within the literature on EIA and environmental planning in developing countries are 
many attempts to generalise about the development planning context typically found in 
developing countries, and the effect such a context has had on the operation of EIA and 
subsequent EIA capacity-building efforts. The following paragraphs are a summary of 
commentary provided by 26 authors who have explored these themes (Abel and Stocking 
1981, Murphy 1982, Webber 1983, Kennedy 1985, Mayda 1985, Smith 1985, Lohani 1986, 
Roque 1986, Towle 1987, Cartwright 1989, Adams 1990, Henry 1990, Rickson et. al. 1990, 
Atkinson 1991a, Kolo 1991, Turnham 1991, World Bank 1991a, Bisset 1992, Escobar 1992, 
Biswas 1993, Ebisemiju 1993, Wood 1993, Appiah-Opoku 1994b, MacAndrews 1994, 
MacDonald 1994, Onorio and Morgan 1995). 
In general, institutional, administrative and management structures relating to the 
environment are weak and underfunded in developing countries, and there are significant 
shortages of personnel trained in environmental planning. Although existing legislation for 
environmental planning may be sophisticated?, enforcement, and the commitment to 
enforcement, is usually weak to non-existent. Informal processes allowing EIA requirements 
to be circumvented are common. Ecological and social data pertinent to EIA are lacking or 
inaccurate, and existing data are not shared widely. Data processing, storage, and retrieval 
capacities are generally very limited. The combination of high foreign debt loads and 
widespread poverty dictates that the most important concern of governments and individuals 
1 Although environmental legislation may be sophisticated. Kennedy (1985, 288) has cautioned that, typically. such 
legislation does not form a comprehensive framework. Large legal gaps usually exist in the frameworks of most developing 
countries. and new legislation is added on a piecemeal basis whenever specific problems have been identified. 
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in developing countries is the unwavering commitment to economic growth, and 
environmental concerns are poorly developed by comparison. 
Decision-making processes associated with development planning, often a legacy of 
elitist colonial bureaucratic structures, are usually highly centralised and compartmentalised. 
This typically results in the concentration of authority among a small group of powerful elite 
housed in a highly sectoral governance structure, which often leads to power struggles, \urf 
protection', and resistance to integrated or coordinated planning. The formal training of most 
development planning bureaucrats is in economic or technical/scientific disciplines, 
reinforcing the tendency to view environmental planning as a technical or scientific input to 
planning, rather than participatory process of planning. As well, public participation in 
planning is commonly viewed as inefficient, time-consuming or politically dangerous. In 
general, the development planning processes of developing countries are heavily influenced 
by powerful elites: feasibility studies are routinely 'corrected' to reflect more positively on the 
politically-preferred option, corruption and bribery are important decision-making factors, 
and the final siting and approval of development initiatives are regularly determined by 
political rather than environmental considerations. Decentralised forms of planning, the 
devolution of planning authority, and the involvement of the public in scrutinising or 
affecting governmental decision-making, are even less acceptable to developing country 
governments than their counterparts in developed countries. Into this development planning 
context can also be added the generally poor state of knowledge about the impacts of 
development disturbances in tropical ecosystems. 
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In such a context, environmental planning initiatives such as EIA have typically 
occupied a marginalised position in the development planning processes of most developing 
countries, being assigned a mitigatory rather than strategic role in the planning process, and 
have usually been radically underfunded. Reflecting the primacy of development and 
economic growth concerns, environmental concern is generally low in both mass society and 
the development planning bureaucracy, and there is a perception that development will 
necessarily involve environmental degradation. Crucially, environmental planning processes 
such as EIA, in order to integrate easily with the development planning status quo of 
developing countries, have typically been conceived of as a technical/scientific, rather than 
participatory, exercise. 
2.2.2 The Aid Response: EIA Capacity-Building 
With EIA generally occupying a marginalised and ineffective position in developing 
countries, development aid agencies have recognised the need for EIA capacity-building as a 
new development mandate (Malik 1995, Robinson 1992, Simonis 1990, World Bank 1992). 
This new mandate, and the model of EIA used internally for aid agency projects, are both key 
to an understanding of the spread of EIA to developing countries8. Many developing 
countries, under pressure from development aid agencies and wanting to mimic western 
approaches to development (Appiah-Opoku 1994b), have enacted their own EIA 
requirements, but according to Wandesforde-Smith and Moreira (1985) have largely based 
these on the technical model first designed under US-NEPA. In addition to their role as 
8 A partial list of development agencies which both use EIA for their own projects. and suppon EIA capacity-building 
programmes in developing counlries includes: The Asian Development Bank (AOB). Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The World Bank. The German 
Development Aid Agency (GTl),The Swedish Development Aid Agency (SIDA), and the OECD Development Assistance 
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agents of pressure, development aid agencies have provided much of the financial and 
technical EIA assistance, and have prepared a host of EIA guidelines for use both within the 
agency and as a procedural framework for developing countries (see for example: UNEP 
1988, UN-ESCAP 1990, The World Bank 1991a-c, Asian Development Bank 1993b)9. 
Significantly, most development aid is conceived of in the form of projects, and the model of 
EIA used to assess such aid is highly project-focused. 
By the early 1980s, the "combination of pressure and assistance" from foreign aid had 
produced the expected results: developing countries, particularly in Asia and Latin America, 
began to adopt EIA within their development planning and regulatory frameworks 
(Wandesforde-Smith and Moreira 1985, 224)10. As of 1991 Ebisemiju (1993, 248) 
documented 19 developing countries with formal EIA systems, and in 1995 Ortolano and 
Shepherd (1995, 3) estimated that more than half the countries in the world employed EIA on 
at least an ad hoc basis. For the most part, developing countries: " ... have not had to define for 
themselves the problems for which EIA is presumably the solution; aid agencies and others 
have done this for them" (Wandesforde-Smith and Moreira 1985, 224). Most commonly, a 
technical model of EIA. bearing strong resemblance to US-NEPA approaches, has been 
transferred to developing countries and "it has not seemed important .. .to confront the 
question of what it takes, apart from will and commitment on the part of those at the top of 
Group. 
9 Such guidelines are based largely on a technical model of EIA and are formulated as generic approaches to EIA to be used 
in all contexts. 
10 Others have suggested that Latin American countries have been slow to adopt EIA. Robinson (1992). in an international 
review of EIA. noted that many Latin American countries (as well as those in the Middle East and Africa) had not adopted 
EIA. This contradictory analysis is likely the result of definitional issues (e.g .• are Central American countries included or 
excluded under both authors·l.atin America· designations? Are EIA systems judged to be present by both authors if they are 
not formally legislated?). 
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the system, to make EIA work in the developing world" (Wandesforde-Smith and Moreira 
1985, 225). 
2.3 General Benefits of EIA for Developing Countries 
There is little doubting the importance of EIA as a concept. .. The central 
question is how EIA is made to work within the established political and 
institutional frameworks in different countries and, in tum, what effect these 
frameworks will have upon the effective implementation of EIA. 
(Clark and Herington 1988, 4) 
Although the literature is not always explicit about the model of EIA that is being 
discussed, and there is danger in generalising about all developing countries, there is a "near 
consensus that environmental impact assessment and review processes are essential" for 
developing countries (Leonen and Santiago 1993, 172). This support has resulted from 
observations about general benefits linked to the presence of EIA in a country's development 
planning system: these benefits transcend the model of EIA chosen, although differing 
models are likely to confer greater or lesser benefits. 
Support for EIA starts from the almost universally held position that some level of 
economic growth and development is needed in developing countries in order to achieve 
ideals of sustainability (Biswas and Agarwal 1992, Goodland and Daly 1992a, Devlin and 
Yap 1994, Goodland 1994, Sankoh 1996). Unlike developed countries, with regard to which 
some critics contend that present levels of economic activity and material consumption must 
be reduced in order to achieve sustainability (Wackemagel and Rees 1996, 33), the 
legitimacy of the need for actions to stimulate at least a minimal level of growth and 
development in developing countries is hardly questioned. With the legitimacy of growth and 
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development established, EIA is generally seen as the single best "operational tool to 
approach sustainability in projects so far available" (Goodland and Daly 1992a, 38)11. 
Four general benefits of adding EIA to a country's development planning and 
regulatory framework have been identified in the literature: I) as a means of enhancing 
resource use efficiencies; 2) as a way of making progress towards sustainability goals; 3) as a 
means of influencing and guiding investment, and; 4) as a means of fostering social learning. 
These are explored in tum below. 
2.3.1 Enhances Resource Use Efficiencies 
The first benefit of EIA is its potential to induce resource use efficiencies, by 
reducing the environmental degradation caused by policies, plans and projects meant to 
stimulate growth and development (Hollick 1986). The literature generally recognises that if 
the resource base of a developing country (upon which a majority of citizens, especially 
rural-dwellers, depend) is not used in an efficient manner, acceptable minimum standards of 
living may never be achieved, and environmental degradation linked to poverty may never be 
arrested. The literature also indicates a general sense that, prior to the introduction of EIA, 
the planning regulations and controls of most developing countries are inadequate to the task 
of ensuring resource use efficiencies (Ebisemiju 1993). One of the primary ways in which 
EIA is seen to contribute to resource use efficiencies is through the "internalization of 
environmental externalities" (Goodland and Daly 1992b, 70). In theory, this occurs when 
EIA is successful in anticipating negative environmental externalities (such as habitat 
II Although Goodland and Daly referred to EIA at a project level. they acknowledged that their position reflected the 
limitations and biases of the World Bank. and that developing countries should be responsible for the enactment of "macro-
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degradation, species declines or increased pollution), and the costs of such externalities are 
factored into decision-making about development, rather than simply ignoring them. 
2.3.2 Sustainability Tool 
A second benefit of EIA identified in the literature is its potential to translate 
s11stainability principles into strategy and action (Holtz 1990, Sadler and Jacobs 1990, 
George 1999). EIA is seen as providing an important, albeit reformist, means by which to 
intervene positively in existing economic and political systems (Clark and Herington 1988), 
and to provide a bridge between present forms of development and those envisaged under 
sustainable development ideals (Doberstein 1994). Most developing countries have serious 
domestic ecological problems and long-term change in developmental patterns is thus needed 
for a transition to sustainability. Yet radical change is antithetical to most government 
bureaucracies, and mechanisms such as EIA can provide incremental change while being 
politically acceptable. One example of this is EIA's tendency to foster more cooperative, 
integrative and intersectoral approaches to planning (Hollick 1986, Bartlett 1989, McNeely 
1990, Robinson 1992, Goodland and Daly L992a). This is of particular benefit to developing 
countries, where a multitude of government ministries, non-governmental organisations and 
individual actors are involved in overall development planning. Goodland (1994, 286) 
referred to the multitude of conditions required by sustainability as 'enabling conditions', and 
it is in this light that EIA has its strongest support in the literature. Impact assessment is not 
seen in the literature as the one and only means by which to ensure sustainability in 
developing countries, rather, it is viewed as but one in a long list of enabling conditions for 
sustainability. EIA, as a "general strategy of policy making and administration", (Bartlett 
levelw approaches to EIA and sustainability similar to those suggested by the World Bank (Goodland and Daly l992b. 68). 
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1989, 1) is thus viewed as pragmatic instrument for long-term institutional adaptation, reform 
and change (Lim 1985). 
2.3.3 Influences Development Investment 
A third important benefit of EIA for developing countries is the ability of the impact 
assessment process to either control or attract development investment. Impact assessment 
remains one of the few environmental policy instruments that can directly challenge private 
sector investments at the level at which they are typically proposed to developing countries-
the project level. The increasing globalisation of private sector investment capital has led to a 
situation where the presence or absence of environmental policies and controls are a 
significant factor in the siting, level and nature of private sector development investment 
(Baker 1987, Biswas 1993, Leonen and Santiago 1993). Thus, developing countries are well 
served, over the long term, by the application of environmental policies and regulations 
which can remove regulatory laxity as an investment decision-making factor. As well, much 
of the investment capital for developing countries comes from development aid funding 
sources. With development-aid funding becoming increasingly conditional upon the 
completion of EIA studies (Wandesforde-Smith and Moreira 1985), the use of EIA in 
developing countries is simply a pragmatic response to aid conditionalityl2 and a means by 
which developing countries ensure that development aid flows continue. 
12 Clark and Herington (1988, I) noted that development assistance agencies subject to wgrowing political debarew by 
organised pressure groups have responded by reforming their procedures to wpennit explicit treatment of environmental 
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2.3.4 Fosters Social Learning 
A fourth potential benefit identified in the literature is the contribution of EIA to 
social learning (Rees and Boothroyd 1987, Bartlett 1989, Caldwell 1989b, Boothroyd 1995, 
Wehler et. al. 1995). Social learning has been described as "the process by which changes in 
the social condition occur- particularly changes in popular awareness and changes in how 
individuals see their private interests linked with the shared interests of their fellow citizens" 
(Wehler et. al. 1995, 445). Social learning occurs largely as a result of public involvement 13 
in the EIA process, and is an especially important benefit for the relatively non-participatory 
and closed decision-making systems of developing countries. EIA can contribute to social 
learning when it reveals "the insufficiency of the information upon which society and 
government often propose to act" (Caldwell 1989b, 13). In some cases, social learning may 
be illusory: concern and learning about the environment may not change significantly, but 
concern for and learning about the need to include environmental concerns in development 
planning may show up as de facto social learning. However. even if social learning is of this 
nature, public involvement stimulated by EIA is seen as one way to confirm or refute 
whether the proposed public project or private investment matches a public need, or 
contributes positively to public gains (Ahmad and Sammy 1985). In contributing to social 
learning, EIA is seen, at minimum, as sensitising, educating and raising awareness about the 
unintended negative environmental and social impacts of development amongst bureaucrats, 
political leaders, development proponents and the general public (Renwick 1988, Briassoulis 
factors in decision making". largely through environmental impact assessment requirements. 
13 Public involvement has been defined by Robens (1995. 224) as "a process for involving the public in the decision-
making process of an organization" which "can be brought about through either consultation or panicipation. the key 
difference being the degree to which those involved in the process are able to influence. share. or control the decision 
making". Robens distinguished between consultation. which includes education. information sharing and negotiation as part 
of a goal of better organisational decision-making. and panicipation, which actually brings the public into the decision-
making process. His definitions and distinctions are applied throughout this dissertation. 
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1989, Slocombe 1993, McDonald and Brown 1995). This sensitisation is thought to occur 
gradually over time due to repeated and systematic demands for the consideration of 
environmental and social side-effects in development proposals. 
As a component of social learning, the process of EIA has been described as 
potentially providing "more significant (benefits) than the product" (La Prestre 1995 in Malik 
1995, 101). This is particularly so in its role as a catalyst in " ... redistributing influence among 
the actors involved in conceiving and executing development plans" (Wandesforde-Smith et. 
al. 1985, 204). Ortolano and Shepherd (1995, 8-9) were specific in citing instances where 
EIA contributed to social learning, resulting in the withdrawal of unsound projects, the 
legitimation of sound projects, the selection of improved project location. the reformulation 
of plans (and planning processes), and the redefinition of goals and responsibilities of project 
proponents. Although difficult to document empirically, some authors also link the social 
learning benefit of EIA to the emergence of less environmentally- and socially-damaging 
projects at the design stage (Hollick 1986. Renwick 1988, Burdge 1990, McDonald and 
Brown 1995). 
These four general benefits are exceedingly important for developing countries: as 
development proceeds, EIA forces a wide constituency to incorporate environmental and 
social concerns into decision-making frameworks. Impact assessment also stimulates 
learning about the need for more comprehensive planning reforms beyond the decision-
making arena directly affected by its procedural requirements (Briassoulis 1989). Prior to the 
advent of EIA in developing countries, large scale projects were often implemented without 
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any environmental consideration. Just as often, such projects proceeded even though local 
residents did not express a need for the project, were not consulted about details of the 
project, and did not benefit directly from the project's operation. Ultimately, much of the 
literature on EIA in developing countries agrees that EIA can be, and is, an influential means 
by which to guide and affect development policy. 
2.4 Conceptual Dualism in Environmental Impact Assessment 
Where divergence is strongest within the literature on EIA in developing countries is 
in normative disagreements about the theory and concepts that should underpin EIA practice. 
Thus, although EIA is largely accepted as a beneficial planning procedure for developing 
countries, the most appropriate model of EIA for developing countries remains hotly 
debated. 
There is an abundant literature supporting the transfer to developing countries of a 
model of EIA similar to that first employed in the developed countries where its use was 
pioneered. Referred to hereafter as the 'technical' model of EIA (after Boothroyd and Rees 
1984, 1), impact assessment is conceived of as a rational/technical product, using scientific 
techniques and skilled technicians to predict, preferably through quantitative means, the 
environmental and social impacts of a proposed development project. This model: 
... shares the core concepts central to traditional models of planning processes. 
As in the comprehensive-rational planning model, the procedural structure of 
(the technical model of) EIA includes analysis of the situation, goal setting, 
generation of alternatives and evaluation of consequences ... 
(Lim 1985, 135) 
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The literature supporting the use of the technical modell4 of EIA in developing 
countries is based on the dual perception that the model has been successful in achieving its 
goals in a developed country context, and that these successes can be replicated in 
developing countries. 
Although the technical model depicts EIA as a largely rational/scientific product, 
critics point out that EIA also constitutes a value-laden sociopolitical process within 
development planning (Boothroyd and Rees 1984, Smith 1993, Lawrence 1994a, Sankoh 
1996). Critics of the technical model argue that, particularly in developing countries, such a 
model tends to foster elitist and technocratic planning. As well, they argue that the model 
fosters planning which is reactive to development proposals and thus, cannot guide the 
overall direction of development toward sustainability. These critics argue that the model can 
only marginally reduce the most egregious components of development. They further argue 
that the model dismisses the often useful environmental knowledge housed within indigenous 
societies, and assumes an ability to predict accurately that is simply not possible given the 
state of knowledge about ecological and social systems. The model is criticised for its 
tendency to analyse environmental, social and economic impacts separately, without an 
holistic attempt to bring these analyses together for final decision-making (Lawrence 1994a). 
In response to these and other criticisms of the technical model of EIA, a relatively 
smaller but growing literature has argued that the technical model is not performing well in 
the context in which it was originally designed to operate and requires reconceptualisation 
14 It should be stressed that. similar to the way in which many planners do not distinguish ·planning• from comprehensive-
mtionat•planning. many EIA pr:ICtitioners see only one model ofEIA. the technical model. 
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before its transfer to developing countries (Berger 1984, Towle 1987, Tester 1989, Appiah-
Opoku 1994a, Jiggins 1995, Sankoh 1996). For the purposes of this dissertation, the 
emerging model advocated by critics has been termed the 'planning' model of EIA (after 
Boothroyd and Rees 1984, and Spaling and Smit 1993). To these critics, EIA requires 
recasting in a planning model which incorporates: 1) a participatory decision-making process 
which promotes equity in development; 2) a proactive and continuing assessment of 
macroscale development directions (e.g. whether development is proceeding towards or away 
from a sustainable path); 3) a planning process that incorporates 'multiple ways of knowing' 
(i.e., indigenous as well as scientific knowledge), and; 4) a planning process with ecological 
and social uncertainty as a central organising feature. The planning model of EIA, unlike the 
technical model, informs the process of development planning continuously, and in addition 
to using rational/comprehensive planning approaches, stresses the benefits of using other 
forms of planning such as participatory planning or advocacy planning. 
Although the 'planning model' of EIA is not yet consistently labeled as such in the 
literature, this dissertation argues that the body of criticism that surrounds the technical 
model of EIA has led to alternative conceptions which comprise an identifiable conceptual 
model. Perhaps just as importantly, this dichotomous conception of models of EIA serves as 
a useful organising feature in discussions of the vast literature pertaining to the design and 
use of EIA procedures, and the smaller literature on its use in developing countries. It also 
serves as a useful analytical framework when conducting empirical research on the EIA 
processes emerging in many developing countries, and the multitude of factors affecting 
these. 
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2.5 EIA Model Determinants 
Notwithstanding general agreements that EIA provides positive benefits for 
developing countries. and occasional misperceptions that EIA is a more or less 
"standardized" process (see Werner 1992, 16). there is a significant divergence of opinion in 
the literature about how EIA should be conceptualised and implemented 15. As introduced in 
Chapter One, this divergence is centred around seven main themes: 
l) Role of EIA in Planning: There is divergence about whether EIA should 
be seen as providing a reactive technical product for use as an input to 
technocratic decision-making, or whether it should be a proactive part of 
the political planning process of developing countries. 
2) Scale of Assessment Activities: There is divergence about whether EIA in 
developing countries should focus on the direct impacts of micro-scale 
'means' of development (i.e., projects). or whether it should be more 
broadly defined to consider secondary impacts and the entire range of 
development planning 'means' and 'ends' (i.e., from the project- and plan-
specific implementation of development policies up to the regional and 
cumulative effects of development policies and programmes). 
3) Knowledge Certainty: There is divergence about whether EIA should 
operate from a position of: knowledge certainty (i.e .• the state of scientific 
knowledge is complete enough to allow accurate predictions and 'rational' 
planning decisions to be made about complex. ecological and societal 
systems), or: knowledge uncertainty (i.e .• the state of knowledge is such 
that accurate predictions are impossible (due to the inherent 
unpredictability of ecological and social systems). implying a cautious. 
experimental and adaptive approach based on assumptions of knowledge 
uncertainty). 
4) Epistemology Underlying EIA: There is divergence about whether EIA 
should be based solely upon 'traditional science' (objective, mechanistic. 
reductionist science as a basis of prediction about ecological and social 
systems) or whether EIA should be based on 'multiple ways of knowing' 
about the environment (which. in addition to traditional science, includes 
indigenous knowledge. needs, values and attitudes). 
15 Much of the literature does not differentiate between developed and developing country contexts. however. the researcher 
has attempted to separate opinion about how EIA should be conceptualised specifically for a developing country context 
from that expressed more generically about the need for EIA reform. 
5) Timing and Length of Assessment- There is divergence about whether 
EIA should be conducted as a one-shot (discrete) study, or as an ongoing 
(continuous) process of planning and environmental management. There 
is also divergence about the point at which EIA activities should begin 
(ranging from 'after the project design stage is finished' to 'as a 
component of project and policy formulation) and end (ranging from 
'after project approval' to 'continuing over the life of the development). 
6) Public Involvement- There is divergence about both the stage at which 
the public should be brought into the EIA process (ranging from \he final 
documentation/presentation stages' to \he earliest possible moment), and 
the level of public involvement in the EIA process (ranging from public 
'persuasion' and 'education', to 'delegated authority' and 'self-
determination). 
7) Planning Theory Basis - There is divergence about whether rational 
comprehensive planning theory should underpin the practice of EIA, or 
whether an alternative planning theory (or a combination of theories) 
should provide guidance. 
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It is suggested here that these seven themes usefully describe and define two opposing 
models of EIA, the 'technical model of EIA' and the 'planning model of EIA'. It should be 
noted that these models are idealised conceptions, and that in practice, combinations 
incorporating aspects of each model can exist. Thus, EIA practice may be based on a 
technical model, yet incorporate a multiple epistemological perspective, or it may be based 
on a planning model yet be applied exclusively to projects. Each of the two models is 
described in detail in the following section. 
2.6 The Technical Model of Environmental Impact Assessment 
The technical model of EIA developed under a technocratic engineering and scientific 
paradigm as a planning tool, where impact assessments would be performed in order to 
quantify, forecast and evaluate the impacts of a proposed project and its alternatives 
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(Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). Despite specifications 16 that EIA should be conducted on all 
significant government and private 'actions' (conceivably ranging from policies and 
programmes to individual plans and projects), the more than 25 years of EIA practice has 
clarified that project-level assessment constitutes the normal application of a technical model 
ofEIA (Rees and Boothroyd 1987, Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). 
2.6.1 Model Characteristics 
A number of other names have been used in the literature to describe what is referred 
to in this dissertation as the technical model, and listing these names provides an appropriate 
first attempt at describing its character. The technical model has been referred to as: 
"technological assessment" (Tribe 1973); the "positivist technical" approach (Rees 1985); 
"technocratic" EIA (Torgerson 1981, Benson 1982, Jiggins 1995); the "scientific" approach 
(Spaling and Smit 1993), "conventional" EIA (Lawrence 1994a); the "standard" approach 
(Eedy 1995); the "adversary" approach (Connor 1981) and; the "passive" model of EIA 
(McDonald and Brown 1995). 
2.6.2 Benefits of the Technical Model 
One benefit that the technical model of EIA confers is "the ease with which it can be 
implemented within existing procedures and practice" (Wathem et. al. 1988, 104). The 
model represents only an incremental change to the traditional ways in which development 
planning has been conducted throughout the developed and developing world, which, as 
evidenced by its quick spread and institutionalisation in a diverse range of planning regimes 
worldwide, is a benefit at the implementation stage. Although some writers have viewed the 
16 Including: Canada·s now defunct Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) and its replacement. the 
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technical model of EIA as a positive incremental move toward more holistic, integrated and 
interdisciplinary approaches to development decision-making (House 1976), others see it as 
essentially a modified continuation of the "rational planning" approach (Adams 1990) 
employing reductionist science (Sadler 1986). The latter view is supported by two typical 
features of the EIA process: 1) the information typically considered relevant to EIA is highly 
scientific and quantitative, and; 2) the boundaries' or scope typically set for EIA are typically 
narrow in order to ensure problem tractability. Although the technical model of EIA is only 
incrementally different from prevailing forms of development planning, and is thus seen as 
relatively easy to implement, it has also been heavily criticised on this basis. The model is 
seen as producing forms of development only incrementally less environmentally-damaging 
than the forms replaced. 
The technical model of EIA, with its heavy reliance on scientifically-generated 
knowledge, has been beneficial in providing a platform upon which ongoing research on 
'ecological and social responses to perturbation' has been justified, and through which insight 
has emerged. However, the record of predictive accuracy about system behaviours has been 
dismal (Beanlands and Duinker 1983, Berkes 1988, Rees 1988, Spaling et. al. 1993, Treweek 
1995), and ironically, insight into the indeterminacy of ecosystemic behaviours has been 
bolstered by the unsatisfactory record of EIA studies over the last 25 years. However, when 
EIA is conducted under the technical model, there exists a potential to learn about 
ecosystems previously unknown to science (e.g., in hinterland or previously unstudied 
regions) regardless of the long term accuracy of predictions, simply because a pre-project 
research record is produced where none may have existed before. There have been calls for 
Environmental Assessment Act; US-NEPA. and; a host of other industrialised countries. 
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research adopting an experimental and continuous learning approach in which post-
development system conditions are monitored and compared to the pre-development 
baseline' documented by EIA studies (Holling 1978, Beanlands and Duinker 1983). 
Notwithstanding knowledge that complex systems are likely to have multiple domains of 
stability (Holling 1986), the documentation of at least a minimal or 'snapshot' view about one 
of those domains is likely better than having no information at all: the technical model of 
EIA assures that such scientific information is a study priority. 
Although the previously mentioned benefits of the technical model have been 
identified in EIA literature, it is common for the literature to discuss the technical model as if 
it is the only option available. Thus, it is rare to find a considered reflection about the 
technical model's benefits as compared to an alternative model. However, there is a relatively 
large literature which has been critical of the technical model's assumptions and limitations, 
and this literature is traced in the following section. 
2.6.3 Criticisms of the Technical Model 
... the classical-rational planning model is fundamentally flawed, primarily 
because it assumes rationality and certainty where neither is possible. 
Predictive capabilities, knowledge of intersystemic relationships, and 
understandings of developmental dynamics are all far more primitive than the 
model presumes (Webber 1983, 96). 
Initial criticisms of EIA under the technical model centred on the poor quality of the 
scientific information generated by EIA impact prediction and evaluation methods (Rees and 
Davis 1978, Suter 1981). Under the rational planning ideals of the technical model, the 
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information relevant to decision-making should be value-free, objectively determined and 
scientific. Thus, EIA under the technical model was a tool and technique for generating 
information, and the quality of the scientific data, and the rigour of the reductionist 
approaches on which these data were based, were of key concern (Smith 1993). The first 
evaluations of the technical model, as practiced in the US up to the first half of the 1970s, 
yielded criticisms that were largely related to the quality, rigour and comprehensiveness of 
the reductionist science used. This resulted in a series of scientific texts on EIA (Canter 1977; 
Munn 1979: Ward 1978) and an explosion of articles, reports and books on how to do the 
science of impact assessment better'. It also resulted in criticisms about the "low level of 
experimental and theoretical development of ecology" (Cramer L 986, 325) within EIA. 
Subsequently, the predominant rationale in refining and developing various technical 
methods of impact assessment has been a concern for the poor level and quality of science 
within impact assessment (Smith 1993). 
Criticisms of the technical model of EIA have proliferated and expanded in scope 
since the initial concern with scientific rigour. Treatment in any detail would be beyond the 
scope of this chapter and thus, commentary is restricted to the seven themes identified earlier. 
2.6.3.1 Criticisms Related to the Role ofEIA in Planning 
With respect to the role of EIA in planning, much of the literature has been critical 
of the technical model's tendency to 'stand-alone' in isolation from other planning processes 
or goals. The technical model has not successfully integrated with national or regional 
decision-making (Ortolano and Shepherd 1995) and does not link with existing development 
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policies, programs, and other parallel planning processes (Rees 1985, Hollick 1986, Armour 
1991 in Morrison 1995, Smith 1993). Furthermore, the model is not usually tied to any 
measure of maximum acceptable eavironmental disturbance such as regional carrying 
capacities (Rees 1988), is inadequate in the consideration of cumulative impacts (Rees 1988, 
Hundloe et. al. 1990, McDonald and Brown 1995), and at times, fails to integrate effectively 
with planning at the project level (Adams 1990). 
The technical model has also been characterised in the literature as serving chiefly as 
a mitigator of the immediate local impacts of proposed projects, rather than more broadly 
questioning the need for the project or its contribution to regional or long-term environmental 
and social sustainability (Hollick 1986, Sadler 1986, Boothroyd 1995, McDonald and Brown 
1995). This has been criticised by some as serving to "legitimize a decision-making process 
(EIA) was meant to change" (Ingram and Ullery 1977 in Atkinson 1991a, 403). In the same 
vein, other writers have critically questioned whether, under the technical model, serious 
consideration of alternatives to the proposal is possible or likely. Most development 
proponents are highly committed to one preferred alternative, and may not have the 
competence or motivation to carry out alternatives that do not fit closely with their existing 
values and capacities (Fairfax 1978, Smith 1993, Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). Furthermore, 
although it may be desirable to broaden EIA to examine regional development issues, this 
"may not coincide with a developer's spatial or financial boundaries" (C.P. Rees 1988, 151). 
Although some writers refer to the technical model as playing a role in "preventive" (Simonis 
1990, 111; Mueller and McChesny 1994, 30) or "preventative" environmental planning 
(Robinson 1992, 593), the majority of the critical literature has judged the technical model of 
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EIA to play a reactive and non-creative role (Sadler 1986, Rees 1988, Caldwell 1989b, 
Cocklin et. al. 1992a, Spaling and Smit 1993, McDonald and Brown 1995) insufficient in 
challenging the root causes of environmental degradation. 
2.6.3.2 Criticisms Related to tire Scale of Assessment Activities 
Linked to criticisms about the limited role the technical model of EIA has played in 
planning, are criticisms of the scale of assessment activities. Many writers have criticised 
the overt and persistent tendency of the technical model to focus on projects as if these were 
the sole agent of development or cause of environmental degradation (James et. al. 1983, 
Sadler 1986, Clark and Herington 1988, Rees 1988, Simonis 1990, Cocklin et. al. 1992a, 
Robinson 1992, Smith 1993, Ortolano and Shepherd 1995, Boothroyd 1995, Rees 1995). 
Clark (l994, 321) referred to this focus as a failure to match the "scales at which decisions 
are made (i.e., the program or policy level)" with "the scales at which environmental effects 
are assessed (i.e., the project level)". Sadler (l986, 109) pointed out that project-level EIA 
implicitly molded public policy and planning options, and the review of private projects 
drove public decision-making, "the exact opposite of the intended sequence of (planning)". 
Spaling et. al. (l993, 70) offered one plausible explanation for the project focus of the 
technical model, linking this to the availability of the scientific analytical tools required 
under its reductionist framework: such tools were deemed to be " ... more highly developed for 
local scale assessment than regional or national" scales. At least one author has viewed this 
as a problem of the gulf between EIA theory and practice with the preoccupation to date with 
project environmental assessment being "de facto rather than de jure" (Sadler 1994 , 4 ). 
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However, Edmunds' (1981) analysis is perhaps the most convincing explanation of 
why the technical model has persisted in its focus on projects: when faced with the 
staggering information problems of attempting to predict the environmental effects of general 
policies or programmes, humans typically must engage in "bounded rationality" by "limiting 
the number of variables to those that can be human I y comprehended" (Edmunds 1981, 191 ). 
One powerful and politically acceptable way of bounding rationality within impact 
assessment has been to select the direct impacts of single projects as the limit of the 
assessment problem. The danger, as Edmunds pointed out, is that this approach "presumes to 
solve one problem ... while unknowingly creating others". Tribe (1973) has noted that 
rationality can be bounded to the extent that it misrepresents the real world problem. In 
reducing the overall complexity of the assessment problem, a project focus can make inquiry 
more tractable, yet at the same time, create ecological damage by contributing to a 
misunderstanding of ecological reality. 
2.6.3.3 Criticisms Related to Knowledge Certainty in EIA 
Every major project is a perturbation experiment with highly uncertain 
outcome, because the natural system has never yet experienced the impacts. 
(Carpenter 1999, 112) 
Recent research has shown that ecological and social systems are typified by non-
deterministic stress response behaviours. Thus, the technical models' starting position of 
knowledge certainty (through the predictability of supposedly static and mechanistic 
systems) is simply wrong. This criticism has been advanced broadly, both outside and inside 
EIA literature. Ecological research has demonstrated the inherently dynamic, not static, 
equilibria of ecosystems which can exhibit a range of properties and 'domains of stability' 
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susceptible to 'flipping' in surprising manner in the face of exogenous environmental 
influences and disturbances (Holling 1978, Bacow 1980, Holling 1986, Timmerman 1986). 
The point at which one dynamic equilibrium is disrupted, and the resulting characteristics of 
the new equilibrium, are at best difficult to predict and at worst impossible if the ecosystem 
exhibits chaotic behaviour. Chaos, in which even simple deterministic systems generate 
random behaviour, has created a new paradigm in scientific thought which admits 
fundamental limits to predictability (Crutchfield et. al. 1986). 
EIA under the technical model is based on a supposition of supposed systemic 
equilibrium (Regier 1985) and is ill-prepared to cope with dynamic, unpredictable systemic 
behaviours (Spaling et. a/. 1993, Holling 1978). As well, the technical model has a 
reductionist need for delineated system boundaries and greatly simplified representations of 
complex ecosystems, both of which virtually eliminate the possibility that predictions will be 
found to be accurate. Since the technical model is supposed to facilitate rational decision-
making based on the prediction of ecosystemic responses, any inability to predict leads to the 
inability to make rational decisions involving the environment. 
The track record in making accurate predictions in EIA is extremely weak (Beanlands 
and Duinker 1983, Treweek 1995) and more often than not, what are labeled predictions in 
EIA studies might more accurately be termed educated guesses (Doomkamp 1982a). As 
Ravetz (1986, 419) commented: 
It is relatively easy to build a dam to hold back river water .. .But to predict and 
eventually manage the manifold environmental changes initiated by that 
intrusion is another matter. The flows and cycles of energy and materials that 
are disrupted by the dam will, all unknown to us, take new patterns and then 
eventually present us with new, unexpected problems. 
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Post-EIA monitoring studies have demonstrated a surprising lack of accuracy in predicting 
the impacts of development projects, leading many authors conclude that most impacts may 
in fact be inherently unknowable before they occur (Berkes 1988, Boothroyd and Rees 1984, 
Holling 1978, Jones and Grieg 1985, Holling 1986, Timmerman 1986, Rees 1988, Carpenter 
1995). Commenting about social systems, Torgerson (1981, 84) suggested that the science 
used within impact assessment might more accurately be described as lrans-science': 
questions of fact which are stated in scientific terms, yet which are unanswerable by science 
and thus transcend science. 
The difficulty in predicting the impacts of development proposals is not simply a 
function of difficulties in predicting systemic responses to change, it is also a function of 
difficulties in characterising the 'pre-development' system. One typical stage of the technical 
model of EIA, the characterisation of the pre-proposal ecological and social baseline', 
demonstrates a naive commitment to the belief that these systems are static and thus, 
amenable to 'snapshot' characterisation. Simonis (1990, 22) suggested that the variability of 
ecological and social systems, whether natural or as a result of existing human-induced 
stresses, is so great that "it is difficult to determine whether (it is) the action ... causing an 
impact". In general, knowledge about ecological systems is still so poor that negative 
ecological effects may be functionally invisible until long after they emerge, or until some 
previously unknown critical ecological threshold is passed, possibly irreversibly (Rees 1995). 
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In summary, a growing literature suggests that the technical model's preoccupation 
with scientific prediction is misplaced, and "the typical EIA must provide recommendations 
and information for decision-making under conditions of incomplete information and with an 
unlimited uncertainty range" (Gallopin 1981, 55). For these reasons, knowledge uncertainty, 
rather than knowledge certainty, is a more accurate portrayal of the decision-making basis of 
EIA and development planning. 
2.6.3.4 Criticisms Related to the Epistemology of EIA 
The epistemology underlying the technical model of EIA, characterised as the 
objective/reductionist science view of nature, knowledge, and human interactions with 
nature, has been heavily criticised in the literature as an inappropriate basis for development 
planning. Under this view, the internal logic of nature is mechanical, and thus can be known. 
controlled, manipulated and predicted through scientific inquiry. As well, ecological and 
social impacts are usually treated quite separately under a scientific epistemology, and often, 
attempts to characterise social impacts do not involve the active participation of 
representative segments of potentially impacted societies. Kurian's (1995, 174) research on 
EIA in India suggested gendered differences in social impacts were not picked up under a 
technical model, rendering "a :-vhole genre of knowledge inaccessible to the decisionmaking 
process". Ultimately, Norgaard (1994, 72) has argued that the "unsustainability of past 
development (patterns) has an epistemological explanation", and others have suggested that 
most planning and management practices designed to incorporate environmental concerns, 
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including the technical model of EIA, share the same inappropriate epistemological basis 
(Ravetz 1986, Tester 1989, Atkinson 199la, Alvares 1992, Princen et. al. 1995)17. 
The epistemological view that scientifically structured inquiry is objective has been 
heavily criticised, as has its procedural extension, that rigorous inquiry about a project can be 
conducted by the project proponent (or hired designate) in an unbiased, apolitical and 
objective manner. When linked to the technical model, this has been referred to as the 
principle of 'self-assessment' (Rees 1985, Rees and Boothroyd 1987) which results in a 
conflict of interest and loss of objectivity (Treweek 1995). This leads "inevitably to 
distortions in the interpretation of results, most likely in the proposal's favour" (Rees and 
Boothroyd 1987, 5). Fearnside (1994, 28) documented the effect this principle had on the 
CIDA-funded preliminary environmental assessment of China's Three Gorges Dam, 
concluding that one should "not be surprised that the feasibility study found no problems" 
when estimates of the subsequent engineering, managerial and equipment contracts that 
would flow to the companies conducting the assessment stood at $1.3-1.9 billion Canadian 
dollars. The supposed objectivity of scientific inquiry under the technical model is thus 
largely a mirage, and EIA under the technical model is revealed more accurately to be a 
subjective study under the guise of objectivity. 
17 Norgaard argued that the epistemology underlying most of Western planning and management practice (including the 
technical model of EIA) is composed of five llawed premises about nature and ecology: 
• Atomism (systems are unchanging sums of their parts); 
• Mechanism (there are fixed relationships between system parts. and any system changes are reversible); 
• Universalism (diverse and complex phenomena are a result of relatively few universal principles which do not 
change overtime and space); 
• Objectivism (humans can stand outside of and apart from the phenomenon they attempt to understand). and; 
• Monism (the diversity of attempts to understand complex systems is merging into a coherent understanding of the 
whole). 
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As a corollary to criticisms of the technical model's mode of inquiry, criticism has 
been leveled at the model's tendency to ignore, trivialise, or doubt potentially valid and 
useful alternative ways of knowing and thinking about the environment. Indigenous 
knowledge and the incorporation of values into environmental impact assessment are two 
examples of alternative epistemological bases that are marginalised within the technical 
model. Beauregard (1989, 385) referred to such a practice as the "scientific mode of 
legitimation", arguing that the tendency to ignore ascientific knowledge and information is a 
general feature of rational/technical modes of planning. When non-scientific (but socially 
accepted) knowledge is not incorporated into EIA, and the knowledge and values of 
technocrats are disproportionately represented, power imbalances between project 
proponents and indigenous communities are exacerbated and development opportunities 
bridging all levels of society are squandered (Jiggins 1995, McCreary 1995). These criticisms 
are particularly important for developing countries where, in many sectors of society, formal 
education and scientific knowledge are still the exception rather than the norm, and large 
power imbalances exist between government decision-makers and grassroots levels of 
society. The technical model thus discounts the observation that "objective, detached 
scientific knowledge is just one possible form among many" (Escobar 1992, 143). 
The technical model's epistemological perspective is that a single value-system (that 
of the scientifically-trained assessor) can be used to identify and predict all the important 
consequences of a development proposal (Abel and Stocking 1981, McCreary 1995). 
Alternative ways of knowing and valuing, such as those classified as 'indigenous knowledge', 
are ill understood by environmental planners (Atkinson 1991b), or judged to be problematic 
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for use in the technical model since there are no standards by which the knowledge can be 
recorded, categorised, analysed or tested in a scientific manner (Cole 1993 in Kennett and 
Perl 1995). Thus, in a self-reinforcing argument, indigenous knowledge cannot be used by 
the technical model since it does not conform to the model's epistemological basis, and 
scientific inquiry alone is sufficient to elicit all important information. Ways of knowing and 
valuing the environment other than through those of scientific inquiry are neither required 
nor allowed under the technical modeL 
2.6.3.5 Criticisms Related to the Timing and Length of EIA Activities 
With respect to the timing and length of assessment activities, the literature has 
been critical of the technical model's tendency to treat the assessment of impacts as a 
discrete, short term "one-shot" (Rees 1985, 5) study which begins after the formal proposal 
of a development project and ends after mitigation measures for predicted negative effects 
have been identified. Criticism has come from two directions: the technical model is seen as 
being 'carried out too late' to significantly affect the design of proposals, and 'ending too 
soon' to be able to gauge the full range of impacts, and mitigate these through project 
alterations or phased implementation (McDonald and Brown 1995, 486). These criticisms 
reflect observations that proposed development projects often change dramatically over time 
(Ortolano and Shepherd 1995) and that the dominant themes in most environmental issues 
are uncertainty and surprise, necessitating a much longer view of environmental planning 
activity. Both observations suggest that long term monitoring, continuous learning, and the 
adaptation of projects to the results of monitoring should be an integral part of EIA activities 
(Abel and Stocking 1981, Jones and Grieg 1985, Imperial et. al. 1993). 
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2.6.3.6 Criticisms Related to Public Involvement in EIA 
Public involvement in EIA has been a highly contentious issue in the literature 
relating to EIA in both developed and developing countries. Under the technical model, a 
development proposal is conceived of by a government or private proponent and a variety of 
formal public involvement opportunities are undertaken in order to provide information 
inputs to the EIA study. Although public involvement can be brought about through limited 
forms of public consultation or more powerful and extensive forms of public participation, 
the literature is critical that the technical model has a tendency to stop at public consultation 
with "no options for greater involvement" (Roberts 1995, 224)18. Rahnema (1992, 116) 
referred to this as "manipulated, or teleguided" involvement rather than "spontaneous" public 
involvement. Thus, under the technical model, the public are manipulated into becoming 
involved in the EIA process in a consultative role (through persuasion, education, 
information feedback and consultation); but not in a spontaneous participation role (through 
joint planning/shared decision making, delegated authority or selfdetemzination) (after 
Rahnema 1992 and Roberts 1995) 19. 
Much of the criticism surrounding the technical model's approach to public 
involvement has been driven by the emergence of social concerns as a component of EIA, 
and by critiques of the model of social impact assessment (SIA) that co-evolved with EIA. 
18 Roberts (1995. 224) identified the key difference as being the degree to which those involved in the process actually 
Hinfluence. share or control the decision making". Public consultation has little power to affect decision-making. while 
public participation has relatively more power. 
19 Roberts identified a seven-stage continuum of public involvement within EIA. ranging from the least powerful form. 
'persuasion' to the most powerful form 'self-determination'. Although not stated explicitly by Roberts. this is likely based on 
Arnstein's ( 1969) A Ladder of Citizen Participation which outlined a similar continuum of public participation. Arnstein's 
continuum ranged from non-participation. manipulation. therapy. and informing. to consultation. placation. partnership. 
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Although SIA did not emerge as a serious component of EIA until the mid-1970s (Boothroyd 
and Rees 1984), the United States' NEPA regulations nonetheless formalised public 
involvement and social concerns within the -EIA process (Ingersoll 1990, IAIA-ICGP 1994, 
Burdge and Vanclay 1995). The evolution of SIA subsequently followed a familiar course: 
SIA first emerged as a social science sub-set of EIA with its own quantitative technical 
model (d'Amore 1981, Torgerson 1981), and since that time has seen the emergence of a 
model ofSIA which is qualitative and participatory20. 
In its dependence on professional expertise, social science research and social 
systems thinking, the technical model of SIA has been criticised as a "profoundly elitist" 
approach which results in a concentration of "power and expertise in the hands of 
professionally-trained planners and analysts" rather than communities (Tester 1989, 16). As 
well, it has been criticised for treating potentially impacted communities as "passive 
patient(s) or victim(s) of the project development process" (Connor 1981, 135). Under the 
technical model of SIA, public involvement is limited to debates about the means of 
development (i.e. projects) rather than ends (i.e. the overall developmental direction of 
society) (Merton 1964 and Tester 1980 in Ingersoll 1990). Commenting on developed 
countries, Simonis (1990, 21) characterised the technical model as providing for a "token" 
form of public involvement, while Fairfax (1978) suggested the form of public input solicited 
delegated aulhorir.y and. ultimately, full citizen control. 
20 Like !he two exrremes of EIA identified in this dissenation, olher writers have used a dualistic framework where SIA 
approaches are viewed as "gravitating toward lhe opposing poles of a continuum" (Torgerson 1981. 73). Tester (1981) 
characterised the two exrremes wilh respect to social impact assessment. The first approach. which he did not label. bears a 
strong resemblance to what has been referred to in this paper as !he 'technical model': SIA is performed by a "detached 
observer". uses "objective" social science. depends upon scientific/mathematical models. and is conducted wilh the aim of 
producing an SIA "product" 10 be used as an input to decision-making. In contrast. he labeled the opposing exrreme ofSIA 
as the "alternative approach"(Tester 1981. 102), suggesting that SIA is performed by a "participant observer". uses 
"subjective" approaches that are more accurately termed an "art". depends upon qualitative and participatory research. and is 
conducted with the aim of facilitating the "process" of decision-making while only secondarily producing a product. 
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under a technical model was so formal, predictable, and proposal-oriented that it stifled, 
rather than stimulated, public involvement. 
The question of the form and staging of public involvement in EIA is arguably an 
even more contentious issue in a developing country context. As Henry (1990, 100) and 
others have noted about developing countries, "development is a political process, and in that 
process decision-making rationality is derived primarily from considerations of political 
power and not from the social data produced by (the technical model of) SIA". In developing 
countries, public involvement under the technical model is not likely to move beyond public 
consultation. This is due to a series of factors: there is less likely to be a tradition of public 
participation or accountability in decision-making; national development policies and 
projects are determined by a political and economic elite that routinely exclude grassroots 
community levels (Henry 1990); judicial systems are less likely to be independent of political 
influence, and; there is an elitist perception that the average member of the public cannot 
understand the nature, scale and potential impacts of many proposals. Thus, public 
involvement under the technical model is likely to be an effort to persuade, educate or share 
information with the potentially 'affected publics', rather than facilitating their participation 
in development decision-making. 
2.6.3.7 Criticisms Related to the Planning Theory Basis 
The technical model of EIA follows the central tenets associated with 
rational/comprehensive planning theory, and many of the criticisms leveled at the technical 
model's epistemological and knowledge certainty base are applicable to a discussion of 
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rational planning theory21. Rational comprehensive planning, in its most basic form, 
embodies four main elements: 1) goal-setting; 2) identification of alternatives; 3) evaluation 
of alternatives, and; 4) implementation of decisions (Hudson 1979). Translating these 
elements to the technical model of EIA, the "goal" of the EIA process is to collect all 
environmental information relevant to a particular development proposal (and its identifiable 
"alternatives"), preferably by some form of quantitative forecasting model. Then, after 
"evaluating alternatives", an objective, rational decision is made about the least damaging 
alternative, and the "implementation of decisions" proceeds. 
Critics have identified a series of major flaws with the rational planning theory which 
underlies the technical model: the theory is poor in dealing with lack of social agreement 
about a proposed action (Etzioni 1968}; it erroneously assumes certainty in knowledge 
(Goldberg 1986); it places an over-reliance on quantification and modeling and thus transfers 
power to a technocratic elite (Grabow and Heskin 1973}; and it disavows the validity of 
subjective knowledge (Goldberg 1986). Critics contend that it is impossible for EIA to 
simply achieve a 'comprehensive' understanding of the ecological and social setting for a 
particular development proposal, let alone predict ecosystemic or social responses with 
enough accuracy to select rationally the best of a series of development alternatives. 
21 The use of the term 'planning theory' is problematic. but is used in this dissertation to refer to normative theories about 
planning procedure. Although some planning theorists use the word theory in its normative and predictive meanings 
simultaneously. this usage is Hentirely inconsistent with normal usage of the term in the social sciences" (Breheny 1983. 
108). and there is more suppon within the discipline for the position that procedural planning theory is the more 'appropriate· 
concern of planning theorists (Bolan 1980. Davidoff and Reiner 1973 in Briassoulis 1989; Faludi l973b. Friedmann 1987. 
Hightower 1969). Hudson (1979, 393) summarised the bulk of planning theory literature as being "principally concerned 
with procedural techniques". and it is this usage that is adopted here. 
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Despite these criticisms, rational planning remains a persistent organising framework 
for many forms of planning, including environmental impact assessment. Hudson (1979) has 
argued that rational planning's power and appeal lies in its conceptual simplicity and its 
similarity to most individuals' decision-making patterns. As well, some theorists have 
speculated that rational planning is intuitively appealing to minds educated under the 
prevailing reductionist, rationalistic mode of 'scientific' inquiry. Taylor (1980) noted that 
reductionist science has served as a powerful metaphor for the organisation of management 
structures dealing with the overall problem of societal form and emerging problems related to 
societal transformations. With science proving so successful in manipulating the physical 
world, he concluded that it was not surprising that society turned heavily toward scientific 
problem-solving and planning approaches for guidance in dealing with emerging problems. 
In summary, the technical model of EIA has been revealed through a seven-part 
classification of criticisms that have emerged in the literature over the last 25 years. In 
response to the criticisms discussed in the Section 2.6, planning theorists and practitioners 
have advanced ideas about the way in which EIA should be reconceptualised before being 
transferred as a planning process for use in developing countries. Continuing with the seven-
part classification advanced previously, these ideas are traced in the following section. 
2. 7 Planning Model of Environmentallmpad Assessment 
EIA can be characterized as a politicaUadministrative process. It is a political 
process inasmuch as it guides and legitimates decision-making and involves 
the allocation of power. As such, it can either perpetuate and reinforce 
inequities in the political process or it can facilitate shared decision-making 
with interested and affected publics - especially those publics traditionally 
underrepresented in the political process (Lawrence 1994a. 16). 
2. 7.1 Model Characteristics 
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As with the technical model. the planning model of EIA has been referred to in the 
literature under a variety of labels which inform an initial description of its characteristics. It 
has been referred to as: the "radical" approach (Rees 1979. Rees 1985); the "process" 
(d.Amore 1981) or "planning process" approach (Boothroyd and Rees 1984); the "joint 
venture/co-operative" approach (Connor 1981); the "political" approach (Cunningham 1984. 
Craig 1990 in Gagnon et. a/. 1993); the "panicipatory" (Jiggins 1995) or "panicipative" 
(Robens 1995) approach. and; the "community" approach to EIA (Robens 1995). In brief. 
the planning model structures EIA as a panicipatory and value-laden planning process linked 
to larger political planning and decision-making processes. embracing uncenainty rather than 
prediction as an organising feature. As well. the planning model incorporates multiple ways 
of knowing about environmental and social impacts. and takes theoretical guidance from a 
variety of planning theories in existence. 
2. 7.2 The Benefits of the Planning Model 
The planning model of EIA emerged largely as a response to criticisms voiced about 
the technical model of EIA. Thus. the planning model is seen in the literature as providing 
the general benefits of using any form of environmental impact assessment (e.g. increasing 
resource use efficiency. social learning) while also providing additional benefits not provided 
by the technical model. 
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Where the technical model posits the role of EIA in planning processes to be that of 
a stand-alone, reactive technical study focusing mainly on biophysical impacts, the planning 
model is seen as integrating better with existing planning processes, and offering a broader 
and more proactive framework with which to critically assess long-term cumulative effects of 
development. Crucially, it is also seen as providing a structured framework by which to 
encourage and manage public involvement in all aspects of assessment and planning. The 
main benefits flowing from this, according to the model's proponents, are that the broader 
trend of development can be critically assessed by members of society, rather than just 
individual projects: broader societal input is a means by which to negotiate decision-making 
about environmental and social systems (Jiggins 1995). This broadening of input can be seen, 
in and of itself, as a powerful equity benefit for developing countries. 
Accordingly, the scale of assessment activities under the planning model is not 
restricted to the direct impact of projects, and in fact flows upstream through programme, 
plan, region and policy levels where more generic impacts can be identified and assessed 
(Boothroyd 1995)22. Although individual projects would still be assessed for site-specific 
impacts, the planning model, in assessing the policies and programmes framing projects, 
would provide much of the background information germane to project-level assessment. 
Project-level assessment would thus become a more rapid and simple endeavour, saving 
valuable and scarce resources in both developed and developing countries. The planning 
model would preclude a great deal of assessment activity at the project level simply because 
the most-damaging policies, plans and programmes would be eliminated before associated 
22 Upstreaming refers to the introduction of environmental considerations into the very early stages of policy and 
progr.unme planning so they contribute to the overall direction of progr.unmes. plans and projects (after Graybill 1985). 
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projects could be conceived23. As well, by focusing on levels higher than the individual 
project, the planning model allows for a greater understanding of the cumulative effects of 
development activities. 
Another major benefit of the planning model identified in the literature flows from its 
treatment of knowledge certainty in the EIA process. Unlike the technical model, 
knowledge about stress response in complex. ecological and social systems is assumed to be 
uncertain at best and potentially unknowable with any degree of long-term accuracy. The 
planning model has benefited greatly from ecological research which emerged concurrent 
with US-NEPA style EIA approaches, and has incorporated the results of this research into 
its procedural framework. Uncertainty, chaotic behaviours and surprise are assumed to be 
present in every attempt to predict systemic responses to development, regardless of the 
degree of quantifiable scientific studies carried out. Thus, the planning model of impact 
assessment, and any decision made as a result of impact assessment, is understood to be 
grounded in inaccurate and incomplete knowledge. This can only be seen as a benefit for 
development planning activities and decision-making, which, under the technical model, 
assumed a level of understanding which simply did not ex.ist and led to decisions based on a 
false sense of certainty. Stated differently, the model of reality used in the technical model 
was at odds with reality, and the planning model has partially redressed this by embracing 
uncertainty as an organising concept. For developing countries, the benefit may be that 
damaging courses of development will not be embarked upon lightly on the basis of one-time 
23 This stems from the appreciation that development projects are conceived out of a web of supportive policies. plans and 
programmes. Most development projects would never reach the proposal stage without such support and thus. the planning 
model allows a more proactive approach to environmentally- and socially-sensitive development planning. and for efficient 
use of liSSessment resources. 
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predictions which will inevitably be proven inaccurate. More emphasis and resources can 
thus be devoted to initial designs, and monitoring and adjusting development activities rather 
than attempting costly exercises in scientific prediction. 
The epistemology underlying the planning model, characterised as allowing for 
"multiple epistemologies" (after Redclift 1992, 35) or 'multiple ways of knowing' about 
complex phenomena, is beneficial in that it addresses the impossibility of science to fully 
understand and predict complex system behaviours. The planning model recognises that 
"different ways of understanding complex systems yield different insights" (Norgaard 1994, 
73) which when combined lead to a fuller understanding of these systems. By allowing for 
multiple ways of knowing about systems, the planning model provides for a beneficial 'next 
step' whenever science is in doubt, and provides a knowledge base which can be compared, 
contrasted or added to that of science. 
In particular, the planning model validates the use of indigenous or traditional 
ecological knowledge (TEK) within EIA24_ This is beneficial, in part, because a combination 
of 'scientific' and 'indigenous' data may yield a better overall data set and enable better 
communication in the planning process (King 1983, Johannes 1993, Kumar et. al. 1993). 
24 TEK is "generated. recorded, and transmitted differently than Western scientific knowledge" (Johnson 1992. 6) making it 
problematic for use within the technical model. Johnson defined TEK as "a body of knowledge built up by a group of people 
through generations of living in close contact with nature ... (which includes) a system of classification. a set of empirical 
observations about the local environment. and a system of self-management that governs resource use" (Johnson 1992. -'>· 
TEK differs from Western science in that generally it: is transmitted orally; is learned through observation and 
experience; ascribes a life force to so-called inanimate objects; views human life on par with non-human and inanimate 
entities; is inherently holistic; emphasises emotional involvement and subjective understanding; depends mainly on 
qualitative data; is based on data generated by resource users rather than specialised researchers; is based on a long time 
series of data for a small locality; is used within a decision-making environment which is non-hierarchical and non-
compartmentalised. and; generates explanation through collective experience and perpetual revision in the face of new 
information. With its roots in past experience and present-day learning. TEK is both cumulative and dynamic, building upon 
the experience of earlier generations and adapting to the new technological and socioeconomic changes of the present 
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Emery and Patton (1997, 13) saw the complementary use of TEK as a means of filling in 
gaps in scientific ecological knowledge of the region potentially affected by a development 
proposal: 
Given the relatively ineffective long-term scientific methodology associated with 
environmental impact assessments - primarily lack of long-term baseline data, little 
knowledge of the subtle effects from the project's actions, inability to predict long-
term effects accurately, difficulty in defining or even discovering indirect effects, and 
an inability to determine (ecological) bottleneck occurrences of critically important 
factors -traditional knowledge bases are amply able to help fill these gaps (Emery 
and Patton 1997). 
Perhaps most importantly though, developing countries generally have a high proportion of 
individuals whose epistemological base might be termed 'traditional'. Thus, the planning 
model, in allowing for and encouraging the use of knowledge generated under non-scientific 
epistemologies, has the additional and important benefit of fostering equity through broader 
public involvement in the EIA process. This occurs when individuals, whose knowledge and 
beliefs have not been shaped by Western scientific precepts, are nonetheless encouraged to 
contribute their knowledge, information and values to the EIA process25. 
When compared to EIA studies done under the technical model, the timing and 
length of assessment activities under the planning model can be described most simply as 
'beginning earlier' (in order to assist in the design and selection of more appropriate 
development proposals) and 'ending later' (in order to monitor and adapt developments to 
(Johnson 1992) and is a coherent paradigm separate from that of science (Showers and Malahlena 1992). 
25 TEK researchers have noted that it is inappropriate to use TEK "in isolation from the social and political structure in 
which it is embedded" (Johannes 1993. 35). Thus. the use of TEK for impact assessment contains the caveat that TEK 
Inputs• be accompanied by attempts to understand and document the context of this knowledge. For e:"<ample. Johannes 
(1993) described cultures in which human activities were understood to cause degradation. others in which this 
understanding was weak or non-existent. and still others in which the understanding changed drastically between 
generations. 
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emerging knowledge about impacts). Graybill (1985) observed that the early design stage 
was a critical milestone in environmental inputs to development proposals: 
As a (proposal) progresses from the feasibility stage through the construction 
stage, decisions, disbursements, interdependencies, financial obligations, 
personal commitments, momentum to construct and physical progress 
accumulate to form an ever increasing obstacle to change or revision ... By the 
time the early design stage is passed, most of the major ... dimensions have 
been frozen. By then there is virtually no such thing as a small change ... 
(Graybill 1985, 349). 
Thus, the planning model provides two important benefits: by beginning earlier' the model 
allows for environmental and social considerations to be built into the design of development 
policies, programmes and projects, and; by 'ending later', allows for emerging knowledge 
about unanticipated impacts to contribute to the redesign, phasing, scaling down or 
modification of the proposed development. Overall, the longer timeframe of assessment 
activities can reduce the imprecision inherent in attempts to characterise continually 
changing ecological and social systems through 'one-shot' assessments. EIA under the 
planning model can thus contribute to the design of less damaging proposals, can more 
accurately portray ecological and social systems, and can assist in proposal redesign in the 
face of emergent social and environmental responses and limits. Figure 2.1 represents the 
UNEP's conception of how EIA, like that envisaged under a planning model, can contribute 
at many stages of a project's lifecycle. 
The planning model views early and continuous public involvement in planning and 
decision-making as the most effective means of ensuring that societal values, attitudes and 
knowledge are incorporated into development decision-making. The planning model 
transcends the technical model's tendency to view public involvement as a means of 
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soliciting 'data', or to educate and 'sell' the proposed development to an uneducated or 
skeptical public. Public involvement under the planning model assumes that local people in 
developing countries have the knowledge and expertise to evaluate proposed changes to their 
lives (Tester 1989). Under the planning model, public involvement is conducted in a manner 
that Roberts (1995, 224) referred to as the "shared decision-making, delegated authority and 
self-determination" approaches to public involvement. This approach confers the benefit that 
some measure of power is relocated out of the hands of technocratic planners and analysts, 
and back to potentially affected communities (Tester 1989), particularly those traditionally 
underrepresented in the political decision-making process (Lawrence 1994a, 16). This is an 
Figure 2.1: UNEP EIA Cycle 
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important benefit for developing countries since it broadens the societal and knowledge base 
upon which socially and environmentally significant decisions are made. Additionally, public 
involvement, when practiced consistently over longer time periods, provides an "informal but 
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effective early warning system" for the detection of unintended and unpredictable 
consequences of development (Faludi 1973b, 281). 
Public involvement under the planning model involves two changes in perspective 
which provide overall benefits to the integration of EIA with existing political planning 
processes. The first shift involves viewing the impact assessor not as a source of technical 
expertise, but rather, as either a 'receiver' of communication from the public (King 1983), or 
a "facilitator" of communication among the public, proponent and government actors (Jiggins 
1995, 61). The second shift involves moving away from a view of expert-driven technical 
planning and decision-making, to a view that the public can and should have some level of 
direct decision-making capacity. As well, by soliciting public values and attitudes, rather 
than just scientific and technical information, the planning model provides a means by which 
planning can be conducted in the face of uncertainty. Furthermore, there are many benefits to 
involving intended development beneficiaries in the design, decision-making and operation 
of development programmes and projects (Egger and Majeres 1992, Rahnema 1992, Vivian 
1992, Fellizar 1994, Roddan 1994, Chambers and Jiggins 1987 in Jiggins 1995), particularly 
in developing countries26. 
The planning theory basis for the model is a mixture of rational planning, mixed 
scanning, transactive planning and advocacy planning. Mixed scanning' refers to a form of 
planning which attempts to guide short-term or small-scale developments (e.g. a single 
26 These benefits include: stimulating community self-esteem and empowerment. designing less environmentally and 
socially damaging development interventions. providing and using detailed local knowledge within the development 
process. developing a sense of ownership and stewardship toward the development and fostering a concomitant success and 
persistence of the development. and stimulating the two-way exchange of knowledge between the community and planning 
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project) toward longer term and larger-scale goals (e.g. sustainability). Stated another way, 
mixed scanning suggests that long-term development planning goals can provide a 
framework within which individual impact assessments would be gauged and tested for 
approval. This also might involve efforts to initiate or redesign project-level proposals to 
provide better support for longer term national or international sustainability goals. 
Transactive planning theory provides guidance in suggesting that EIA practice should 
involve 'face-to-face' contact with the people potentially affected by proposed developments 
(Hudson 1979), and that EIA practitioners, as well as 'potentially-affected people', can learn 
through such contact. Advocacy planning theory suggests that, through EIA processes, 
disenfranchised groups (e.g. racial minorities, the poor, community groups and rural-
dwellers) should be assisted by planners in gaining access to the decision- and plan-making 
processes of governments and business, and thus, participating in the earliest and highest 
levels of EIA decision-making. Planners involved in the EIA process would thus take on an 
"explicit role ... as a facilitator of social change through the support by the planner of social 
groups whose interests had previously been excluded from the planning process" (Cenzatti in 
Friedmann 1987, 440). 
2.7.3 Resistance to the Planning Model 
Although the planning model began to emerge as a response to criticisms of the 
technical model, it is not yet recognised widely as a cohesive model. Thus, few criticisms 
have been leveled directly at the planning model. What has been voiced openly are mainly 
conceptual or theoretical discussions of the difficulty of moving away from the technical 
bureaucrats. 
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model. Most commonly, a form of passive resistance to change is seen within the EIA 
community and the technical model persists in spite of growing calls for change. 
The planning model's suggestion that assessment activities should move beyond the 
project level to plan, programme and policy levels has been resisted on at least three points, 
each of which relates to the more general nature of proposals at non-project levels and the 
difficulty this heightened generality causes for the prediction of impacts. EIA is seen as more 
difficult when assessment is to be conducted: 1) without reference to a particular location; 2) 
on highly dynamic non-project 'proposals', and; 3) on 'proposals' which may be ill-defined, 
hidden from public knowledge, or never explicitly defined as a proposal. However, it is 
suggested here that these problems are not specific to non-project assessment: examples 
abound where EIA is conducted on a project using the technical model of EIA, yet faces 
difficulties because the proposed 'project' is ill-defined (Rees 1985), not tied to a particular 
location, or changes drastically during, or subsequent to, assessment activities27. Benson 
( 1982) saw such criticisms of higher-order assessment as a fundamental question of whether 
EIA is carried out on a plan or policy (as per the technical model), or as part of a planning 
and policy development process (as per the planning model). Thus, much of the criticism 
surrounding EIA at non-project levels stems from assumptions about the appropriate role of 
EIA in the planning process, and a deeply held faith in the ability of the technical model to 
accurately reveal the impacts of proposed project-level developments. 
27Rees (1985. 7). in referring to EIA studies conducted on an ill-defined Beaufon Sea project. simultaneously criticised 
both the project proponent and the EARP (EIA) process when he referred to the Kconceptual problem (facing panicipants in 
the process) of advancing predictions in the absence of a definitive project proposalM. EIA under the technical model was 
expected to deliver a scientifically credible and exhaustive description of the project's impacts. even though no one involved 
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The planning model has been criticised for its support of two linked positions: that 
planning can (and indeed, must) be based on knowledge uncertainty, and that knowledge 
useful in the EIA process can be derived from epistemological bases other than those of 
science (Canter 1977, Alcances et. al. 1983, Beanlands and Duinker 1983, Biswas and 
Geping 1987, Carpenter and Maragos 1989, ADB 1991, Carpenter 1995, Lee et. al. 1995). 
Planning which openly acknowledges that uncertainty is the basis upon which decisions are 
made contrasts sharply with accepted planning approaches used by individuals, corporations, 
and government planning bureaucracies, and which are based on a presumption of predictive 
ability based on scientific knowledge. Criticisms have thus emerged from an array of actors 
in the EIA process, from planners, to politicians to environmental professionals, all of whom 
share the tendency to trust only 'objectively verifiable' knowledge in decision-making. To 
planners steeped in rational/objective approaches, the planning model's embrace of 
uncertainty and knowledge pluralism amounts to a refutation of 'rational' decision making 
based on 'objective' science, and such alternative forms of rationality are generally 
discounted in societal decision making (Rees 1995). Politicians are particularly loathe to 
accept uncertainty in the decision-making milieu since this leaves them vulnerable to 
criticism from political opponents or a public demanding accountability (Hammond et. al. 
1983). Environmental professionals involved in the preparation of EIA studies have 
predominantly been trained under a positivistic science tradition and are often the most 
staunch opponents of suggestions that their work should be based on uncertainty and values 
rather than predictive science. Lee et. al. (1995, 93) were explicit in this regard in their 
suggestion that integrity within EIA could only be preserved by the "screening out of extra-
scientific pressures" such as "subjective judgments involving values, feelings, beliefs and 
in the process knew accurately what proposal was being advanced. 
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prejudices". Open criticism of calls for the inclusion of traditional knowledge in EIA is not 
generally found in the EIA literature, although there is a long history of literature which 
ignores or trivialises the potential role of traditional knowledge in the EIA process. This 
amounts to thinly veiled doubts about the veracity and legitimacy of epistemologies other 
than that of reductionist science28. 
The greatest resistance to the planning model has come from its support for 'public 
participation' (shared decision-making, delegation of authority, or self determination) rather 
than 'public consultation' approaches to public involvement. Although most EIA studies 
conducted around the world attempt to involve the public in some way, limited forms of 
public 'consultation' (which views the public as a group to be persuaded. educated or used as 
a source of information) continue to be the norm. Resistance to public 'participation' 
approaches stems mainly from the understanding that such approaches involve a significant 
devolution of power, to the point where the overall need for the development may be 
questioned, and decisions directly affecting the scale, location and overall feasibility of the 
proposal may be decided by the public rather than the proponent, politician or planning 
bureaucracy. The decision-making model which currently prevails in many countries, in 
which 'rational' decisions are made by technical elites on the behalf of the public, is thus 
threatened by the public participation approaches advocated by the planning model. This is 
resisted or seen as problematic by those who do not trust the public's abilities. 
28 See for example: Canter 19n. Alcances et. aL 1983. Beanlands and Duinker 1983. Biswas and Geping 1987. Carpenter 
and Maragos 1989. None of these sources indicate a significant role for or benefit from traditional knowledge in EIA 
processes. 
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The planning model is not a widely understood or tightly defined model available for 
easy use by EIA practitioners. The model remains largely a body of criticism and suggested 
reforms which are borrowed from selectively. It is perhaps most accurate to state that the 
technical model continues to be the standard by which most EIA practices, regulations and 
procedures are guided, and the planning model has exerted selective influence over the 
conceptualisation and practice of EIA. This influence is traced in the following section. 
2.7.4 Emerging Influence of the Planning Model 
2.7.4.1 Changing the Scale of Assessment 
The planning model has been influential in introducing environmental impact 
assessment activities that go beyond the project-specific focus of the technical model. The 
environmental impact assessment of policies, plans or programmes has coalesced into 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) (Wood and Dejeddour 1992, Boothroyd 1995) 
and the assessment of impacts over areas larger than a single project and comprising many 
discrete development activities has resulted in both 'Regional Environmental Assessment 
(REA)' and 'Cumulative Effects Assessment (CEA)'. 
Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) is an evolving approach that attempts to 
assess the environmental impacts of decisions made at levels of strategic decisions 
(Partidario 1996)29. More specifically, it has been defined as the environmental impact 
29 Strategic environmental assessment is also referred to in the literature as ~environmental policy appraisal~ (Wathem et. 
al. 1988. 103). ~policy EA~ and ~policy impact assessment~ (Partidario 1996). ~environmental policy review~ (O'Riordan 
and Sewell 1981). "environmental policy analysis~ (White and Hamilton 1983. 39) and "programmatic environmental 
impact assessment~ (Therivel 1993). However. Boothroyd (1995) distinguished between ~policy analysis and evaluation~ 
(which determines whether stated objectives and goals were met by the policy) and "policy impact assessment~ (which 
determines whether there were outcomes additional to those desired by the implementation of the policy). Combining these 
two traditions, he suggested. was the term "policy assessment~ which. when applied to environmental and social systems. 
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assessment process used for policies, plans and programmes which are approved earlier than 
the authorisation of individual projects (Lee and Walsh 1992). The word strategic refers to 
"its relative positioning in the pyramid of decisions from policy visions to programs of more 
concrete activities" (Partidario 1996, 33). SEA represents a significant departure from the 
project-focus of the technical model, and is recognised as potentially pre-empting 
environmental impacts before the project stage. It is also recognised as providing a more 
proactive approach to the integration of environmental considerations in development 
planning (Lee and Walsh 1992, Rookwood 1993). In contrast to the technical model of EIA, 
a number of impact assessment methods are generally used within the same study to 
determine primary impacts, and secondary impacts are routinely addressed. Proponents of 
SEA see it functioning ideally within a multi-tiered environmental assessment framework 
whereby first broad policies, then regional and sub-regional plans and programmes are 
assessed in a stepwise fashion before relatively brief individual project EIAs are carried out 
(van Pelt 1993, Sadler 1994). However, for most planning regimes, the use of SEA within 
such a tiered framework is still an ideal of the future. 
SEA remains much less used in governmental and aid agency decision-making than 
project-specific EIA (Lee and Walsh 1992, Therivel et. al. 1992, Sadler 1994) and, although 
it is a step toward planning model ideals, it nonetheless contains problematic issues 
reminiscent of the technical model's lack of integration with planning processes. Although 
SEA has promise for the review of government policy in its broadest sense, Therivel's (1993) 
review of hundreds of SEAs conducted in the US, the Netherlands, Germany and the United 
Kingdom revealed that SEAs had been applied exclusively to plans and programmes rather 
was the only tradition which could assess the totality of changes brought on by implementation of the policy. 
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than policies. Although SEA represents a viable outgrowth of the planning model of EIA, it 
remains underused for the assessment of policy and usually is not tied legislatively to 
decisions made about individual projects. Furthermore, critics have suggested that SEA 
continues to be viewed as the formal assessment of completed policy, plan or programme 
proposals, entailing the familiar risk that proponents have already committed themselves to 
all but minor mitigations to the proposal (Boothroyd 1995). Thus, there is a need for the 
assessment of policies, programmes or plans: l) which are never identified formally as 
'proposals' (e.g., implicit or existing policies); 2) during the design stage, and; 3) which 
includes the assessment of the objectives, higher goals and externalities surrounding policies 
(Boothroyd 1995, 105). Clearly, SEA has not broken completely from the technical model's 
procedural bases and biases. 
Regional environmental assessment (REA)30 is an approach to impact assessment 
which eschews the single project as the base of assessment in favor of assessing multiple 
actions within one ecosystem or geographic region. The World Bank has defined REA as 
assessment conducted " ... when a number of development activities are planned or proposed 
for a relatively localised geographic area, such as several projects in one watershed" (World 
Bank 1991a, 12). REA purportedly provides an assessment framework capable of providing 
an integrated perspective, defining cumulative impacts of proposed multiple developments in 
a region; identifying cross-media or transboundary impacts, and establishing regional 
priorities in environmental management and planning (James et. al1983). Although REA has 
30 Other related approaches have been referred to as: 'regional assessment' (Bidwell 1992); 'areawide environmental 
assessment' (US-HUD 1981. Sadler 1986); 'regionalleve1 EIA' (Gamman and McCreary 1988); 'ecosystem planning' (Rees 
and Davis 1978); 'environmental zoning' (Lee 1985); ecological assessment for regional development' (Cooper and Zedler 
1980); 'regional carrying capacity' (Rees 1988; Rees 1990); integrated regional assessment' (James et. al. 1983), and; 
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usually been conceived of as the assessment of multiple projects in a particular region, it has 
a much greater potential to become the overall organising framework for the assessment of 
all development proposals in a particular region (Bidwell 1992), be they projects, plans, 
programmes or policies. 
Ideally, there should be strong links between regional environmental assessment and 
carrying capacity analyses. As Rees (1988 and 1990) has pointed out, the assessment of 
environmental impacts in a regional sense is of no significance unless these are in relation to 
permissible limits of ecological or social impact, which are in tum linked to physical limits to 
development in that region. Regional carrying capacities need not be expressed in absolute 
physical terms alone (Rees 1988), but in a multitude of terms and management options that 
are morally, ethically and physically relevant to the humans occupying that region, and 
which define limits to the maximum level of development or human activities in the 
region31. To date however, carrying capacity approaches are not commonly carried out as 
part of mainstream REA activities, and project-specific rather than regional assessments are 
still the norm. 
Another emerging form of non-project EIA is cumulative effects assessment (CEA), 
which has evolved out of the recognition that important environmental decisions, or 
'integrated regional economic-cum·environmental development planning· (ADB 1992). 
31 A determination of regional carrying capacity typically begins with a consideration of regional resources and desired 
standard of living for the region·s human population (since a ·standard of living· is tied to per capita resource consumption 
rates). From these two components can be determined the maximum number ofindividuals which can be supported by these 
resources at the desired level of development. This is complemented by an 'Ecological Footprint" approach to regional 
assessment. In the latter. the consumptive resource demands of individuals. populations. projects or even policies are 
calculated. and the area (marine or terrestrial) required to sustain the consumptive entity is then calculated. The ecological 
footprint represents a viable and promising means by which proposed developments can be assessed for their aggregate 
regional impact on natural capital and ecological sustainability (after Wackernagel and Rees 1996). 
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"cumulative environmental effects" (CEE)32, are the result of numerous, apparently 
independent, small decisions largely outside of traditional environmental assessment, 
regulation and decision-making frameworks. W.E. Odum (1982, 728) referred to this process 
as "the tyranny of small decisions", tracing its roots to contemporary scientific management 
and political decision-making structures which have shown a reductionist bias toward 
concern for the parts rather than the whole. In Odum's view, one key to avoiding the problem 
of cumulative environmental effects was for planners and politicians to adopt a "large-scale 
perspective encompassing the effects of all their little decisions" (Odum 1982, 729). Interest 
in and research on CEA has developed over the last fifteen years with the recognition of the 
deficiencies inherent to project-specific EIA (Ross 1990 in Cocklin et. al. L992a, Davies 
1991) and the need to adopt a wider frame of reference. Research conducted by Sonntag et. 
al. (1987) led to a typology of cumulative environmental effects33, and was a precursor to 
the first attempts to introduce these within existing EIA frameworks. At the heart of concern 
for cumulative effects is concern for the whole, whether a particular ecosystem, region, 
watershed, or social system, and a geographic area typically larger than that considered under 
the technical model. As well, there is a recognition that cumulative effects are in fact the 
result of numerous supportive policies, regulations and managerial decisions (Odum 1982), 
all of which should be brought within the purview of EIA. 
32 Sonntag et. at. ( 1987, 3) defined lhese as: 
• 1mpac1S on lhe natural or social environmeniS [lhal)lake place so frequently in lime or densely in space lha11he 
effeciS of individual 'insuliS' cannot be assimilated. and/or, 
• The impaciS of one activity combining with !hose of anolher in a synergistic manner. 
33 The typology included: time and space crowding; compounding effeciS; time lags; extended boundaries; triggers and 
lhresholds. and; indirect and patchiness effeciS (Sonntag et. at. 1987). 
82 
One way in which CEA has been implemented is as an information-generating 
adjunct to project-level analyses (Spaling and Smit 1993, Lawrence 1994b). At the project 
level, CEA has attempted to scientifically trace project impacts in combination with all other 
synergistic impacts. However, this approach is not promising as it quickly runs into the 
practical and theoretical difficulties of predicting the synergism of the proposal with not only 
existing projects, but also those in the earliest stages of formulation or those not yet 
formulated but with a potential to be put forth as a proposal (Kennett and Perl1995, 349). As 
well, there are typically a myriad of development activities judged loo small' to trigger 
formal EIA and CEA studies, and thus very little is known about such activities, yet these 
activities still act synergistically with the impacts of large projects. Thus, reinforcing Odum's 
(1982, 278) dictum that "regional (environmental) problems are highly vulnerable to small 
decision effects", many authors have suggested that the most useful level at which to 
implement CEA is at the regional or ecosystem level rather than the individual project level 
(Rees and Davis 1978, Dickert and Tuttle 1985, CEARC 1988, Harris 1988, Rees 1988, 
Davies 1991, Arensberg 1992, Cocklin et. al. 1992a). This coincides directly with the 
planning model's lack of emphasis on site-specific assessment. It has also been suggested 
that, as the scale of human activity has reached levels which transform global ecological 
processes, an appropriate scale at which some EIA studies should be conducted should also 
be global through a consideration of global natural capital (Goodland and Daly 1995, Rees 
1995). 
The use of the SEA, REA and CEA alternatives to project-specific EIA, while 
increasing, is still nowhere near as common as is the assessment of specific projects (Clark 
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and Herington 1988, Treweek 1995). As an example, although cumulative effects assessment 
has been applied sporadically (see Herson and Bogdan 1991; Davies 1991}, it has not 
become a standard feature of EIA as it is practiced anywhere (Cocklin et. al. 1992b). Thus, 
although CEA is recognised as potentially forging "a transition from project-specific 
environmental management to a more comprehensive holistic approach to the environment" 
(CEARC 1988, 1), it remains largely a guiding concept that has not yet been transformed into 
a practical operational framework. Similar sentiments can be applied to strategic 
environmental assessment and regional environmental assessment, particularly in developing 
countries where, although " ... considerable experience has been developed on the application 
of EIA at the project level, commensurate progress at policy and programme levels simply 
has not been made" (Biswas 1993, 4). 
2.7.4.2 Uncertainty as an Organising Framework for EIA 
The planning model of EIA has benefited from and incorporated the results of 
complex systems research and theories, and research on the outcomes of development 
interventions. This research has demonstrated that systemic responses to perturbation are 
difficult or impossible to predict due to the tendency of such systems to behave in 
unpredictable, surprising, chaotic and indeterminant manners, and that unanticipated 
outcomes of development projects and programmes are ubiquitous (Black 1991). In the 
planning model, uncertainty is understood to be present in any attempt to assess the 
environmental impacts of proposed developments. Although prediction is still an aspect of 
the planning model, much less trust is placed upon the accuracy and comprehensiveness of 
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that prediction34. Instead, unexpected outcomes are expected, monitoring is encouraged 
throughout the lifetime of the development in order to reveal both the accuracy of predictions 
and unexpected system responses, and attempts are made to adapt the development to any 
unexpected system responses. Complex systems theory has undermined the technical model's 
presumption that ecosystemic management can be effected by humans, and the planning 
model has responded with a more cautious approach to prediction and development. 
Returning to the contention that CEA embodies planning model ideals, at least one 
author has judged cumulative effects assessment to be " ... a firm rebuttal of the reductionist, 
mechanistic approaches to environmental knowledge and problem solving" (Cocklin 1993, 
12). CEA is generally understood to involve a higher degree of monitoring and a recognition 
of limits to predictive capacities than does EIA under the technical model. As well, it 
provides a powerful conceptual framework which regional planners and managers can use to 
justify the adaptation and modification of ongoing development in the face of emerging 
systems behaviours. Thus, the expansion in use of CEA has led to a corresponding 
acknowledgement of uncertainty in EIA. 
Another form of EIA that evolved out of the ideals of the planning model is 'adaptive 
environmental assessment and management' (AEAM). AEAM is an approach to impact 
assessment that combines scientific prediction (through the use of computer simulation 
modeling) with human intuition, and an understanding that accurate prediction is impossible. 
34 By definition. environmental impact assessment must contain some component of prediction if it is to be useful in 
reducing the negative impacts of development proposals. What differs in the planning model is the level of certainty that 
such predictions are accurate and cover the full range of eventual impacts, and the timing of predictive effons. The planning 
model of EIA views the effort to predict impacts as imprecise, often wrong, and lacking in comprehensiveness, and builds 
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It is thus understood that development activities that have been allowed to proceed under 
AEAM must be continuously monitored, adjusted and adapted to systemic responses in a 
process of adaptive learning (Briassoulis 1989). The approach emerged out of the recognition 
that the dominant theme in most environmental issues is uncertainty and surprise (Jones and 
Grieg 1985), and thus, there is a need for "prepared responsiveness" (Holling 1978 in 
Briassoulis 1989, 386). AEAM revolves around a series of workshops, the primary objectives 
of which are: to develop a concensus-based computer simulation model of the (eco)system 
being assessed; to integrate various forms of knowledge about the system and the proposed 
development into a description allowing impact prediction and evaluation of alternatives, 
and; to review, evaluate and revise the environmental management decision based on phased 
implementation, pilot projects, monitoring and redesign (Jones and Grieg 1985). 
Out of AEAM can be discerned a blend of the technical and planning models of EIA. 
The technical model is reflected in AEAM's attempts to simplify, model, isolate key 
variables, quantify and predict. The planning model is reflected in AEAM's dependence on 
intuitive knowledge, on skepticism about the accuracy of the model's predictive capacities, 
and on the need to continually monitor and redefine management approaches based on new 
information. The AEAM approach admits that ecosystemic behaviours are fraught with 
surprise and uncertainty, yet counsels that developments and management interventions can 
produce fewer negative impacts if implemented cautiously, and are monitored and adapted to 
the emerging responses of the surrounding systems. AEAM reflects the planning model in 
acknowledging that fundamental data and theoretical understanding often do not exist when 
upon this by counseling that developments should be implemented cautiously and in phases whenever possible to allow for 
continuous monitoring. learning and adaptation in the face of emerging knowledge. 
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EIA studies are first initiated. Holling (1978), one of the main creators and proponents of 
AEAM, clearly saw the approach as differing from the technical model when he stated that 
" .. .if assessment continues into the future, then prediction loses its status as a goal, and 
(impact) assessment merges into environmental management" (Holling 1978, 133). 
2.7.4.3 The Growing Acceptance of Multiple Epistemologies in EIA 
Economic, environmental and social goals are value-laden. Therefore, local 
values, as well as local knowledge and ideas, need to be integrated with 
scientific analyses in strategic decisions. Multiple perspectives should be 
sought (Carew-Reid et. al. 1994, 53). 
The planning model has been influential in legitimising non-scientific knowledge and 
the inclusion of values in EIA processes, particularly those emerging from so-called 
'traditional societies'. Traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) has been described as a 
knowledge base developed over "a millennia of observation, trial and error", and resulting in 
activities which are in "intimate adaptation to the environment" and in "management 
practices ... more specialised and sophisticated than many resource scientists are prepared to 
credit" (Sadler and Boothroyd 1994, 2). Burrows et. al. ( 1991, 269) referred to the 
"instinctive holistic view" of traditional societies, a view which forms the basis of much of 
TEK and which could provide a counter-balance to the reductionist tendencies of scientific 
knowledge. Thus, the use of a multiple epistemological perspective has been advocated for 
use in EIA in order to balance its tendency toward specialisation, improve communication 
among diverse social groups, and enhance the abilities ofEIA to predict and monitor impacts 
(Dene Cultural Institute 1994). 
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One of the first and most successful attempts to incorporate a multiple 
epistemological perspective in EIA was the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry or 'Berger 
Inquiry'. In addition to scientific studies prepared by over three hundred expert witnesses, 
community hearings were held in northern native communities in order to allow native 
peoples to tell the Inquiry " .. .in their own language and in their own way- what their lives 
and their experience led them to believe the impact of a pipeline and an energy corridor 
would be" (Berger 1984, 3). The traditional knowledge and values that emerged from 
community hearings, far more than the 'value-free' scientific evidence submitted as part of 
the EIA, led to the conclusion that the proposed development would result in "sudden, 
massive and overwhelming" social costs. These costs, it was concluded, could only be 
mitigated by at least ten years of prior effort to strengthen native societies and economies, 
particularly through the settling of native land claims (Berger 1984, 4). Berger identified the 
proposed pace of development activities as perhaps the most crucial determiner of social 
impacts. Mirroring the approach suggested under a planning model of EIA, he urged that 
development proceed in a cautious, incremental manner which would assist in the monitoring 
and adaptation of development, and to the incremental strengthening of local self-
determination. A ten year moratorium on pipeline development was recommended by the 
inquiry in order to implement the interim measures needed to buffer northern communities 
from the pipeline's impact35. 
35 The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline did not proceed after the ten year moratorium suggested by Berger expired. nor were the 
suggested interim measures implemented. 
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2. 7.5 Summary 
In summary, the technical and planning models of EIA represent very different 
normative conceptions of impact assessment (see Table l.l). This has strong implications 
upon what is considered to be the 'appropriate' subject matter of EIA, the processes used to 
carry out the assessment process, and the individuals deemed important enough to involve in 
impact assessment. The following section traces existing literature on EIA capacity-building 
in developing countries, and describes the few research efforts which have examined the 
links between models of EIA emerging in developing countries and international aid agencies 
programming. 
2.8 Empirical Research on EIA Capacity-Building in Developing Countries 
.. All international organizations promote institutional strengthening, but no one 
quite knows how to do it" (Horberry 1985, 219) 
Capacity-building is a concept that has emerged as an extremely popular focus of 
international aid agency work in the 1990s, perhaps second only to sustainable development 
as a stated goal of development aid. As a development concept, it received its greatest boost 
in popularity following the 1992 UN Rio conference and the subsequent release of the 
Agenda 21 report. Capacity-building is defined in Agenda 21 (UNCED 1992, 37.1) as the 
process of strengthening a country's "human, scientific, technological, organizational, 
institutional and resource capabilities", particularly as this relates to "crucial questions related 
to policy choices and modes of implementation among development options, based on an 
understanding of environmental potentials and limits". 
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Expressed mainly through international aid agency programmes, capacity-building is 
supported vigorously by development aid officials because it is seen as a means by which aid 
programming can help developing countries to help themselves long after funds have been 
spent. Thus, capacity-building is seen as one way to provide leverage' to limited aid dollars. 
Capacity-building, when applied to an environmental planning theme, can involve a number 
of components: Technology Transfer (e.g. the provision of information technologies, 
computer software, or pollution prevention technologies); Equipment (e.g. the provision of 
computers, vehicles, monitoring equipment); Research (i.e. carried out by aid personnel or in 
partnership with locals); and most importantly, Human Resource Development (e.g. training 
and education); lnstitmional Strengthening (e.g. administrative restructuring); and 
Regulatory and Policy Refonns (e.g. assistance to governments to create or refine 
environmental or development planning laws, or assistance with governmental policy 
reforms). 
In academic research on EIA in developing countries, many authors have pointed to a 
generalised lack of capacity to implement EIA "as intended", and thus, EIA capacity-building 
programmes, both indigenous and development assistance-sponsored, have become an 
important component ofEIA implementation in developing countries (Malik 1995, Robinson 
1992, Simonis 1990, World Bank 1992). A capacity-building approach can address both 
governmental and non-governmental capacities, can lead to multi-dimensional and cross-
sectoral improvements, and should emphasize the importance of understanding the historical 
context within which an activity such as capacity-building operates (Qualman and Bolger 
1996). Precursors to capacity-building approaches usually emphasized technical, 
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technological, and sectoral assistance to the government sector, and did not stress meaningful 
public participation in programme design or as a programme goal. This often resulted in 
fairly narrow capacity gains within specific sectors, and limited self-sustaining capacity 
gains. By contrast, a capacity-building approach offers potential to achieve fundamental 
transformations, or in the research discussed here, to go beyond "EIA as intended" and more 
generally transform existing development planning processes to facilitate sustainable 
development. 
ln examining available research on environmental planning capacity-building in 
developing countries, it is clear that without the dual influence of international aid agency 
pressure and capacity-building programmes, "there would be much less support for 
environmental policies, including EIA, in developing countries" (Horberry 1985, 220). 
However, it is also clear that to date, there have been remarkably few examples of empirical 
research examining EIA capacity-building programmes and the models of ElA process 
promoted through such programmes. Welles (1995, 105) documented a joint USAIDIWRI 
research project which was to have identified, as one of the project's mandates, "what other 
(development aid) donors are doing with respect to EIA capacity-building in Asia". She 
concluded that in carrying out EIA capacity-building, most of the surveyed development aid 
agencies emphasised ElA training and institution-building, while comparatively few 
emphasised public participation, provision of technical equipment, or the monitoring of 
compliance with the findings ofEIA studies (see Figure 2.2). However, this aspect of Welles' 
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research was of a cursory nature36, and in general, failed to address the model of EIA being 
promoted by development aid capacity-building programmes. 











Developm:nt Aid Agency Activities: EIA Capacity-building (Welles 1995) 
Aid Agency Activities 
In 1996 the Environment Department of the World Bank carried out the second in a 
series of reviews of the Bank's experience with EIA, and included a small section detailing 
efforts at EIA capacity-building in developing countries. Most of the Bank's EIA capacity-
building projects were at the proposal stage in 1996, thus, the document provided details on a 
total of only five .. simple hands-on training workshops", each carried out over a three-day 
36 The bulk of the article did not address the issue of what development aid agencies actually did in their EIA capacity-
building programmes: this research issue was addressed through a ~quick survey of donors to detennine what activities they 
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period (World Bank 1996, 19). No details on the form of EIA taught were mentioned, but 
presumably this would follow from the Bank's own three-volume 'EA Sourcebook' and 
would thus be geared heavily toward project-based EIA. The World Bank is explicit in 
suggesting that its own EIA procedures be used as a model in building environmental 
capacity in developing countries, promoting the concept of 'flexible harmonization'37 of 
developing country EIA processes with those of the Bank. The World Bank has committed to 
the creation of an EIA training strategy for each of its six lending Regions. One of those 
regions, the Latin American and Caribbean, screens every major38 Bank project for EIA 
capacity-building needs (World Bank 1996, 19). It should also be noted that the Bank also 
viewed internal (i.e. within the bank's own employee base) EIA capacity-building as an 
important goal for the post-1996 period. Overall, the report's discussion of EIA capacity-
building in developing countries was weak, did not explicitly discuss the model of EIA to be 
promoted by the World Bank in developing countries, and did not report empirically results 
of any form of capacity-building other than simple EIA training courses. 
In another example of published research on EIA capacity-building, Onorio and 
Morgan (1995) empirically evaluated an 11-nation EIA capacity-building programme by the 
South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). Capacity-building efforts were 
limited to a series of 5-day training courses carried out in each country over the 1992-93 
period. Although details of the course content were not given, the article's commentary on 
have underway to strengthen Asian country EIA capacities'' (Welles 1995, 114). Results comprised a scant two paragraphs 
and one descriptive figure. 
37 Aexible harmonisation would see the Bank's own EIA process form a basis around which developing countries and 
countries-in-transition would base their own EIA processes, leading to "mutual savings in time and cost~ (World Bank 1996. 
137). 
38 A 'major' project is that which warrants a 'Category A' designation under The World Bank's internal EIA categorisation, 
meaning that an EIA is "normally required" due to the likelihood of"diverse and significant environmental impacts" (World 
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changes needed for future training courses gave some insight into training course content. 
Most importantly, the authors felt that future EIA capacity-building efforts would benefit 
from an attempt to adapt "western-conceived EIA practices to (South Pacific) cultures with 
different power structures, decision-making systems, and land ownership customs" (Onorio 
and Morgan 1995, 97). Other priorities for future EIA capacity-building were: l) helping to 
better integrate EIA with national planning procedures, 2) assisting South Pacific 
communities to gain a better understanding of EIA and become involved in decision-making, 
and 3) adapting the public involvement component of EIA to reflect the local customs of 
South Pacific nations. Thus, SPREP's first experience with EIA capacity-building resulted in 
a series of changes to the EIA model being taught in the future, away from that of a technical 
model and closer to that of the planning model. However, other aspects central to a planning 
model of EIA (i.e. uncertainty, multiple knowledge bases) were not mentioned by the 
authors. 
2.9 The need for EIA Capacity-Building Research 
As the previous section has suggested, the existing 'state-of-the-art' in empirical 
research examining EIA capacity-building is underdeveloped, and requires much more 
attention. There is a general lack of research examining the level of influence the planning 
model of EIA has had in developing countries. The environmental impact assessment 
literature has indicated, at a conceptual/theoretical level, that the planning model of EIA 
shows promise for translating sustainable development goals into action in developing 
countries. However, efforts to translate the planning model's conceptual base into a coherent 
framework of EIA practice have been patchy, and largely reported in literature focusing on 
Bank 199la.4). 
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developed rather than developing countries. Thus, it is unclear whether this implies the 
planning model has not significantly influenced EIA practice in developing countries, or 
whether it has simply been underrepresented or underreported in the literature. 
There has been virtually no attempt by researchers to conduct empirical research on 
EIA capacity-building efforts by development aid agencies. What does exist are many 
examples of empirical research examining capacity deficiencies in developing country EIA 
systems (see for example: Lim 1985, Leonen and Santiago 1993, Berger 1994, Mulders 
1997) or, to a lesser extent, identifying capacity-building 'action plans' or lists of priorities for 
developing countries (see for example: Smith and Wansem 1994, Khadka and Shrestha 
1996). To date however, the author has been unable to locate any example of empirical 
research which systematically and critically examines aid-funded capacity-building 
programmes and the EIA model promoted by such programmes. 
Both research gaps may be partially explained by the relatively recent nature of both 
EIA and capacity-building as potential research subject: EIA is not yet thirty years old and 
capacity-building as a concept is arguably less than ten years old39. However, the relative 
lack of research examining the transfer from one country to another of planning techniques 
such as EIA is also an observation that can be applied more broadly to planning literature. As 
39 EIA capacity·building as a development aid priority emerged most prominently after the 1992 UNCED Rio conference 
and associated Agenda 21 repon. Chapter 37 of Agenda 21 is entitled ~National Mechanisms and International Cooperation 
for Capacity-811ilding in Developing Cormtries~. The chapter preamble introduces the concept as follows: 
The ability of a country to follow sustainable development paths is determined to a large extent by the 
capacity of its people and its institutions as well as by its ecological and geographical conditions. 
Specifically, capacity-building encompasses the country's human. scientific. technological. organizational. 
institutional and resource capabilities. A fundamental goal of capacity-building is to enhance the ability to 
evaluate and address the crucial questions related to policy choices and modes of implementation among 
development options. based on an understanding of environmental potentials and limits and of needs as 
perceived by the people of the country concerned. 
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Masser (1986, 165) observed, there is a general "lack of research on the transfer and 
diffusion of planning experience", including the transfer and export of planning experience 
between unequal developed and developing country partners. Thus, the research gap on EIA 
capacity-building in developing countries is but a subset of a more general gap in existing 
planning research and literature. 
The following chapter traces the history of EIA as a component of Vietnam's 
development planning regulatory framework, describes the main actors in Vietnam's EIA 
process, and introduces the many EIA capacity-building programmes that have attempted to 
assist Vietnam in implementing EIA. 
Chapter Three 
CHAFTERTHREE-THEEMERGENCEOFE~RO~NTALIMPACT 
ASSESSMENT IN VIETNAM 
"When you look at environmental issues in Viet Nam, you have to realise 
that it's only within the last ten years that environment even got on the 
agenda" (Informant# 15 1994). 
3.1 Development Planning and the Environmental Challenge in Viet Nam 
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Viet Nam has been characterised as the world's third largest \ransitional' country 
following China and Russia, and this transition has contained both economic and political 
elements. Following formal independence from the French in 1955, North VietNam adopted 
centralised planning in the form of the DRY model-40. During this period, the state officially 
owned all industry, and agriculture was based on a system of collectives (Elliott 1992, Irvin 
1995). Although most development planning decisions were made by the central 
government, many state enterprises were managed by provincial or local authorities. Thus, 
central planning in Viet Nam has also included significant decentralised operational decision-
making (Irvin 1995). Following the 1975 reunification of North and South Viet Nam, the 
Communist Party attempted to extend the DRV model to the south, yet throughout the 1955-
1980 period, a sizable informal sector economy co-existed with centralised planning, 
subverting its aims by providing a viable and needed economic altemati ve. 
40 DRV stands for 'Democratic Republic of VietNam". changing later to 'Socialist Republic of Viet Nam" following the 
1975 reunification of North and South VietNam (Irvin 1995. 746). 
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Efforts to reform development planning began slowly in the early 1980s (Irvin 1995, 
World Bank 1995), slowed by Soviet bloc aid which temporarily propped up the Vietnamese 
economy (Elliott 1992). Limited ad hoc reforms in the early 1980s failed to significantly 
stimulate the economy and through the mid-80s, Viet Nam experienced declining per capita 
food production, famine conditions in the north, and annualised inflation rates ranging from 
130-1000% (Elliott 1992, Irvin 1995). The impetus for more radical reform of VietNam's 
development planning process was the death of the Communist Party General Secretary, Le 
Duan, in 1986 and his replacement by a reformist, Nguyen Van Linh (Irvin 1995). The Sixth 
Party Congress, held in December of 1986, saw an open recognition that "centralised 
management.. .has weakened the socialist economy .... (and) put distribution and circulation 
in a state of chaos" (cited in Elliott 1992, 132). The Congress effectively called for an 
abandonment of the classical centrally-planned socialist industrialisation model in favour of a 
decentralised agriculture-led model (Irvin 1995). 
Against this backdrop, the doi moi policy reforms41 were launched, guiding the 
country away from central-planning toward a market economy, and these were followed by a 
second, more radical wave of reforms in 1988-89. Additional reforms have continued to be 
launched to this day, with occasional temporary retrenchment, calls for renewed 
conservatism or in some cases, reversals (Hainsworth 1999). Viet Nam is now into its second 
decade of doi moi reforms (Hainsworth 1999), and although the country has witnessed rapid 
41 A succinct translation is difficult but it is generally understood to mean 'economic renovation/reform in the pursuit of a 
mixed economy•. 'openness to new ideas·. and. somewhat less frequently. 'change within government and society'. Most 
simply. doi moi refers to the basket of reforms needed to facilitate the transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
market-based 'multi-sectoral economy (Hainsworth 1999). Policy reforms include the reduction and elimination of industrial 
subsidies. the granting of long-term land tenure certificates. free trade of agricultural products. elimination of restrictions on 
small enterprises. closure of unprofitable State Owned Enterprises. promotion of individual self-reliance. and establishment 
of a suite of policies designed to attract foreign investors (Elliott 1992. Irvin 1995. SRV 1996. Hainsworth 1999). 
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economic growth as a result, negative side effects of doi moi policies are beginning to 
emerge (e.g. environmental degradation and development-induced forced resettlement). 
Throughout the early 1990s, VietNam's GOP grew by an estimated 8.2% per annum (SRV 
1996, MPYUNDP 1997c), inflation dropped from 400% in 1988 to 5.3% in 1993 (World 
Bank 1995, 62), and industrial and service sector growth has provided a measure of balance 
to the extremely high dependence on agriculture of the 1950-1980 period. The incidence of 
household poverty has been estimated to have been reduced by more than 35% since the 
launching of doi moi reforms in 198642 (UNDP 1996b, 1). 
Along with impressive and consistent gains in economic expansion and poverty 
reduction, the dismantling of centralised planning has brought with it problems related to the 
devolution of planning control and development planning coordination by the central 
government. Regionalism, the influence of powerful local individuals and the tendency of 
provincial and commune administrations to pursue their own objectives regardless of 
whether these are in the broader public interest, are all problems with which the central 
government of VietNam is wrestling (Elliott 1992). Perhaps more importantly however, doi 
moi reforms have also led to a host of unintended social and environmental problems, 
particularly rising income disparities (Hainsworth 1999), regional development disparities 
(UNDP l996b) and widespread impacts on the environment (World Bank 1995). 
VietNam's current openly avowed development objective is to use industrialisation 
and modernisation as a means of turning the country from a "backward, agricultural country" 
42 Two 1993 surveys on which the UNDP based this estimate found that 90% of poverty-stricken households were in rural 
areas of VietNam. 
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(SRV 1996, 5) into an industrialised nation. Under this vision, agriculture and other primary 
sector activities are expected to decline steadily as a percentage of VietNam's GDP, to be 
replaced by high-value manufacturing and service sector industries. The Vietnamese 
government has established three broad 'focal economic zones' designed to act as growth 
poles for industrial development43 (MARD 1997 in Hainsworth 1999, 47), and within these 
broad zones has designated land for many 'export processing zones' and 'high technology 
industrial parks' (World Bank 1995, SRV 1996). To achieve the Viet Nam government's 
desired rate of GDP expansion of 9-10% per annum over the 1990-2000 period, planned 
growth rates for industrial outputs were 14-15% per annum, while service sector growth was 
planned to be 12-13% (SRV 1996, 6). This represents a doubling of industrial output and 
service sector contributions in only 5-6 years, and is indicative of the speed with which the 
Vietnamese government wishes to industrialise and modernise. 
The environmental implications of doi moi policies and Viet Nam's rapid 
industrialisation trajectory have received increasing attention through the 1990s, both by 
development aid and Vietnamese government agencies. Over 50% of the country's forest 
cover has been lost since 194344 and agricultural land per capita has decreased by 50% 
(World Bank 1995, MPUUNDP l997c, Quy 1997). Coastal wetland ecosystems such as 
estuaries, seasonally-inundated deltas, and mangrove forests have been hard hit by a variety 
43 These three zones 3l'e: l) Hanoi-Haiphong-Quang Ninh region in northern VietNam. 2) Quang Nam-Da Nang-Quang 
Ngai region in central VietNam. and 3) Ho Chi Minh City-Dong Hai-Vung Tau in southern VietNam. The Asian 
Development Bank has estimated that over 80% of all Foreign Direct Investment commitments have been made in these 
three 3reas alone (AOB 1995. 25). 
44 In 1943,67% of the country was forested but by l99l this had dropped to 29%. The Northern Mountains region was 
worst hit. dropping from 95% forest cover to just 17% over the same time period. (World Bank 1995. 14). Afforestation 
programmes have reduced the rate of loss but have not yet halted net losses. and primary forest3l'e being cut at a rate ~rar 
exceeding their natural regenerative capacity~ (Rambo 1995, xiii). 
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of economic development pressures, particularly agriculture and forestry, aquaculture45, and 
urban and industrial development. Agricultural intensification and extensification, while an 
important contributor to VietNam's food security, have increasingly led to environmental 
damages such as loss of biodiversity, soil degradation, habitat fragmentation and 
agrochemical pollution. Demand for forest products for construction and manufacturing has 
risen rapidly, leading to governmental efforts to reduce felling quotas (SRVIUNDP 1995b) 
and a 1991 ban on the export of logs and timber (World Bank 1995). 
Concerns about environmental degradation in Viet Nam are made all the more urgent 
by observations that, despite the successes of doi nroi policies, Viet Nam is still one of the 
poorest and most densely populated nations in the world (World Bank 1995), particularly in 
rural areas. As ranked by the United Nations Human Development Index', Viet Nam is 
considered to be at the lower end of a series of 'Medium Human Development' countries, 
placing 1l01h out of 174 countries: other countries bracketing VietNam's placement in this 
index include Algeria, El Salvador, Bolivia and Swaziland (UNDP 2001). Poverty data from 
1992-1993 revealed that 22% of all Vietnamese families fell below the hunger poverty line, 
and that 90% of these families live in rural areas (Hainsworth 1999, 1). VietNam has a rural 
population of over 55 million, extremely high rural population densities in the Mekong and 
Red River deltas (comparable to Java or Bangladesh (Hainsworth 1999, 49)), and one of the 
lowest current levels of per capita cultivated land area in the world (0.13 ha/person) (World 
Bank 1995). It has been estimated that with the combined effects of continued population 
45 The World Bank labeled lhe most widespread and destructive form of aquaculture practiced in VietNam as wshifting 
aquaculture". This refers to lhe practice of constructing low-cost ponds in acid-sulphate soil regions (formerly mangrove 
forest). and abandoning lhe pond for a new location when waters become too acid to support shrimp. usually within four 
years (World Bank 1995. 46). 
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growth and land quality degradation, per capita cultivated land area in areas such as the Red 
River Delta will decline to just 0.03 ha/person by 2025 (Quy 1997, 26}. In VietNam, as in 
other countries, rural populations depend heavily on rural natural resource bases and the 
economic activities (such as agriculture, forestry and fisheries) associated with natural 
resources. However, it is VietNam's rural population density which sets it apart from many 
other countries: negative environmental byproducts of economic activity are likely to be felt 
keenly by huge numbers of Vietnamese rural dwellers. The development and use of planning 
processes, tools and techniques, such as environmental impact assessment, which can reduce 
such impacts on Vietnamese rural dwellers is thus an exceeding[ y important component of 
VietNam's pursuit of sustainable development. 
The rapid industrialisation pursued under doi moi policies has also led to obvious 
environmental impacts in urban areas of the country. Rapid urbanisation (often unplanned 
and as a result of new industrial employment opportunities), unsuitable and dangerous mixes 
of housing and industry, proliferation of air46 and water pollution, and the production of 
increasing amounts of solid waste are all urban afflictions linked to industrialisation. The 
World Bank (World Bank 1995, 54) summed up the urban impacts of Viet Nam's 
industrialisation policies as follows: 
Contrary to casual observation, urban and industrial water and air pollution 
has become critical in Vietnam's major cities ... There are no effectively 
functioning treatment plants. Untreated sewage and industrial wastewater is 
discharged into water bodies and streams within and around (urban) areas. 
Local authorities lack the capacity to dispose of wastes and control emissions. 
461n 1995,lhe United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) estimated lhat over 3,000 Vietnamese 
industrial enterprises were discharging wastewater wilhout any form of treatmenL and over 50 toxic or hazardous gases were 
recorded present in industrial centres such as Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh City and Viet Tri (UNIDO 1995 in SRV IUNDP 1995b, 
vii). 
Vietnam's rapidly increasing pace of industrialisation and lack of pollution 
prevention and control has created urban pollution of soil, air, and water, the 
extent to which varies with location and type of industries. 
These observations are particularly true in northern Viet Nam where the bulk of 
heavy industry is located. 
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VietNam's severely restricted forest and land bases suggest that, unlike many of Viet 
Nam's neighbours, industrialisation under doi moi policies cannot depend on expansion of 
existing levels of the conversion of natural capital to manufactured capital (SRVIUNDP 
L995b). Doi moi policies initially directed investment into sectors where VietNam enjoyed a 
comparative advantage, including both labour intensive (e.g. textile, clothing and footwear) 
and resource intensive industries (e.g. fossil fuels, construction materials and food 
processing), leading to increased pollution and resource depletion. However, there has been a 
growing recognition in the country that VietNam's per capita stocks of natural capital are a 
fraction of nearby countries such as Malaysia, even after significant economic development 
has already taken place47. Thus, foreign aid agencies have begun working with the 
Vietnamese government to design environmental and economic regulations ensuring that 
both domestic and foreign economic developments are guided toward environmental 
sustainability (SRV/UNDP L995b, viii). 
Environmental concerns and rising awareness culminated in two key policy 
contributions in the early 1990s: the June 1990 release of Viet Nam's National Plan for 
47 In 1995 the Vietnamese Government and UNDP estimated that forested land per capita in VietNam was 0.14 hafperson 
and arable land was 0.09 hafperson. while in Malaysia the figures were estimated to be 1.02 hafperson (forested land) and 
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Environment and Sustainable Development (NPESD), and participation in and submission to 
the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The NPESD 
represented a significant formal policy commitment to the incorporation of environmental 
considerations into VietNam's development planning framework, and guided the reform of 
development planning policies, action plans and institutional structures throughout the 1990s 
(SRVIUNDP 1995b). VietNam's UNCED submission, while not binding, is best viewed as 
an international declaration of the country's commitment to "sustainable national 
development" (SRV 1992, 2), and sustainable development goals. These and other initiatives 
described in the following section suggest that Viet Nam has made good initial progress in 
addressing environmental concerns linked to doi moi policies, and that there is a serious 
desire among some members of the Vietnamese government to restructure the development 
planning process along sustainable development lines. Nonetheless, Viet Nam's 
environmental prognosis remains questionable to many aid agency staff, stimulating among 
aid officials a sense of urgency and desire to fund sustainable development-related aid 
programmes. As one NGO country representative suggested: 
Every (developing) country has problems, and every country is trying to 
achieve economic growth, and for most countries it is obvious how it will tum 
out environmentally and economically ... .ln VietNam it could go either way. 
They could become another tiger, or they could fall off into some kind of eco-
spasm". 
(Informant #15 1994) 
It is within this framework of caution and concern that aid officials have embraced one 
particular environmental planning process, environmental impact assessment, as a means for 
Viet Nam to facilitate sustainable development. 
0.27 ha/person (arable land) respectively (SRV/UNDP l995b. vii). 
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3.2 The Chronology of EIA in VietNam 
The remainder of this chapter is an historical analysis of the development and 
implementation of EIA in Viet Nam and the model of EIA practiced to date, and an 
introduction to the many EIA capacity building projects that have been funded and carried 
out by development aid agencies. Information sources which contributed to the analyses 
included published books, published journal, newspaper and magazine articles, "grey 
literature" (unpublished reports issued by government agencies, development aid agencies, 
research institutes and consulting firms) and key informant interviews. 
VietNam, largely due to its tumultuous recent development history, has only recently 
directed attention toward the unwanted environmental and social impacts of development. 
Unlike many counterpart nations in Southeast Asia, environmental impact assessment is a 
new addition to the Vietnamese planning structure. Although hopes are high that EIA will 
play a significant role in future movement toward sustainable development, current capacities 
to implement EIA in VietNam are very low. 
Prior to 1983, the term "Environmental Impact Assessment" was virtually unknown 
in Viet Nam (Can 1997). However, concerns over the unintended negative effects of 
development, particularly environmental effects, received steadily increasing attention in the 
country throughout the 1980s. The Doi Moi policies initiated in 1986 and still underway, 
were a major catalyst to the increased profile of environmental concerns in the country. New 
institutions and administrative structures were created in order to address such environmental 
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planning concerns: institutions crucial to an understanding of the environmental and 
development planning system that has since emerged are described in Box 3.1. 
As early as 1984, Viet Nam explored the use of EIA as a means of reducing the 
negative impacts of economic development (Can 1994a). Bolstered by the many changes 
brought on by the Doi Moi policy, the country has since made steady progress in advancing 
the use of EIA within its development planning framework. Viet Nam's official participation 
in the 1992 UNCED conference, and its progress on a host of international and national 
environmental action plans, have assisted in raising the profile of environmental planning 
processes such as EIA. 
Viet Nam's key piece of environmental protection legislation, the National Law on 
Environmental Protection (NLEP), came into effect early in 1994. As a "framework" piece of 
legislation, it requires MOSTE (at the central level) and DOSTEs (Departments of Science, 
Technology and Environment at the provincial level) to prepare specific decrees, guidelines, 
decisions, and circulars addressing specific problems. While separate laws exist, for example 
on land, water resources and forestry, the NLEP regulates general issues related to 
environmental protection. The government has already issued several decrees including those 
pertaining to: environmental impact assessment; inspection and control; environmental 
quality standards, and environmental monitoring. Recently, emphasis has been placed by the 
government on the issuance, by OOSTEs, of environmental standards for each of VietNam's 
53 provinces. However, the implementation of the NLEP has been slow, and observers in 
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Viet Nam have commented that "what is said in the Environmental Protection Law is not yet 
fully implemented, not even close" (Informant #51 1998). 
Box 3.1: Environmental Planning Structure in Viet Nam 
There are two key Ministries responsible for administering the confluence between 
environmental and development planning. The first, the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Environment (MOSTE) and its provincial level counterpart DOSTEs, was given responsibility for 
environmental protection in VietNam in 1992. In 1994, restructuring within MOSTE produced the 
National Environment Agency (NEA) which has the overall authority to implement environmental 
policy in the country. The NEA is responsible for developing environmental legislation and standards, 
reviewing EIAs, and carrying out compliance enforcement and environmental monitoring (Asia 
Environmental Trading (AET) Ltd. 1999). While many other line ministries such as Forestry or 
Agriculture deal regularly with environmental issues, MOSTE takes official responsibility for 
environmental affairs in VietNam. MOSTE is not considered to be a strong ministry (Informant #15 
1994, Informant #16 1994, Informant #23 1995), particularly in comparison to the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment or the Ministry of Industry. MOSTE's weakness and lack of official 
recognition by other ministries may be explained by its relative "youth". its overall shortage of staff 
and funding, Vietnamese development priorities, and the general state of procedural and regulatory 
flux surrounding development planning in Viet Nam. 
The most important organisation regulating development planning is the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment (MPI), also judged by many to be one of the most powerful ministries in Viet Nam. 
The MPI was created in 1995 following the merger of the State Planning Committee (SPC) and the 
State Committee for Co-operation and Investment (SCCI). Most significant development projects 
must gain investment licensing approval from the MPI, a process that may or may not trigger an EIA 
depending on a variety of formal and informal criteria relating to project type, size and financial 
investment (World Bank 1995). 
In addition to MOSTE and MPI, other line ministries have had environmental protection 
mandates codified through the establishment of Environment Units within ministerial Science and 
Technology Departments, or through the work of environmental specialists within the personnel ranks 
of the ministry. In some cases, limited environmental impact assessment functions have been carried 
out within Environment Units (e.g. the Ministry of Transport and Communications has carried out 
initial environmental impact assessment studies on its own highway and port development proposals) 
(Informant #49 1998). Nonetheless, final EIA review responsibility remains with MOSTE. 
(Sources: Informant #15 1994, Informant #16 1994, Informant #23 1995, World Bank 1995, 
Informant #49 1998, Asia Environmental Trading (AET) Ltd. 1999). 
In addition to the expansion of the country's regulatory and administrative 
framework, another critical factor leading to increased acceptance of environmental planning 
and EIA in VietNam has been the expansion, or in many cases, resumption48 of multilateral, 
48 The International Monetary Fund lifted its ban on relations with Vietnam on July 15. 1993. Lending to Vi::mam by the 
Asian Development Bank resumed July 28, 1993, and other majors donors such as the World Bank resumed lending 
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bilateral and non-governmental development aid, "especially since 1993" (SRV 1996, 26). 
This has brought with it both a requirement that environmental assessment be carried out on 
proposed aid-funded projects, and a relatively new development aid mandate: the desire by 
aid agencies to instill environmental planning measures such as EIA as part of the overall aid 
package. One senior staff member of a multilateral aid agency observed that in VietNam, 
many such measures have been "donor-driven", with aid donors identifying priority 
environmental issues and designing the responses (Informant #1 1994). Environmental 
impact assessment has been a very high priority for many donors, and a multitude of 
programmes concentrating on EIA "capacity-building" have been implemented. 
Viet Nam's experience with environmental impact assessment can be thought of as 
occurring in three relatively distinct phases: the learning phase (pre-1990); the formalisation 
phase (1990-1994), and; the implementation and capacity-building phase (1995-present). 
These are detailed in the following sections. 
3.2.1 Phase 1: The Learning Phase (pre-1990) 
The "learning" phase of EIA in Viet Nam was characterised by a series of indigenous 
research programmes, training efforts, and "learn-by-doing" EIA case studies (see Table 3.1). 
The creation of the National Research Programme on Environment (NRPE) in 1981 provided 
the first measure of structure to VietNam's progress in applying EIA, and the programme 
was responsible for the first EIA course offered in-country. Over 200 scientists from 
universities, colleges and research institutes around VietNam participated in NRPE over the 
next ten years (Can 1994b). During the same time period there were several attempts by 
immediately following Viemam's repayment oflMF arrears on Oct- 7. 1993 (Informant #2 1994). 
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university departments, government staff, specialised research programmes, and institutes to 
conduct initial environmental examinations (lEE) or "pilot" EIAs of large projects. However, 
since the development planning process of the time period did not legally require EIA, and 
EIA methods were not well known in VietNam, early studies were largely "ad hoc", isolated 
from official planning processes, or were carried out or post-construction. One of the most 
historically significant of these post-construction EIAs was carried out in 1989 on the Hoa 
Binh dam and reservoir project, and its results have served as EIA training case study 
materials ever since (see Plate 3.1 and Box 3.2). 
Table 3.1: The Learning Phase of EIA in Viet Nam (pre-1990) 
1981: •State Committee for Sciences and Technology (SCST) funds the National Research 
Programme on Environment (NRPE). 
1984: •NRPE offers first EIA short-course. 
•First EIA initiated in VietNam: Tri An Water Reservoir (initial environmental investigation 
and later, a post-construction EIA). 
1985: •First legislation indicating the need for environmental considerations in decision-making on 
major development projects (Resolution No. 246/HDBT, 20/09/85). 
•Draft National Strategy for Environmental Protection outlines suggested actions to provide 
for the "gradual and solid development of a comprehensive framework for national and sub-
national environmental planning and management" (SRV 1992, 35). 
1986: •Five year research project on EIA methods and procedures initiated by SCST. EIA 
legislation and approaches of Indonesia. Malaysia and Thailand examined. 
1987: •First extended EIA training course offered at Center for Natural Resources and 
Environmental Studies (CRES), University of Hanoi. Between 1987-1995. 180 SCST staff 
attend the six-month course. 
•Environmental Impact Assessment Research Unit (EIA-RU) established at CRES 
1989: •Hoa Binh Reservoir post-construction EIA case study carried out by NRPE. 
(Sources: Hirsch 1992.1DRC 1993a. Can 1994a, Can 1994b, Can 1997, Sang 1997) 
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Environmental impact IBieSSIDeDt during the learning phase bad value mainly as a 
teaching, training and capacity-building resource rather than as a development planning 
input. This phase was typified by indigenous efforts to learn about EIA, yet was hampered by 
a lack of coordinated networking among EIA researchers and was not linked in any way to 
the Vietnamese development planning process. 
Plate 3.1: Boa Biah BalD 
(Photo: Doberstein 1998) 
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Box 3.2: Boa Binh Hydropower Project 
The Hoa Binh dam. 70 kilometres west of Hanoi. is Viet Nam' s largest hydro project. The 
dam was built in stages between 1979 and 1994, and when completed had a maximum generating 
capacity of 1920 MW and a reservoirof230 km length (Research Notes 1998). By completion, a total 
of 58,000 residents had been displaced, 167 workers had been killed, and 11.000 ha of agricultural 
and forested land had been flooded. Although no formal environmental or social impact studies were 
conducted before the dam's construction, limited "post-construction" EIA studies were carried 
through the government-funded National Research Programme on Environment, and then used as 
case study training materials by various Vietnamese university departments. 
Hirsch (1992) carried out independent impact assessment research as the dam neared 
completion. Although his study was not a formal EIA linked to Vietnamese planning processes. it 
revealed much about the nature of environmental and social impacts caused by the dam and serves as 
a useful model as to why EIA studies should have been carried out. Although the dam provides 
significant positive downstream impacts (primarily electricity generation and flood protection), most 
significant negative impacts were concentrated in the uplands regions adjacent to and upstream from 
the dam. Significant among these impacts were population displacement, deforestation (for reservoir 
preparation, and due to rapid clearing of hillsides near the reservoir by farmers displaced to upland 
portions of the watershed), enhanced soil erosion and loss of sustainable livelihoods for the former 
farmers of the region. Although the reservoir was designed to be serviceable for over 75 years, excess 
siltation has reduced its expected usefulness by 25 years. Most displaced farmers are ethnic 
minorities, primarily Muong, Tay, White Thai and Black Thai, although Hmong and Dao 
communities were also indirectly affected. Efforts to compensate these groups were judged to be an 
example of"overly centralised planning with little local involvement", and were marginally effective 
and wasteful (Hirsch 1992, 12). Compensation included both direct cash compensation and land in 
new resettlement sites (usually away from the reservoir edge in elevated uplands sites), yet "most 
families found the amounts insufficient even to cover basic removal expenses" (UNDP 1996b, 118). 
Vietnamese planners have learned from the Hoa Binh dam experience and beginning in 2000 
will conduct an EIA on a linked project: the Son La hydro scheme upstream of the Hoa Binh 
reservoir. The scheme will have up to 3600 MW of generating capacity, or roughly twice that of Hoa 
Binh dam. Hirsch (1992, 25) estimated that up to 130,000 ethnic minority peoples and Kinh majority 
peoples will be displaced by the project. Although impact assessment studies had not commenced as 
of 1998, the scheme will likely be subject to a series of environmental, economic and social impact 
studies (Informant #59 1998). Because the project will likely be funded by international aid agencies, 
the Vietnamese government has taken steps to ensure that the impact assessment undertaken for the 
scheme is of a relatively high quality. The government has requested that at least three different aid-
funded capacity building projects prepare guidelines for hydro impact assessment studies. 
The value of such guidelines remains in question: some key informants in Viet Nam were of 
the opinion that the dam will go ahead regardless of EIA study findings (Informant #15 1994. 
Informant #48 1998). The proof of this, according to one researcher at an environmental institute, is 
the Vietnamese Government's ongoing effort to relocate the soon-to-be flooded provincial capital Lai 
Chau to Dien Bien (Informant #48 1998). Nonetheless. EIA studies will undoubtedly recommend 
impact mitigation possibilities, ranging from design changes to resettlement plans, and may represent 
the last chance of reducing some of the negative environmental and social impacts of the project. 
(Source: Hirsch 1992, Can 1994, lnformant#15 1994, UNDP 1996b, lnformant#48 1998) 
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3.2.2 Phase ll: The Formalisation Phase (1990 -1994) 
Over the 1990-1994 period, there was a rapid increase in the number of initiatives 
linked to environmental impact assessment, and strong progress was made toward 
formalising the role of EIA in development planning (see Table 3.2). Most notable during 
this period was the release and implementation of the NPESD. Within this plan, the 
development and implementation of EIA was seen by the Vietnamese Government as one of 
its "highest priorities" in reforming the government's legislative, policy and development 
planning framework (SRVIUNDP 1991, 20). The NPESD spawned many linked activities, 
including conferences, institutional restructuring, and issuance of supplemental 
environmental guidelines. Although increasingly out of date, the NPESD remains the single 
most important event responsible for the legitimisation of EIA in Viet Nam. 
Viet Nam's environmental policy and institutional framework evolved most rapidly 
between 1993 and 1994. VietNam passed its National Law of Environmental Protection 
(NLEP) late in 1993 (see Box 3.3). Although the NLEP represents an environmental policy 
statement more than a set of clear rules, procedures, liabilities or sanctions, it is nonetheless 
seen as a major achievement that some Vietnamese individuals worked toward for over 20 
years (Informant #9 1994). With the NLEP coming into force early in 1994, EIA became a 
requirement for many proposed developments, with specific guidelines (Decree 175/CP) 
issued later in the year. As a result of NPESD recommendations, the Vietnamese National 
Environment Agency (NEA) was created in 1994 as a sub-unit within MOSTE, and as the 
central and prime authority administering and implementing EIA in VietNam. 
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Table 3.2: The FormaUsation Phase of EIA in VietNam (1990-1994) 
1990: •NRPE submits detailed proposal for suggested EIA regulations to SCST. 
•International conference on "Environment and Sustainable Development" held in Hanoi. 
•Instruction No 187/Cf (12106197) implementing "National Plan for Environment and 
Sustainable Development: a Framework for Action. 1991-2000" {NPESD). 
•Initiation of first EIA prepared by an international environmental Consultancy {ESSA Ltd .• 
Canada). Quan Lo - Phung Hiep irrigation project. 
1991: -Government publishes NPESD guiding the rapid development of environmental planning. 
and especially EIA. over the following years. 
1992: •State Committee for Science and Technology restructured and renamed Ministry of Science. 
Technology and Environment {MOSTE). 
1993: •Prime Minister issues Order No. 73/TTg. (25/02193) on "the urgent task of environmental 
protection" which requires all major development projects to "have an EIA". 
•Issuance of temporary guidelines for the "implementation of environmental impact 
assessments" for major development projects {No. 1485/MTg. 10/09/93). 
•Law on Environmental Protection {umbrella legislation for EIA requirements) promulgated 
Dec. 27. 1993. 
1994: •National Law on Environmental Protection (NLEP) in force as of 10/01/94. Anicles 17 and 
18 outline EIA requirements. 
•MOSTE's Depanment of Environment and Natural Resources renamed the "National 
Environment Agency" {NEA) and given implementing authority for EIA. Initial staff of 17 
rising to 30 by year end. 
-Government decree on "Guidance for the implementation of the Law on Environmental 
Protection" {Decree 175/CP. 18/10/94). Chapter 3 details EIA requirements. 
-Guidelines issued for "EIA for ongoing plants" (Circular 1420/MTg. 26/11/94). "regulation 
and organisation of the appraisal committee on environmental impact assessment" and 
"issuance of environmental licenses" {Decisions 1806/QD-MTg. 31/12/94 and 1870/QD-
MTg. 31/12194). 
(Sources: SRVIUNDP 1991, Can 1994a. Can 1994b. Informant #11 1994. SRV 1994. SRVIUNDP 
1995a. Sang 1997) 
Initial EIA requirements specified under Decree 175/CP were ambitious, requiring 
that both proposed and existing domestic and foreign joint-venture projects and institutions 
of virtually all kinds and scales would be subject to EIA, as would area master plans. and 
provincial and urban development plans (Binnie & Partners et. al. 1994, SRVIUNDP 1995a). 
The requirement that existing projects (i.e. approved before the NLEP came into force) 
should conduct an EIA is atypical of the normal use of the EIA concept, and is perhaps better 
known as "environmental auditing". However, it should also be noted that other developing 
countries such as Indonesia have adopted similar requirements in the early years of EIA 
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implementation. Such an approach is best seen as a conscious desire by developing countries 
to bring all developments under at least cursory environmental, and in some cases social, 
impact scrutiny. 
Box 3.3: Vietnamese EIA Requirements in Law 
Articles 17 and 18 in the National Law ofEnvironmental Protection provide the legal basis for EIA in 
Viet Nam, while Decree 175/CP while a variety of Circulars, Decisions and Official Documents 
provide further details (see Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). 
National Law on Environmental Protection 
Article 17: Organizations and individuals in charge of the management of economic, scientific, 
technical, health, cultural, social, security and defense establishments that have begun operation prior 
to the promulgation of this law must submit an EIA report on their respective establishments for 
appraisal by the State management agency for environmental protection. 
In case of failure to meet environmental standards, the organizations of individuals concerned 
must take remedial measures within a given period of time as stipulated by the State management 
agency for environmental protection. Upon expiry of the stipulated time limit, if they still fail to meet 
the requirements of the State management agency for environmental protection, the latter shall report 
to the higher State authority at the next level to consider an decide on the suspension of operation or 
other penalizing measures. 
Article 18: Organizations, individuals when constructing, renovating production areas, population 
centers or economic, scientific, technical, health, cultural, social, security and defense facilities; 
owners of foreign investment or joint venture projects, and owners of other socioeconomic 
development projects, must submit EIA reports to the State management agency for environment 
protection for appraisal. 
The result of the appraisal of EIA reports shall constitute one of the bases for competent 
authorities to approve the projects or authorize their implementation. The Government shall stipulate 
in detail the formats for the preparation and appraisal of EIA reports and shall issue specific 
regulations with regards to special security and defense establishments mentioned in Article 17 and in 
the article. The National Assembly shall consider and make decision on projects with major 
environmental impacts. A schedule of such types of projects shall be determined by the Standing 
Committee of the National Assembly. 
Government Decree 175/CP 
According to Government Decree 175/CP, EIAs must be conducted for the following projects, 
programs and strategies: 
1) The overall strategies for regional development, strategies and plans for the development of 
provinces and cities under the central government, and strategies for urban and population 
development. 
2) Economic, scientific, health care, cultural, social, security and defense projects. 
3) Projects being carried out within VietNam with the funds invested, assisted, granted or contributed 
by foreign organizations or individuals or international organizations. 
4) Projects mentioned in Items 1, 2 and 3 above that were approved before 10 January 1994 but that 
have not yet conducted an EIA. 
5) Economic, scientific, health care, culture, social, security and defense units that have been 
operating since before 10 January 1994. 
(Source: SRVIUNDP 1995a) 
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Viet Nam designed its EIA requirements with inputs from a variety of international 
influences. Vietnamese policy-makers examined the EIA systems and experiences of other 
Asian countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, and most notably, Thailand. Thailand's EIA 
system was felt to be particularly relevant due to the country's similar geographical position, 
climatic regimes and environmental problems (Informant #29 1995, Informant #30 1995). As 
well, a series of multilateral, bilateral and NGO aid agencies influenced the establishment of 
Viet Nam's EIA process. In 1992, the University of Hawaii's East/West Center hosted a 
group of Vietnamese researchers for an intensive six-week effort at producing a Vietnamese-
language EIA manual (Informant #30 1995, Informant #48 1998). During the same time 
period UNEP, ESCAP, UNESCO, IUCN and a host of bilateral aid agencies provided further 
assistance through workshops, informal discussions and the provision of secondary 
documents relating to EIA (Informant #30, 1995). 
3.2.3 Phase ill: The Implementation/Capacity-Building Phase 0995-present) 
During the 1995-1997 period, continued progress on EIA implementation was made 
and there was a rapid expansion in the numbers of national- and provincial-level 
environmental assessments conducted and reviewed. The multitude of supporting conditions 
needed to integrate EIA with Vietnamese development planning processes led to a steady 
stream of new regulatory guidelines, NEA staff level increases and both indigenous and 
development-aid funded capacity-building initiatives (see Table 3.3). 
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This process of capacity-building is anticipated to continue well into the future. Over 
the 1998-2000 period, the NEA has indicated its desire to create an information database 
system for the management of EIA information, to expand its national monitoring network, 
and to expand efforts to integrate EIA with regional and national planning processes (Sang 
1997, 10). Such capacity-building efforts will be financed primarily through multilateral, 
bilateral and NGO aid funding. 
Table 3.3: Implementation/Capacity-Building Phase of EIA in Viet Nam (1995-present) 
1995: -Guidelines on "preparation and evaluation of environmental assessment repons for foreign 
direct investment projects" (Circular 715/MTg. 03/04/95). 
•Rapid increases in the numbers ofEIAs produced and reviewed (>800 as of03/95). 
•National Forum on Environmental Education and Training held 27-29/12/95. 
•NEA has a total of 35 staff by year end. 
1996: •Sample format for EIA reports (Official Document 812/MTg. 17/04/96). 
•Environmental Standards promulgated (Decision 2920/QD-MTg. 2l/12196). 
1997: •NEA staff levels increase to 60. 
-Guidelines on "Control of pollution at business establishments after they have obtained a 
decision for approval of environmental impact assessment repon" (Circular 276fiT-MTg. 
6/03/97). 
-Guidelines on "Instruction on guidance and appraisal of environmental impact assessment 
repons for investment projects" (Circular 1100/MTg, 20/08/97). 
•>250 large project EIAs reviewed by NEA to date, and >1250 smaller projects reviewed by 
MOSTE provincial counterpans (DOSTE). Few proposals rejected on environmental grounds 
alone: 70% are required to modify the proposed development in some manner. 
eQf >8000 factories inspected by NEA staff, 46% are fined $50 - S 1450 USD for polluting in 
excess of national standards (mainly chemical, garment, cement and seafood plants). At least 
54 enterprises are forced to close and S 110,000 USD in fines are collected. 
(Sources: SRV 1994, IDRC/SRV 1995, World Bank 1995, Freshfields 1997, Sang 1997, SRVIUNDP 
1995b, Thai 1997, Viemam Economic Times 1997, Vietnam Investment Review l997a & 1997b) 
3.3 The Model of EIA Initially Practiced in VietNam 
Since the mid-eighties, EIA in Viet Nam has evolved from limited use as a training 
and learning resource, to increasingly formal and systematic efforts to establish it as part of 
the development planning process. Indigenous efforts to transform development planning 
processes, and the proliferation and growing influence of EIA capacity-building aid 
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programmes, have led to the current situation where there is a general acceptance of the need 
for environmental planning procedures such as EIA, a legislative requirement that EIA be 
conducted for certain classes of proposed developments, and a track record of carrying out 
and reviewing over 1200 EIAs (see Appendix 3 for a description of the institutional 
arrangements and general steps in VietNam's EIA process). Every province in Viet Nam 
now has a functioning DOSTE and personnel numbers in the National Environment Agency 
have grown rapidly (World Bank 1995). The EIA requirement that operational projects 
should conduct an EIA has resulted in many old and polluting industries being closed down, 
fined, relocated and/or redesigned to incorporate modem pollution-prevention equipment 
(Vietnam Investment Review 1997b, Informant #53 1998). Viet Nam has thus made an 
"excellent start on developing the regulatory regime necessary to implement the findings of 
the EIA process" (SRVIUNDP 1995a, 50). 
Nonetheless, EIA as practiced in Viet Nam following the implementation of the 
NLEP is judged to have had a relatively minor effect upon development planning and 
decision-making processes, primarily due to the model of EIA adopted. Using the seven 
themes outlined in Chapters One and Two, the first few years of EIA practice are judged to 
have demonstrated that a limited, technical model of EIA (see Table 3.4) was initially 
adopted for use in Viet Nam. Public involvement in the Vietnamese EIA process, although 
present on an informal and case-by-case basis (Welles 1995), has been judged to be "weak" 
and visible "at all stages of the environmental assessment process" (Hagler-Bailly 1996, 3-5). 
Viet Nam's EIA regulations, unlike those of many other countries, "do not contain any 
reference to public participation" (World Bank 1995, 323). Whenever the opportunity to 
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participate is granted, the rules governing public involvement are unrealistically rigid: final 
EIA reports written in Vietnamese are made available to the public "at one or more of the 
following places: government agency offices, health posts, schools and libraries", and any 
public comments must be made in writing and within a short time frame (Hagler-Bailly 1996, 
3-7). This consigns public participation to the very last stages of EIA preparation, and begs 
the question how many Vietnamese people could meet the necessary requirements to 
participate49. Public participation is not allowed prior to the comment period, and this has 
contributed to the low quality and "superficial" (Hagler-Bailly 1996, 3-6) character of social 
analyses in EIAs completed to date. 
Table 3.4: EIA Model Initially Practiced in Viet Nam 
Model Criteria Vietnamese EIA Practice 
INTENDED ROLE FOR EIA IN VIETNAMESE • Technical input to technocratic planning 
DEVELOPMENT PlANNING • Mitigation role 
• Legitimising decisions already taken 
SCALE OF ASSESSMENT • Exclusively project-level EIA 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF EIA • Scientific and quantitative data 
• Indigenous knowledge, values or opinions 
not solicited or incorporated with EIA 
studies 
KNOWLEDGE CERTAINTY IN EIA • EIA predictions assumed to be accurate 
• Uncertainty not acknowledged 
TIMING AND LENGTH OF EIA ACTIVITIES • Studies conducted late in the project cycle 
(following investment licence, land 
clearance or partial construction) 
• "One-shot" studies of short duration 
PuBuc INvOLVEMENT IN EIA • Virtually non-existent 
• When public are involved, formal 
consultation mechanisms exclude majority 
of public 
PLANNING THEORY BASIS • Rational comprehensive planning + 
"cronyism" 
49 In order to participate under the current requirements, individuals must have an understanding of what EIA is. timely 
knowledge about EIA comment and review periods. access to the location(s) where the report is lodged. a high enough 
standard of technical Vietnamese language to understand the report's nuances. and the required written language abilities to 
provide written comment. This likely excludes more than 95% of VietNam's population. 
ll8 
Despite international advances in the understanding and practice of "non-project" 
EIA, including regional/areawide environmental assessment and strategic assessment, 
project-specific EIA has dominated the first few years of implementation in Viet Nam. With 
limited budgets to address environmental planning (see Table 3.5), developing country 
governments such as VietNam could "leverage" the use of EIA by first building capacity for 
strategic or regional assessment (thus eliminating the worst policy or programme options 
which may spawn hundreds of individually-damaging projects), before moving into project-
specific EIA. 
Table 3.5: Environmental Planning Budget: Government Public Investment Program 
(PIP) 50 
SECTOR Percent of Total PIP budget 
• Water Supply and Transportation 33.2 
• Irrigation, Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries 24.2 
• Energy and Industry L6.7 
• Telecommunications 7.L 
• Others (not defined) 6.4 
• Education & Training 4.2 
• Society, Health 3.7 
• Culture, Information 2.8 
• Science, Technology and Environment !:Z 
Total=lOO.O% 
(Source: SRV 1996, 24) 
To date however, no environmental assessment of a proposed development policy has 
been carried out in Viet Nam (Sy 1997). This fact may be traced back to the wording of 
50 The PIP is designed to create favourable conditions for: domestic and foreign business expansion. development of human 
resources. and stimulation of new economic growth and structural change. It is funded approximately 55% by the 
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Decree 175/CP which currently governs the practice of EIA in the country: strategic 
environmental assessment is not mentioned. Although the Decree requires that urban and 
provincial development plans and area master plans should incorporate EIA studies (Binnie 
& Partners et. al. 1994, SRVIUNDP l995a), this has not been carried out in general practice. 
The quality of many EIA studies produced by Vietnamese consultants is considered 
to be very low, and may be traced to a series of disparate factors. A strong perception exists 
among the investment community that "any EIA will pass", particularly since many 
development planning decisions have already been made through traditional, personal 
relationships at higher levels of decision-making (Informant #51 1998). In many cases, 
completed EIA studies are simply treated as the tangible evidence that administrative 
requirements have been satisfied and that the project may proceed to the project approval 
stage (Informant #47 1998). In one extreme example, a Vietnamese institute involved in EIA 
consulting reportedly advertised the fact that the institute had completed 70 EIA studies in 
three months, had a standard report framework available in their computer files which could 
be modified to suit each new project, and could produce a small- to medium-sized EIA study 
for a reasonable cost in only three days (Informant #51 1998). In such an environment, "most 
EIAs done in VietNam are essentially useless, being poorly conceived and written, and are 
just used as a requirement to pass the project" (Informant #47 1998). 
EIA quality is further lowered by a lack of willingness to fund EIA studies to an 
adequate level. The cost quoted to proponents by potential consultants is a major deciding 
factor on consultant selection, and it is common for proponents to simply select the lowest-
Vietnamese government and 45% by development aid (SRV 1996. 23). 
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cost consultant rather than consider factors such as consultant reputation or EIA study design 
and strategy (Informant #51 1998). Another factor leading to low quality EIA studies is the 
time typically allotted, particularly for domestically-funded projects. Although a large 
foreign-funded project with a mixture of foreign and Vietnamese EIA consultants may follow 
a time frame typical of developed countries, most domestic- or government-investment 
projects have resulted in EIA studies completed within 1-4 months (Informant #41 1998, 
Informant #50 1998, Informant #55 1998). Social impact assessment, while clearly stated as 
a requirement of the Vietnamese EIA process, is lacking or superficial in most EIA reports 
(Informant #53 1998, Informant #60 1998). This reflects both the current lack of highly 
trained applied social scientists (Informant #48 1998) and a recognition that the assessment 
of social impacts, while improving, is still a sensitive issue for decision-makers in VietNam 
(Informant #53 1998, Informant #62 1998). 
The first few years of EIA practice following the NLEP's promulgation have also 
pointed to a series of problems related to EIA implementation capacity in Viet Nam 
(SRVIUNDP l995b, Hagler-Bailly 1996, Sang 1997). Early practice has demonstrated 
anomalies between the model of EIA 'as designed' and the model 'as practiced'. There have 
also been reports of land clearance for major development projects proceeding in advance of 
EIA studies (SRVIUNDP 1995b, Vietnam Economic Times 1997). In the Vietnamese 
development planning process, land use permits for a specific location are frequently issued 
to investors before an initial environmental examination or full-scale EIA has been 
conducted. Thus, crucial project location decisions are left out of the purview of EIA studies 
unless an EIA review results in outright project rejection and proponents are forced to 'start 
.. 
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over'. It has also been reported that many development projects required under EIA 
regulations to carry out some measure of environmental impact study "have not gone through 
any EIA whatsoever" (Can 1997, 116). In the first few years of EIA implementation it has 
been common for EIA studies to be required only of comparatively "rich" proponents, i.e. 
foreign joint ventures, donor projects and large projects (Informant #24 1995, Informant #58 
1998). Such projects are more likely to be drawn into the EIA process due to their perceived 
wealth, whereas, "government projects are themselves not as yet subjected to satisfactory 
environmental impact assessments" (flCA 1995, 31) and many national- and provincial-level 
government projects which should have been subject to EIA have proceeded without any 
environmental or social impact studies whatsoever. Post-EIA monitoring, although specified 
in almost all EIA approval conditions, has generally been very weak (Triet 1997, Informant 
#42 1998). Each of these problems may be traced to the current lack of capacity in VietNam 
to implement the EIA process as it was originally designed . 
One factor complicating Viet Nam's efforts to implement new planning measures 
such as EIA has been the generalised trend toward decentralising the country's 
administrative, regulatory and development planning functions over the last decade. In many 
instances, the responsibility for such functions has simply been transferred to provinces 
without corresponding attention paid to increasing provincial capacities (Informant #16 1994, 
Informant #17 1994). As well, such changes have caused a great deal of uncertainty over the 
jurisdiction and authority needed to implement environmental planning measures such as 
EIA (Informant #18 1994). In some cases, positive responses have emerged: some line 
ministries, provincial DOSTEs and urban authorities have developed their own 
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environmental units or staff specialists. However, these positive examples are far from the 
norm and additional capacity-building is required before decentralisation yields benefits for 
all regions. In some cases, decentralisation has also allowed provincial-level government 
decision-makers to intensify resource development and generate personal earnings through 
the receipt of bribe money and diversion of resource profits. 
In summary, due to both weaknesses in the initial model of EIA practiced in Viet 
Nam and a lack of implementation capacities, "the environmental assessment process as 
implemented in Viet Nam is not in the critical path of the (development planning) decision-
making process" (Hagler-Bailly 1996, 3-1). At present, the main value of EIA within Viet 
Nam's development planning process is in the identification of mitigatory actions for 
proposed projects: to identify some of the areas where proposed projects can be refined and 
their negative impacts reduced or positive impacts accentuated. There are some indications 
that EIA requirements have led to secondary benefits such as wider consultation across 
ministerial boundaries, or between national, provincial and commune or mass organisation 
levels (Informant #23 1995, Informant #24 1995). Fundamentally however, the EIA process 
in Viet Nam is not yet well placed, systematic, or powerful enough to place ecological, 
equity and sustainability concerns in the same league as those of economic growth. These 
observations are both a starting point for, and legitimation of, the need for EIA capacity-
building in Viet Nam. 
The following section traces the emergence of EIA capacity-building as a 
development aid mandate in Viet Nam, and briefly introduces each of nine aid programmes 
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in operation in Viet Nam since 1994. Detailed analyses of these programmes then follow in 
Chapter Four. 
3.4 EIA Capacity-Building as a Development Aid Priority in VietNam 
The lack of EIA implementation capacity in VietNam has been openly recognised for 
many years by government policy-makers, NEA staff and development aid agencies. As a 
result, EIA capacity-building has become a national development priority (SRVIUNDP 
1991) and an important component of aid agency programming within VietNam. Although 
indigenous training and capacity-building for EIA has been conducted in Viet Nam since 
1984, and limited foreign EIA training programmes occurred as early as 198851, the first 
significant development-aid funded EIA capacity-building initiatives did not appear until 
1994 (see Table 3.6) coinciding with the implementation of the National Law of 
Environmental Protection. It has also coincided with a shift in aid programming, away from 
emergency relief and refugee assistance, toward "technical cooperation involving knowledge 
transfer and capacity building" (UNDP 1997, 9). 
Like many aid programmes, the institutional structures and decision responsibilities 
for EIA capacity-building initiatives have been complex. The most typical structure has been 
for a multilateral or bilateral development aid agency, in consultation with host government 
officials, to set broad aid programme parameters and commit funds to the programme. The 
agency then invites NGOs, consulting firms or academic institutes to prepare funding 
proposals which 'fill in the details' of proposed activities and, if successful, to carry out 
51 ln 1988 the East-West Center at University of Hawaii sponsored a two month study visit by two Vietnamese scientists to 
learn and develop knowledge about ElA. 
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implementation. A second, slightly different, structure is used by non-governmental agencies. 
Through prior work in the country, an NGO will identify a specific EIA capacity 'gap', design 
a programme addressing these gaps, and then solicit the necessary funds from existing 
multilateral or bilateral aid programmes. 
Table 3.6: Development Aid Agency EIA Capacity-Building Activities in Viet Nam 
1992: •UNEP funds three EIA shortcourses organised by the CRES "Environmental Impact 
Assessment Research Unit". 
1993: •East-West Center (U of Hawaii) workshop for Vietnamese EIA trainers on "Implementing 
Environmental Impact Assessment in Vietnam". 
•USAID/WRUJICA regional workshop on "Strengthening EIA in Asia": participants from 10 
Asian countries (including one from Viet Nam). 
•UNEP!Hanns Seidel Foundation training course on EIA techniques conducted under the Viet 
Nam Government's Science and Technology programme. 
1994: •IDRC funds a year-long course on environmental planning and management (with a 
significant unit on EIA). 
•WHO conducts EIA shortcourse, including health impact assessment. 
•SIDNIUCN "Strengthening of MOSTE" project initiated (EIA capacity-building one 
component). 
1995: •ADB "Viet Nam: strengthening environmental planning and EIA capabilities" project 
initiated. 
•UNDP's Capacity 21 "Strengthening national capacities to integrate the environment into 
investment decisions" project initiated (EIA capacity-building one component). 
eCIDA-funded "Policy Implementation Assistance Project" (PIAP) initiated (EIA capacity-
building one component). 
1996: -<:IDA-funded "Vietnam-Canada Environment Project" (VCEP) project initiated (EIA 
capacity-building one component). 
1997: •European Union project on "Capacity Building for Environmental Management in Vietnam" 
commences. 
•UNEPnDCN initiates "EIA Capacity Building-the UNEP EIA Manual Trial in Vietnam" 
project. 
•Netherlands Embassy announces new EIA capacity-building project focussing on technical 
training in EIA. 
1998: •UNDP Capacity 21 project (Phase m initiated: three demonstration projects feature 
areawide environmental assessment. 
(Sources: IDRC 1993a, ADB 1994a, Can 1994b, ESCAP Environment News 1994, IDRC/SRV 1995, 
RCG/Hag1er-Bailly 1995, SRV/UNDP 1995a, Smith and van der Wansem 1995, Welles 1995, 
ESSA/SNC Lavalin 1996b, Hagler-Bailly 1996, EU Project 1997a, UNEP 1997, Vietnam News 
1997) 
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Within development aid programmes it is often difficult to trace responsibility for 
specific design details, and EIA capacity-building programmes are no exception to this. Most 
typically, EIA capacity-building programmes result from of a combination of design 
influences. Funding agencies impose their own programme parameters, host country 
governments express their own development priorities, and influential host country 
individuals are often of key importance in designing aid programmes. At the implementation 
stage, implementing agencies often stamp their own priorities upon aid programmes, changes 
to original programme designs are common, priorities unforeseen at the programme design 
stage result in programme changes, and 1mplementation gaps' (i.e. differences between what 
is intended at what emerges during implementation) frequently emerge in aid programmes 
due to institutional, personnel or technical limitations (Gow and Morss 1988). 
Over the six years following the implementation of the NLEP, numerous EIA 
capacity-building projects were designed and funded by bilateral, multilateral and non-
governmental development aid agencies, and are profiled briefly in the following pages. In 
the first few months following the implementation of the NLEP, aid agencies committed so 
much funding and initiated so many programmes that the absorptive capacity of NEA and 
MOSTE was seriously tested52. However, this problem has since been reduced through 
increased staffing levels within MOSTEINEA, and better awareness on the part of aid 
agencies. 
520ne key informant remarked in 1994 that "for the last 1 112 years MOSTE has been completely bogged down with work 
involving donors" (lnformantltl8 1994), while another suggested that "aid has been initiated too fast. and with too hard a 
push. with the result that the Vietnamese are often unable to deliver when implementation of programmes begins" 
(Informant lt3 1994). Difficulties in absorbing aid have been recognised across most other sectors in VietNam. where the 
problem has not been in attracting aid funding but in using the funds dedicated. For example, In the 1993-1995 period rapid 
inflows of development aid strained the Vietnamese government's capacity. and although donors pledged over $2 billion in 
each year. disbursements averaged only $500 million per annum (UNDP 1996 in Cook 1997. 43). 
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For the purposes of the following discussion, aid-funded EIA capacity-building 
initiatives in VietNam will be classified by the period in which they were initiated, either the 
"formalisation phase" (1990-1994), or the "implementation and capacity-building phase" 
(1995-present). Over these phases there has been strong representation from multilateral and 
bilateral aid programmes, and an increasing participation from international NGOs. Each of 
the programmes contain a mix of institutional strengthening, regulatory and policy reforms, 
technology transfer, equipment provision, research, and human resource development 
components. 
3.4.1 EIA capacity-building programmes: Formalisation phase 
3.4.1.1/nternational Development Research Centre (/DRC) 
During the formalisation phase, development aid-funded EIA capacity-building 
initiatives began to emerge but were mainly limited to short training courses or periodic 
workshops. One exception to this was a one year environmental planning and management 
course funded by the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) as part of 
its Viet Nam/Canada Sustainable Economic Development (VISED) project. Trainees were 
selected from a variety of government institutes at both the central and provincial levels. 
Training was conducted by Vietnamese and foreign environmental experts at University of 
Hanoi's Centre for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies (CRES), and featured a 
comprehensive EIA, environmental planning and management, and ecology curriculum. 
Environmental and social impact assessment theory and practical case studies comprised 
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approximately half of the overall training activities (IDRC 1993a). As a training course, EIA 
capacity-building activities did not go beyond human resource development. 
3 .4.2 EIA Capacity-Building Programmes: Implementation/Capacity-Building Phase 
3.4.2.1 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
In 1995, two development assistance projects focusing on EIA capacity-building were 
initiated in Viet Nam. The first of these, entitled "VietNam: Strengthening Environmental 
Planning and EIA Capability", was funded by the Asian Development Bank and carried out 
by Hagler-Bailly Ltd., an American consulting firm. During the one-year duration of the 
project, a series of short-term foreign consultants worked within MOSTFJNEA to strengthen 
EIA capacity through a variety of regulatory, institutional, human resource development and 
technology transfer means. Regulatory capacity was strengthened through a review and 
refinement of existing EIA regulations and guidelines, and the creation of draft EIA sectoral 
guidelines for cement plants, thermal power plants, road/highway projects, and industrial 
development zones/estates. Institutionally, the project conducted an analysis of existing EIA 
implementation capacity and future capacity-building needs in Viet Nam for a variety of 
institutional sectors (i.e. NEA, EIA practitioners, local and provincial environmental offices, 
and environmental offices of line agencies). Human resource development was carried out 
through the provision of EIA short courses for central and local government officials, and, 
with Vietnamese counterparts, the preparation of four EIA project case studies. Technology 
transfer included the selection, procurement and installation of a computerised "EIA expert 
system" (ADB 1994a, RCG/Hagler-Bailly 1995, Hagler-Bailly 1996). 
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3.4.2.2 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP: Phase I) 
A few months after the ADB project began, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) initiated a two-year project entitled "Strengthening National Capacities 
to Integrate the Environment Into Investment Decisions". The project resulted from the 
UNDP's dual observations that there were "limitations (to) project-specific EIA as an 
instrument for incorporating environmental management into investments", and that in Viet 
Nam, "most investments are too small to be subjected to a formal EIA" (SRVIUNDP 1995a, 
50). As these observations and the title suggest, the project was a broad effort to instill 
consideration of environmental factors into all levels of development planning and decision-
making processes in Viet Nam, particularly those affecting development proposals that were 
too small or not in project form and thus escaped the EIA process. EIA capacity-building was 
but one portion of overall project activities, reflecting the UNDP's observation that in Viet 
Nam there is an "overemphasis on EIA as a tool for managing the environment, and a lack of 
knowledge of other available tools which should complement EIA" (SRVIUNDP 1995, 15). 
Unlike previous EIA capacity-building projects, the Ministry of Planning and Investment 
(MPO was the prime institutional focus due to its central role in Viet Nam's investment 
decision-making and development planning processes. 
Initially, EIA training and capacity-building activities were designed to extend to 
virtually all levels, including central, provincial, district and even village levels (UNDP 
1993a, SRVIUNDP 1995), however, early stages of the project proceeded slowly: 
"Fully six months of the project was spent getting across what EIA was, 
suggesting how EIA related to MPI's activities, and establishing a beachhead 
from which other forms of EIA such as strategic, areawide and cumulative 
assessment could be broached" (Informant #47 1998). 
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As a result, early in the implementation phase this ambitious project was scaled back and 
most EIA capacity-building activities were confined to the central level and to the Ministry 
of Planning and Investment. Two of the main successes of the project were to raise 
environmental awareness within the Ministry, and to stimulate MPI to establish their first 
provisional EIA guidelines, for use by and within MPI prior to formal MOSTE-Ied EIA 
scrutiny (Informant #47 1998). Thus, the project was successful in initiating procedures 
which will move environmental considerations 'upstream' in the project design and decision-
making processes of MPI (Informant #62 1998). 
3.4.2.3 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA-PIAP) 
Late in 1995, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) initiated the 
CDN$8 million four-year Policy Implementation Assistance Project (PIAP). One of three 
main objectives of the project was to assist the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Environment to 'implement environmental policies'. However, due to the number of capacity-
building projects already slated for MOSTE, PIAP project officials changed the institutional 
focus of the project during the project inception mission, and after consultations with a wide 
range of potential partner ministries the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) 
was selected (Informant #49 1998, Informant #50 1998). 
The main objective of the environmental component of the project has been to assist 
MTC to implement Article 5 of the Law on Environmental Protection, whereby "each 
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sectoral ministry should develop its own management system in environment" (Informant 
#49 1998). The project bas resulted in a number of capacity-building initiatives: training 
activities on the EIA of roads (see Plate 3 .2); development of an EIA training manual for the 
transport sector; the stimulation of MTC to develop their own environmental regulations and 
sectoral EIA "standards", and; the stimulation of MTC to create an environmental 
management unit (developed as an environmental "quality control" point for all projects 
submitted to MOSIE for EIA appraisal). Training courses carried out by the PIAP project 
have stressed that EIA activities should be initiated at the project design phase rather than the 
project announcement phase (Informant #SO 1998). 
Plate 3.2: PIAP Capaeity-Buildiag Workshop/Field Esereises (Photos: Doberstein 1998) 
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3.4.2.4 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA-VCEP) 
In 1996, a CDN$10 million CIDA-funded project entitled Vietnam-Canada 
Environment Project' was initiated and EIA capacity building was one of its main priorities. 
The overall goals of the EIA activities under VCEP were to: "strengthen the capability of 
Vietnamese agencies and institutions to administer and manage the EIA process, as well as to 
conduct environmental impact assessments", and to; "provide examples of how 
environmental considerations can be better integrated in development planning activities" 
(ESSA/SNC Lavalin 1996a, 2-45). Institutionally, project activities were split between the 
central government NEA and a series of provincial DOSTEs. 
Project activities included regulatory, institutional, technology transfer and human 
resource development components. The project attempted to build upon the ADB's project's 
regulatory activities by developing additional procedural and technical EIA guidelines 
(including sectoral EIA guidelines), most notably for Viet Nam's burgeoning hydropower 
sector53. Institutionally, the VCEP project attempted to establish or strengthen EIA 
administrative units at both central and provincial levels, and provided direct technical 
support to EIA review panels, NEA and DOSTEs, particularly for the preparation of new 
EIA capacity-building proposals. Technology transfer was carried out after an assessment of 
information management needs within NEAIMOSTE, and the project was responsible for 
designing and providing information resources and EIA information management systems. 
53 The request for such guidelines carne from the Vietnamese government which initially suggested the VCEP project 
prepare hydropower guidelines specific to the proposed Son La hydro scheme (see Box 3.2). However. CIDA would only 
agree to the preparation ofMgenericM guidelines, recognising that guidelines specific to the Son La scheme could provide a 
convenient means of deflecting criticism of the project away from the Vietnamese proponents and onto Canadian aid 
132 
Human resource development was carried out through the development and provision of 
training courses for NEA, DOSTE and line Ministry staff, as well as staff from consultancies, 
private industries and universities (ESSNSNC Lavalin 1996b). 
3.4.2.5 European Union (EU) 
Three new EIA capacity-building projects were initiated by development assistance 
agencies in 1997. The first, entitled "Capacity B11ilding for Environmental Management in 
Vietnam", was funded by the European Union (EU), and was carried out by faculty and staff 
from the Free University of Brussels, The Viet Nam National Center for Science and 
Technology, and the National University of Hanoi. The overall project goal was to "support 
the improvement of environmental and natural resources management" in Viet Nam through 
capacity building aimed at developing "a scientifically reliable basis for EIA in Vietnam" 
(EU Project Brief 1997), particularly through GIS and strategic environmental assessment 
applications (see Plate 3.3) 
Institutionally, the project focused mainly on building capacity in Vietnamese 
university institutes (e.g. the project assists the National University of Hanoi's Faculty of 
Environmental Sciences through curriculum development, scholarship provision and 
overseas exchanges). Some project activities (e.g. preparation of an EIA manual, and 
regional- and strategic environmental assessments for Halong Bay/Quang Ninh province) 
have also resulted in institutional links with central and provincial government agencies such 
as NEA and provincial DOSTEs. The project selected three specific EIA sectors for 
programmes (Informant #63 1998). 
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particular consideration: tourism; hydropower and; urban development. Thus, many capacity-
building activities revolved around these themes. 
Plate 3.3: Europeaa Uaioa Project· Workshop ud Stntegic Asleu•eat Esereise 
3.4.2.6 United Nations Environment Programme/International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (UNEP-/UCN) 
The second EIA capacity building project initiated in 1997, entitled "EIA Capacity 
Building-the UNEP EIA Manual Trial in Vietnam Project", was conducted jointly by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Viet Nam chapter of the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). The project was designed as a 
series of workshops and field visits (see Plate 3.4), the first of which was attended by 
Vietnamese central and provincial government officials, Vietnamese and foreign EIA 
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consultants, and EIA professionals from the wider Asian region (UNEPIIUCN 1997, 
Informant #54 1998). 
Plate 3.4: UNEP Project Works.op ud FleW Visit· Electro•ics P ... t 
(Photos: Doberstein 1997) 
The main goal of the six-month project project was the "Vietnamisation", distribution 
and testing ofUNEP's 700+ page generic EIA training manual (UNEP 1996a, UNEP 1996b, 
UNEP-IUCN 1997). This manual, prepared as a resuh of recommendations made at a 1994 
Environmental Assessment summit, was designed as a modifiable "tool for trainers, to assist 
them in preparing training courses targeted for specific groups and relevant to existing 
political, social and economic climates and development priorities in (Viet Nam)" (UNEP 
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1996a). Project activities included carrying out an EIA training needs assessment, funding 
the development of Viet Nam-specific EIA case studies and training materials, translating tbe 
training manual into Vietnamese, and distributing approximately 150 copies of the translated 
manual for testing and use by EIA trainers in Viet Nam (Informant #54 1998). As well, a 
series of workshops beld over the lifetime of the project filcilitated general discussion about 
areas of reform for future versions of the training manual. 
J. 4.2. 7 Netherlands Embassy 
The third EIA capacity building initiative announced in 1997, entitled tbe 
"Environmental Impact Assessment Capability Strengthening Project (EIA-CSP)", was 
funded by the Netherlands Embassy. The six-month project concentrated solely on human 
resource development, paying particular attention to training and strengthening activities 
related to technical capacities of EIA preparers and appraisal committees (Informant #40 
1998, Informant #41 1998). 
Plate 3.5: Netherlaads E•bassy Pnject -Iaceptioa Workshop 
(Photos: Doberstein 1998) 
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The project carried out these aims through technical training courses, and the preparation of 
"hands-on" EIA case studies of an industrial park and an urban solid waste landfill (Vietnam 
News 1997). The project was housed physically within the National Environmental Agency 
and staffed through a combination of short term foreign consultants and longer term 
Vietnamese consultants seconded from their usual positions within NEA. 
3.4.2.8 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP: Phase II) 
A major environmental capacity-building project entitled "Capacity 21: Phase If' 
was announced in late 1997 and began operations in May 1998. The project was funded 
jointly by the UNDP and Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, and was the second 
phase of UNDP's environmental capacity-building work with the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment. Although EIA was not a specific focus of the project, it was nonetheless used "as 
a point of entry into the topic of the environment as an investment decision-making criteria" 
(Informant# 47 1998). 
The main aim of the three-year project was to "strengthen Central Government 
capacity to incorporate environmental considerations into its policy and decision-making" 
(UNDP 1999), mainly through human resource development, field research and technology 
transfer. Whereas Phase I of the project concentrated on raising environmental awareness 
among MPI officials, Phase II was designed to demonstrate the benefits of areawide 
environmental assessment and planning for three pilot projects: an industrial zone on the 
edge of Hanoi, a silk-growing region in Lam Dong province, and rapidly developing peri-
urban areas of Halong City. In each case, areawide environmental assessment principles will 
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be applied to existing and proposed developments in order to demonstrate benefits to MPI 
staff, develop training modules, and generate suggestions for consideration by government 
decision-makers (UNDP 1999). 
3.4.3 Future EIA Capacity Building Initiatives 
From this brief summary of EIA capacity-building projects in Viet Nam it is clear that 
much effort and aid agency funding has been directed towards strengthening the 
environmental impact assessment process in Viet Nam. Additional aid-funded EIA capacity-
building initiatives were rumoured to be in the planning and project development stage in 
1998 (Informant #41 1998) and it is almost certain that this trend will continue. However, 
what has been missing, and what is needed before future initiatives get underway, is a 
detailed analysis of programme activities already undertaken in VietNam. Through such an 
analysis, decisions can be made by aid agencies about the coherence of future efforts, and 
about priorities for future EIA capacity-building programmes. 
Each of the programmes profiled in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 represent a single EIA 
capacity-building case study. As outlined previously, the aim of the research undertaken for 
this dissertation is to compare and contrast the activities of these programmes in VietNam in 
order to discern the model(s) of EIA being promoted by development aid agencies. The 




CHAPI'ER FOUR· CASE STUDIES: EIA CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMES 
IN VIETNAM 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents results from the analysis of three main bodies of data gathered 
during the course of field research: l) key informant interviews; 2) documents issued by 
development aid agency EIA capacity-building programmes, and; 3) participant observation 
of EIA capacity-building workshops. A total of sixteen documents issued by nine separate 
EIA capacity-building programmes were subjected to detailed content analysis. Results were 
displayed for further analysis in two formats, comprising both 'multiple' and 'collapsed' 
criteria54(see Tables 4.1 and 4.2), and results were selected for discussion from these figures. 
Research results indicated over the following pages are organised and presented using both 
the analytical themes identified in section 2.5, and those which emerged during the analysis 
of interviews, participant observations and secondary data. 
54 Table 4.( displays the 'multiple' criteria content analysis for each of the seven major themes analysed. for example. in 
examining the 'Role of EIA'. two separate Technical model criteria and three Planning model criteria were coded. By 
contrast. the 'collapsed' criteria of Table 4.2 is a simpler version which indicates simply whether Technical model or 
Planning model criteria are present for each of the seven themes. See the Research Methods section for additional detail on 
content analysis protocols. 
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4.2 Cross-Case Analyses: What Form of EIA is Promoted by Capacity-Building 
Programmes in VietNam? 
4.2.1 Mixed Messages in the Recommended Role for EIA in Development Planning 
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In general, there was a wide variation in EIA capacity-building programming 
addressing the issue of the role EIA should play in the Vietnamese planning process, 
resulting in a mixed message being delivered to Vietnamese counterparts. At one extreme, 
the Asian Development Bank project indicated EIA should function predominantly in a role 
conforming to the Technical Model of EIA: EIA should be used as a \echnical tool' to 
generate scientific information about biophysical impacts, and then this information should 
be fed into the existing development planning process to sit alongside technical and 
economic feasibility studies (Hagler-Bailly 1996). In one ADB project document, over 90% 
of all references to the appropriate role for EIA in Viet Nam identified technical model 
attributes such as the identification of biophysical impacts. At the other extreme, the UNDP 
Capacity 21 (Phase I) project indicated the role ofEIA should largely follow Planning Model 
tenets: EIA should act as a mechanism for increased public involvement, to contribute to and 
reform political processes in planning, and to ensure that all potential impacts (i.e. including 
biophysical, social and economic) are examined. In the two UNDP Capacity 21 (Phase I) 
project documents analysed (MPUUNDP 1997a, MPUUNDP 1997b), 80% and 67% of 
references to the appropriate role of EIA in Viet Nam conformed to attributes of the Planning 
Model. In contrast, such attributes were mentioned only 8% and 10% of the time for the two 
ADB documents analysed. 
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Most commonly, capacity-building programmes supported the idea that EIA should 
concentrate on biophysical, rather than social55 or economic impacts of development 
proposals. As outlined in Box 4.1, the CIDA-funded Viet Nam Canada Environmental 
Project generated sectoral EIA guidelines for hydropower projects in Viet Nam (ESSA/SNC 
Lavalin 1997). The resulting document was systematically weak in promoting the assessment 
of non-biophysical impacts (such as community cohesion, individual livelihoods or ethnic 
minority traditions) in hydropower EIA studies: biophysical impacts were mentioned 5 times 
more frequently than non-biophysical impacts. Although many future hydropower projects 
will likely be located in uplands regions of Viet Nam, no mention was made of the special 
need to assess impacts on the ethnic minorities who reside in such regions. Such a bias 
toward the promotion of limited biophysical impact assessment was common to over half 
(n=9 of 16) of the EIA capacity-building project documents analysed (see Table 4.1). This 
observation provides further support for the contention that many aid agencies promoted EIA 
as having a predominantly Technical Model role. 
4.2.2 Reliance on Project-Level EIA. but Strategic-Level Interest Emerging 
Although some capacity-building programmes in Viet Nam have promoted project-
specific EIA (e.g. two PIAP programme documents refer exclusively to project-level 
assessment, and in two Asian Development Bank documents, 100% and 90% of references to 
the appropriate scale of assessment indicate projects), many programmes have shown an 
emerging interest in capacity-building to conduct "higher order" strategic assessment (i.e. 
plans, programmes, areas/regions, cumulative effects and policies). In an analysis of 16 
55 The assessment of social impacts. under a Planning Model. is understood ro include a wide range of themes including 
health impacts, differential impacts on men and women (gender analysis), impacts on community structures and cohesion. 
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documents describing EIA capacity-building programmes, project-level EIA was mentioned 
more frequently (60%) than strategic levels of assessment (40%). However, one EIA 
capacity-building project sponsored by the EU promoted strategic environmental assessment 
as one of its main project objectives (EU Project Brief 1997a, Nierynck 1998). When SEA 
has been included in capacity-building programming it has generally been addressed as a 
complementary, not alternative, approach to EIA. This observation is seen as a confirmation 
that some capacity-building programmes in Viet Nam are promoting EIA as applicable to all 
levels, from the policy level downwards through programmes, regions and cumulative effects 
assessment and to the individual project level. 
In some cases, there has been an explicit recognition by capacity-building 
programmes that their choice of Viet Nam counterpart has constrained development aid 
agency abilities to promote higher-order EIA of plans, programmes and policies. The PIAP 
project, for example, works within the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) 
where there is currently no tradition of or "willingness" for policy-level assessment 
(Informant #49 1998). The MTC works within a standard framework of project-by-project 
planning and operations, and thus, for reasons of expediency and efficiency, the PIAP project 
adopted the project level for EIA capacity-building activities (see Box 4.2). Over the longer 
term however, successes in implementing EIA at the project-level are seen by PIAP staff as 
providing an avenue for further reform, and therefore, strategic assessment is relegated to the 
status of a longer-term EIA capacity-building goal (Informant #49 1998). 
employment/livelihoods and access to basic necessities. 
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Box 4.1 Capacity-Buildina Actions: EIA Guidelines for Hydropower Projects 
Viet Nam has a large number of medium and large-scale hydro schemes scheduled for 
implementation by 2010, the largest of which is the Son La hydro scheme in Northern VietNam. The 
main dam will be located along the Da river watershed upstream from the furthest extent of the Hoa 
Binh reservoir. The scheme will have up to 3600 MW of generating capacity, or approximately twice 
that of Hoa Binh dam and is expected to cost over $3.5 billion USD (Viet Nam News Feb. 24, 1998). 
When complete, the dam will produce approximately half of VietNam's total hydroelectric power. It 
has been estimated that between 92,000 and 130,000 ethnic minority and Kinh majority peoples will 
be displaced by the project, mainly due to the formation of a 440 sq. km reservoir (Hirsch 1992, 25; 
VietNam News Feb. 24, 1998). 
Because the project will likely be funded by international aid agencies, EIA studies conducted for 
the project must be of an internationally-accepted standard. In 1997 the Vietnamese government 
requested two EIA capacity-building programmes (the CIDA-VCEP and EU programmes) prepare 
generic guidelines for hydro EIAs. These guidelines would then be available for consultation by the 
Vietnamese government and by impact assessment consultants carrying out the Son La EIA. 
However, it is questionable whether these guidelines alone will ensure a high-quality EIA study is 
carried out for the Son La scheme. A review of draft guidelines (ESSA/SNC Lavalin 1997) produced 
under one of the capacity building programmes. the CIDA-funded Viet Nam Canada Environment 
Programme, revealed the following weaknesses: 
A) Ethnic minorities, although the dominant group in most uplands hydropower sites, did not merit 
special mention in the EIA guidelines. 
B) Indigenous knowledge, although a potentially useful addition to EIA studies (and knowledge) in 
uplands regions, was a minor component of suggested environmental data sources. 
C) Guidelines on how to manage the public involvement component of the EIA process were 
lacking. No suggestions were given as to how to involve ethnic minorities (who may be illiterate 
in the Vietnamese language and who may not have access to locations where public involvement 
is solicited), nor how to structure a significant and well-timed public involvement process. 
Overall, the guidelines were strongest in suggesting how environmental components of an impact 
assessment were to be carried out and weakest in suggesting how social impacts were to be assessed. 
It should be noted these guidelines were to be modified in subsequent drafts, and thus. such 
weaknesses may be reduced or eliminated. 
However, the quality of such EIA guidelines may be of secondary importance to the role 
currently ascribed to EIA within Viet Nam's political and development planning process. Such 
guidelines would likely serve a limited role, mitigating only the worst impacts of the proposed project 
rather than fundamentally challenging the need for it. One senior Hanoi-based expatriate researcher 
linked to an environmental research centre was of the opinion the dam "will go ahead" regardless of 
the quality or outcome of EIA studies yet to be undertaken (Key Informant #3 1998). The best proof 
of this, according to the researcher, is the Vietnamese Government's ongoing efforts to relocate the 
provincial capital Lai Chau to Dien Bien: the former will be flooded by the Son La hydro scheme and 
thus efforts are underway to relocate the city's 120,000 population and governmental offices. Thus, if 
development aid-funded capacity-building programmes are to have greater impact on the design of 
less damaging developments, the limited role of EIA in Vietnamese development planning must be 
addressed more centrally. 
Sources: Hirsch 1992. ESSA/SNC Lavalin 1997, Key Informant #3 1998 
When strategic assessment has been promoted by capacity-building programmes a 
wide range of non-project levels are typically represented. Project documents for the IDRC 
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and VCEP projects revealed references to either regional or cumulative effects assessment 
(IDRC 1993a, ESSA/SNC Lavalin 1996b). Other projects, such as the UNEP/IUCN project, 
the EU project, and phases I and II of the UNDP Capacity 21 projects, promoted the full 
range of non-project assessment including plans, programmes, regions, cumulative effects 
and policy assessment. The UNDP Capacity 21 project (phase I) specified in detail the need 
for MOSTE to develop EIA guidelines which the entire range of Viet Nam 's sectoral and line 
ministries could use to assess their own "sectoral development planning" and "sectoral master 
plans" (MPIIUNDP 1997a, 30). The second phase of the UNDP project employed areawide 
assessment through a series of pilot projects designed to demonstrate to Vietnamese staff in 
the Ministry of Planning (MPI) how to incorporate environmental considerations into 
regional planning (UNDP 1998). Additional information about Capacity 21 strategic 
assessment activities is discussed in Bolt 4.3. Of all forms of SEA promoted by capacity-
building programmes, cumulative effects assessment is least represented: over 30% (5 of 16) 
of aid agency documents failed to mention cumulative effects assessment at all, while 
another 25% (4 of 16) mentioned it only once. 
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Box 4.2 Institutional Context Affects Capacity-Building: The PIAP Programme and 
MTC 
CIDA's Policy Implementation Assistance Project (PIAP) works with the Vietnamese 
Government's Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC). Standard MTC planning 
processes are to follow a project-by-project approach to transportation planning, and thus, 
CIDA-PIAP's EIA capacity-building approach has chosen to focus on EIA at the project 
level, leaving the promotion of higher-order assessments for the future. 
When the PIAP project first started in 1996, there was a high level of resistance 
within MTC to the idea that the environmental and social impact assessment should be 
carried out as a standard part of project design and planning. This approach was seen to be 
the mandate of the Ministry of Science, Tec~mology and Environment (MOSTE). However, 
acceptance of EIA came more rapidly when senior members of MTC realised the creation of 
an Environmental Management Unit within MTC, and application of basic EIA as a standard 
part of transportation project planning, would result in significant gains to MTC's planning 
autonomy. Although MOSTE would still ultimately review EIAs conducted for MTC 
projects, it would be less likely to reject outright transportation projects which had already 
considered or mitigated some of the environmental impacts. As well, the creation of a MTC 
environmental management unit, and training of staff environmental specialists, was thought 
as a likely means for MTC staff to be selected as technical experts for EIA review panels 
appraising transportation-related projects. 
The development of EIA capacity in MTC has since been easier to accomplish: MTC 
has developed, with many inputs from PIAP staff, its own EIA guidelines or "standards" for 
transportation projects and is negotiating with MOSTE to have these adopted as a national 
standard. The MTC also reached an agreement with MOSTE that small-scale MTC projects 
will be internally assessed through its own environmental unit in order to reduce the EIA 
appraisal burden on MOSTE and allow it to concentrate more exclusively on larger projects. 
As well, MTC staff have been exposed to a series of EIA training courses, practical case 
studies, and follow-up training sessions related to EIA over the first three years of the PIAP 
project. In one training session, MTC staff from a variety of departments were exposed to a 
one-day refresher course on EIA, followed by a second day of field-based practical case 
studies involving three alternative routings of a proposed highway project. Staff visited cities 
and villages which would be impacted, studied the proposed routings, and carried out 
practical exercises in mitigating the impacts of each alternative routing. 
Nonetheless, MTC still requires much EIA capacity-building. As recently as 1998, 
MTC conducted separate EIAs for each of three transportation-related projects that were 
linked both spatially and functionally (a deepwater port, an airport export processing zone 
and a connecting six-lane highway). As well, comprehensive social impact assessment has 
not been practiced as part of MTC project design: initial planning for the highway project 
would have seen a series of rice-growing villages obliterated simply because they were 
located on rocky outcrops which MTC engineers viewed as ideal raw materials for the 
highway substrate. Thus, although PIAP has led to greater EIA capacities within MTC, much 
remains to be done in future years, and perhaps, subsequent phases of the CIDA project. 
Sources: Field Notes Feb. 26-27 1998, Informant# 49 1998, Informant #50 1998 
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Box 4.3 Extending EIA Capacity Beyond Environmental Institutions 
One of the successes in development aid EIA capacity-building has been the extension of 
EIA capacities beyond MOSTE and academic environmental training institutions, to mainstream 
development planning institutions such as the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). MPl is the 
most influential and powerful of Viet Nam's governmental ministries, and is charged with the 
responsibility of evaluating over 1000 major investment proposals per year. As "the key integrator of 
investment" (lnformant #59 1998) MPI is in the mainstream of development planning, project design 
and decision-making. 
Until the arrival of the UNDP Capacity 21 (Phase I) project, MPI's evaluation criteria for 
development proposals rested almost entirely upon: 1) the technical nature/feasibility of the project, 
and; 2) proposed investment capital. Until recently, environmental considerations were not part of 
MPl's project appraisal process. The Capacity 21 project recognized that MPI was in an excellent 
position to incorporate environmental impact and environmental planning concerns at an early, 
project design phase of the development planning cycle. Thus, throughout both phases of the project, 
effons have been made to raise awareness within MPl of the need to incorporate environmental 
considerations with development planning. 
In addition to a series of training programmes held for MPI staff, the UNDP project adopted a 
participatory approach in developing MPI-specific 'Environmental Screening Guidelines' to be used 
in determining potential environmental impacts for all major MPI investment projects. Existing 
screening guidelines were first obtained from the Asian Development Bank, World Bank and the 
European Union. Then, a series of large projects now in operation in Viet Nam (including Hoa Binh 
dam and the My Thuan bridge project) were used as case studies, and MPl staff took pan in training 
sessions to determine how project impacts could have been reduced through design changes. 
Following these activities, MPI-specific guidelines were developed by MPI staff at a UNDP 
workshop. The guidelines were developed as a means of assisting in the design of less-damaging 
investment projects, and assisting in MOSTE's mandate to ensure that proposed developments have 
undergone an environmental review. This recognises that capacity within MOSTE to administer the 
EIA process is still so low that MPl often "takes decisions to approve projects without asking 
NENMOSTE for an environmental assessment" (Informant #51 1998). 
One aspect of capacity-building which has been pushed recently by the UNDP Capacity 21 
project (Phase m is strategic environmental assessment, mainly at the regional and policy levels. This 
has been adopted, in part, as a means by which MPI can avoid overlapping with MOSTE's area of 
responsibility, the environmental assessment of projects. Three areawide assessments. involving 
ongoing environmental problems in a silk production region, an industrial zone, and a peri-urban area 
of Halong City, have been used by UNDP consultants to demonstrate to MPI how to incorporate 
environmental considerations into regional planning. One of the Vietnamese counterparts in the 
project reflected that SEA was of great importance for the future of MPI's project-planning because 
"once projects have been decided upon there is not much room to change .•. EIA must move upstream 
in decision-making to have a more positive and profound effect" (Informant #62 1998). Through 
initial training in EIA at project levels, the Capacity 21 project has gained a foothold and begun to 
stimulate thinking in MPI about incorporating environmental considerations into development 
planning processes at regional and policy levels. 
(Sources: Informant #47 1998, Informant #51 1998, Informant #59 1998, Informant #62 1998, 
MPUUNDP 1998). 
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4.2.3 Scientific Knowledge Seen as the Key to EIA Capacity-Building 
Of all the themes differentiating the Technical and Planning models of EIA, the 
expected knowledge base for EIA practice proved to be the least contentious for capacity-
building practitioners in Viet Nam. The dominant knowledge base upon which EIA is 
expected to rest is largely agreed to be that of science and quantitative data gathering 
methods. This view is then translated into capacity-building activities designed to make 
Vietnamese EIA practice more "scientifically reliable" (EU Project 1997a, 1). Only 1 of 16 
documents analysed (the UNEP-IUCN training manual) supported the use of Planning Model 
forms of knowledge (i.e. a multitude of knowledge forms should form the knowledge base of 
EIA, including scientific facts and knowledge. indigenous knowledge. public values and 
opinions) more frequently than Technical Model forms. In many cases, scientific knowledge 
and quantitative approaches were the only forms of knowledge deemed valid for EIA 
applications (6 of 16 documents mentioned scientific/quantitative forms of knowledge 
exclusively). 
Of all Planning Model attributes related to the knowledge base of EIA. the inclusion 
of societal values and opinion in public involvement phases of the EIA cycle was most 
strongly supported. Generally, capacity-building project documents acknowledged the value 
of incorporating public opinions, although most commonly this was understood to come in 
the form of feedback on completed EIA studies rather than as a valued form of knowledge 
useful in the data gathering phases of EIA (i.e. useful knowledge about ecological or social 
systems, or the potential impacts of development on such systems). Little mention was made 
of the value of including TEK, and/or customary community-level ecological and social 
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knowledge in EIA studies. Two key informants commented that such a lack was, in part, due 
to the recognition by capacity-building staff that such forms of knowledge are not accepted 
as valid by Vietnamese technocratic planners, who feel that people who exhibit traditional 
knowledge are backward' (Informant #15 1994, Informant #48 1998). 
4.2.4 An Assumption of Certainty in EIA Applications 
Another theme differentiating the Technical and Planning models of EIA is the 
treatment of knowledge certainty and uncertainty in the EIA process. When capacity-building 
programme documents were analysed for this theme, 75% (12 of 16) documents showed a 
greater level of support for Technical Model attributes (i.e. In effect, near certainty of EIA 
predictions is assumed). For most capacity-building programmes, EIA was promoted to 
Vietnamese counterparts as a process which would lead to accurate predictions of impact, 
and which would allow the 'selection' of the least damaging of a series of project alternatives 
or project designs. None of the project documents analysed featured a significant level of 
discussion about uncertainty in EIA, chaotic systems responses to perturbation, development 
planning in the face of uncertain impacts or ecological/societal responses, or phased 
'adaptive' implementation of developments. This represents a large gap in EIA capacity-
building programming, particularly as some Vietnamese voice concern that most EIA reports 
submitted for governmental review "have no discussion of uncertainty or risk assessment" 
(Informant #59, 1998). 
When Planning Model themes relating to uncertainty did emerge, these were largely 
confined to statements about the need to monitor post-construction impacts in order to 
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"periodically review and alter impact management plans" (UNEP 1996, 587). Although 
uncertainty, adaptive planning, or precautionary approaches in development planning were 
mentioned at least once in the majority of capacity-building programme documents ( 11 of 16 
documents), only the UNEP-IUCN and IDRC projects indicated these as anything but a 
minor feature of capacity-building activities (IDRC 1993a, UNEP 1996). Nonetheless, the 
relatively strong and consistent support among aid agencies for long-term monitoring, and in 
some cases project adjustment or redesign, assists in promoting the concept that EIA includes 
a measure of uncertainty. 
4.2.5 Promotion of Longer-term or Multi-phase EIA 
Among many of the capacity building programmes there was a strong degree of 
support for the promotion of EIA which went beyond the Technical Model's 'one-shot' 
(singular and short term) studies so frequently criticised in EIA literature (see for example: 
Jones and Grieg 1985, Rees 1985, or McDonald and Brown 1995). Of 16 capacity-building 
programme documents analysed, only 2 (13%) demonstrated greater support for one-shot 
studies (i.e. the ADB and CIDA-PIAP programmes). However, in both of these cases, post-
construction monitoring was also indicated as an important component to EIA, promoting the 
message to Vietnamese planners that even the most basic forms of EIA require some measure 
of follow-up. The message that post-construction monitoring and follow-up is an important 
component of EIA was mentioned frequently by a diverse range of Vietnamese attending 
capacity-building workshops (UNEP-IUCN Workshop Notes 1997, Netherlands Embassy 
EIA-CSP Workshop Notes 1998, PIAP Workshop Notes 1998). As a result of this awareness 
on the part of Vietnamese programme participants, the promotion of limited 'one-shot' studies 
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under a Technical Model, if attempted by development aid programmes, would likely be 
ignored by the intended Vietnamese audience. 
Most commonly, development aid programmes promoted the Planning Model ideal 
that EIA should go beyond singular and short term studies by: carrying out EIA over longer-
term study periods; carrying out a series of studies throughout the lifetime of the 
development, and/or; practicing EIA as an essentially continuous process of impact 
assessment, monitoring and in some cases, adaptive planning and re-design. As but one 
example of this, the UNEP-IUCN capacity-building programme EIA Training Resource 
Manual promoted the concept that EIA should be carried out "throughout the project cycle, 
beginning as early as possible in the concept design phase" (UNEP 1996b, 73) and 
continuing long enough to provide for monitoring, management, audit and evaluation that 
can lead to "improvements in project (re-design" (UNEP 1996b, 74). Variations of this 
message were found in the majority of aid agency documents analysed, and in a broad range 
of key informant interviews with aid program affiliates (Informant #47 1998, Informant #60 
1998, Informant #61 1998, Informant #63, 1998). 
4.2.6 Public Involvement and Social Aspects ofEIA: Much Talk but Little Action 
Foreign aid projects follow the requests that originate from the Vietnamese 
side, so because (social aspects of EIA) is not a Vietnamese priority, it is not 
an aid priority. 
(Informant #59 1998). 
Although EIA capacity-building programmes generally recognise the potential 
importance of public involvement from the perspective of public involvement and social 
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impact assessment, one trend was clear: few capacity-building activities include these 
elements. This was recognised very soon after the 1994 passage of VietNam's National Law 
on Environmental Protection (NLEP). In 1995 one senior UNDP official observed "EIA 
capacity-building has started without this social factor" (Informant #29 1995). However, 
even with this early recognition, as late as mid-1998 very few capacity-building activities 
with such a social theme had been carried out by development aid agencies (Informant #59 
1998, Informant #62 1998). 
Both public involvement and social impact assessment themes are touched upon in 
most projects that deliver capacity-building shortcourses and training sessions, yet these 
topics are generally minor components of overall course content. The Netherlands Embassy 
EIA-CSP project conducted EIA training over a 25 day period involving 66 discrete training 
themes/sessions, yet social impact assessment was not mentioned, and 'public involvement' 
comprised just 1 of the 66 sessions {Haskoning Consulting Engineers and Architects 1998b, 
13-16). Similarly, the CIDA-VCEP Human Resources Strategy and Training Plan (ESSA 
Technologies Ltd. 1996, 17-19) identified a total of 24 one- to two-week training courses or 
single-day workshops to be delivered over the project lifetime to national and provincial 
government EIA staff. However, during this time, only two seminars addressing social 
impact assessment and public participation were planned, and the expected duration of each 
seminar was just one day. A third example of the lack of capacity-building action related to 
public involvement was seen in the UNEP-IUCN project. Following the distribution of the 
project's EIA training manual to Vietnamese counterparts, feedback was solicited on means 
to strengthen the manual: the Vietnamese participants identified the need to strengthen 
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content and training on public participation (UNEPIIUCN 1997, 108). A notable exception to 
this general tendency was the IDRC capacity-building project which devoted approximately 
10% of training course contact hours to social impact assessment and public involvement 
themes (IDRC 1994, 12), the highest level documented among capacity-building training 
courses. 
The lack of development aid activity directed toward building Vietnamese capacities 
to carry out social impact assessment and public involvement is further seen by examining 
the choice of Vietnamese counterparts in capacity-building programmes: most counterparts 
have been selected from environmental, hard science, planning or construction/engineering 
institutions. There is a decided lack of attention paid by development aid agencies toward 
involving personnel from 'social' Ministries, social science departments of Universities, or 
socially-oriented Vietnamese NGQs56 in EIA capacity-building programmes. By way of 
example, invited Vietnamese guests for the opening workshop of the Netherlands Embassy 
EIA capacity-building project included approximately 25 individuals from environmental, 
technology or construction institutes or agencies, while only 3 individuals representing 
socially-themed institutes (e.g. Ministry of Labour Protection, and the lnstitute of Society 
and Economy) were invited (Netherlands Embassy EIA-CSP Workshop Notes 1998)57. 
Although capacity-building programmes generally mention the need for increased public 
56 These are more accurately termed GONGOs (Governmental Non-Governmental Organisations). GONGOs are 
organisations that function similarly to NGOs but which have significant ties to government through funding. personnel or 
monitoring of activities. No Vietnamese NGOs are truly autonomous from the Vietnamese government (Kaosa-ard et. al. 
1995). 
51 This is. in part. a reflection of the disproportionately higher numbers of'technically' vs. 'socially' -themed Vietnamese 
agencies. institutes and Ministries. However. if capacity-building programmes are intent on upgrading social impact 
assessment capacities it will be necessary to oversample' from socially-themed institutes and "undersample' from those that 
are lechnically' -themed.. 
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involvement and social impact concerns in the Vietnamese EIA process, they usually fail to 
involve those who may have the most appropriate background. 
The form of public involvement promoted by development aid agencies varied 
significantly from programme to programme, often resulting in a contradictory message 
being delivered across the range of Vietnamese counterparts. Although 81% (n=13 of 16) of 
aid agency documents analysed mentioned public involvement as an integral part of EIA, 
31% (n=5) demonstrated greater support for Technical Model tenets (i.e. limited efforts to 
educate the public about a project's impacts, persuading the public of the project's benefits, or 
consulting the public for input at the EIA review stage). Only 19% (n=3) of documents 
demonstrated greater support for Planning Model forms (such as participation in impact 
studies, shared decision-making about project attributes or location, or delegation of partial 
decision-making authority to potentially affected publics). The remaining 38% (n=5) of aid 
programmes mentioning public involvement adopted a 'shopping-list' approach whereby the 
full range of Technical and Planning Model approaches were promoted equally for 
consideration by Vietnamese counterparts. While it was common for capacity-building 
programmes to promote public involvement at the scoping and EIA review stages, only two 
development aid programmes (UNEP-IUCN and UNDP Phase IT) were explicit in promoting 
public involvement throughout all stages of the EIA process. As a result of this variation, 
some Vietnamese counterparts are being encouraged to practice greatly limited forms of 
public involvement (e.g. formal, written public commentary only at the EIA review stage), 
while others are encouraged to explore a fuller range of options (e.g. participatory techniques 
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of environmental and social data gathering, and delegation of partial authority over project 
design or locational decisions). 
4.2.7 Reliance on Rational Comprehensive Planning Theory as an EIA Basis 
For the majority of capacity-building projects in Viet Nam, rational comprehensive 
planning theory underpinned the model of EIA promoted, with little attention paid to the 
incorporation of alternative planning theories. When aid agency documents were analysed, 
75% (12 of 16) contained more frequent references to planning theory corresponding to the 
Technical Model. Most capacity-building projects promoted a form of EIA which, through 
comprehensive, scientific and predictive studies, would be capable of identifying the least-
damaging' of a series of project alternatives, an approach consistent with the usual 
interpretation of rational comprehensive planning theory58 (see for example Hudson 1979). 
Furthermore, most capacity-building projects explicitly promoted the concept that EIA study 
teams should be comprised of technical environmental experts, rather than individuals with 
skills in public involvement, advocacy or with knowledge about wider environmental and 
social policy goals. From these observations, Technical Model tenets are judged to be 
dominant for this area of analysis. 
However, two capacity-building projects, the first and second phases of the UNDP 
Capacity 21 project, advocated EIA approaches with a theory base more consistent with the 
Planning Model. Although these projects continued to rely on rational comprehensive 
planning theory for many capacity-building activities, they also advocated the use of mixed 
58 See section 2.6.3.7 for detail on rational comprehensive planning. 
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scanning theory. For example, the broad goal of "environmental sustainability" was 
transformed into guiding principles for the design and assessment of development proposals 
both large and small, and for regional development plans (UNDP 1998, 12) and capacity-
building was based on these principles. Such an effort conforms to mixed scanning theory, in 
that the planning of individual projects or regional plans is constrained and guided by longer-
term, and larger-scale sustainability considerations. The second phase of the UNDP project 
also featured pilot projects designed to build Vietnamese capacities to carry out 
environmentally sustainable development on a regional scale. In carrying out pilot projects 
with their Vietnamese counterparts, the UNDP adopted a strategy of holding "interactive 
public meetings and participatory appraisal exercises" (UNDP 1998, ill-34) with individuals 
most likely to be affected by changes in the developmental patterns of each region, and 
public comments were incorporated in subsequent project activities. In using face-to-face 
meetings with the affected public as a means to carry out project activities, capacity-building 
under the UNDP project was judged to have incorporated transactive planning theory. 
As mentioned in section 4.2.5, many capacity-building projects advocated multi-stage 
or continuous EIA rather than the linear approach expected under rational comprehensive 
planning theory. Although most capacity-building projects promoted rational comprehensive 
planning approaches in the earlier stages of EIA (i.e. in determining the 1east damaging' 
alternative), most also promoted the use of follow-up studies, monitoring and project re-
design to reduce impacts even further. Thus, the EIA process advocated by most capacity-
building programmes follows a modified form of rational comprehensive planning theory, 
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where adjustments and unanticipated impacts can be incorporated into long term 
development planning and management. 
The following section outlines a variety of factors identified by capacity-building 
programme staff, and their Vietnamese counterparts, as influencing the model of EIA 
promoted by development aid agencies for use in the country. 
4.3 Factors Influencing EIA Models Promoted by Capacity-Building Programmes 
4.3.1 Funding Agency Goals 
Development aid funds committed by both multilateral and bilateral aid agencies for 
programming in Viet Nam were typically governed by a range of explicit goals, policies or 
strategies. The ADB "core environment program", governing all of ADB's environmental 
lending and technical assistance throughout the 1990s, contains five main elements (ADB 
1994b, 81-92): l) the promotion of environmental lending; 2) the design of country-specific 
environmental programming; 3) internal environmental capacity-building for ADB staff; 4) 
project-level environmental review, and; 5) institutional capacity-building in developing 
countries. The last two elements were instrumental to the design and operation of the ADB's 
EIA capacity-building programme in VietNam where there was an almost exclusive focus 
on project-level EIA applications and the capacity-building required to effect these in Viet 
Nam's National Environment Agency. Prior to the project's commencement, a senior 
environmental staff member of ADB involved in the project's design expressed the opinion 
''EIA is fundamentally a design tool for projects" (Informant #l, 1994). With such an 
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institutional, and sometimes personal, commitment to project-level EIA, it is not surprising 
ADB's capacity-building activities were centred on project level applications. 
Similarly, just prior to the commencement of IDRC's 1994 EIA capacity-building 
programme in Viet Nam, six "core themes linking environment and development" were 
developed as guidelines for IDRC programming over the 1993-1996 period (IDRC 1993b, 8). 
The first of these, "integrating environmental, social and economic policies" through 
initiatives such as "strengthening of human resource and organizational capabilities", and 
"increasing the number of social scientists ... capable of integrating environmental concerns 
into their work" was influential in guiding IDRC's EIA capacity-building programme in Viet 
Nam. Consequently, IDRC's capacity-building programme in Viet Nam promoted EIA which 
incorporated social impact assessment and public involvement concerns as important 
elements of the EIA process. 
Although difficult to enumerate for all EIA capacity-building programmes in Viet 
Nam, the stated goals and objectives guiding multilateral and bilateral aid programming were 
observed to be important influences on the model of EIA promoted. Thus, if aid agencies 
wish to adjust their model of EIA, an obvious starting point is to adjust the wording of their 
own mission statements, programme goals and aid strategies. However, another important 
influence which may prove more difficult to control is the actions of the institutions carrying 
out aid agency programmes, the implementing agencies and Vietnamese counterparts. 
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4.3.2 Biases of the Implementing Agency 
I also examined the influence of the agency implementing capacity-building programmes. 
In addition to using the seven EIA model themes to analyse capacity-building programmes, I 
ranked subjectively each programme on a scale ranging from one to five (see Table 4.2). A 
rank of one represented a 'strong Technical Model', a rank of three represented a Mixed 
Planning and Technical Model', and a five represented a 'strong Planning Model'. The 
distribution of ranked programmes was as follows: 
• I judged one programme (ADB) to be a 'strong Technical Model'; 
• Three programmes (Netherlands Embassy, CIDA-PIAP and CIDA-VCEP) were 
judged to be examples of a 'moderate Technical Model'; 
• Two programmes (the EU and IDRC programmes) were judged to be examples of a 
'mixed Planning and Technical Model'; 
• I judged three programmes (the UNEP-IUCN, UNDP-Phase II and UNDP-Phase I 
programmes) to be 'moderate Planning Models'. 
When the ranked programmes were plotted on a chart (see Figure 4.1) capacity-building 
programmes clustered together in a series of three broad groups (loosely defined as the 
technical model' programmes, the 'mixed model' programmes and the 'planning model' 
programmes respectively). 
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One discernible feature linking each of these groupings was the personnel or 
institutions implementing capacity-building programmes. All programmes falling into the 
\echnical model' category were designed and carried out by private consulting firms 59, while 
all 'mixed model' programmes were carried out by academic institutions or their consulting 
designates, and all 'planning model' programmes were carried out by United Nations agencies 
or their NGO affiliates. Thus, EIA capacity-building programmes in Viet Nam were judged 
to have been influenced by the type of implementing agency carrying out programme 
activities. 
4.3.3 Biases of the Vietnamese Counterpart 
Another possible influence affecting the model of EIA promoted by capacity-building 
programmes is the choice of Vietnamese counterpart institution. Development aid 
programmes typically involves at least one foreign institution (the implementing agency) and 
one or more Vietnamese counterpart institutions (see Table 4.3), and research results suggest 
the choice of Vietnamese counterpart is a factor in the model of EIA promoted. To date, EIA 
capacity-building programmes have worked with a range of Vietnamese counterparts: 
• Three have worked with MOSTE (ADB, Netherlands Embassy and CIDA-VCEP 
programmes); 
• Two have worked with academic institutions (EU and IDRC programmes); 
• Two have worked with the Ministry for Planning and Investment (UNDP Phases l & 
m. and; 
• One has worked with the Ministry of Transport and Communications (CIDA-PIAP). 
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When the subjective ranking of each programme is displayed graphically (see Figure 4.1), it 
appears that the choice of Vietnamese counterpart may also play a role in the form of EIA 
model promoted. In broad terms, a Planning Model of EIA appears to be most acceptable to 
Vietnamese academic institutions, individual EIA trainers and the Ministry of Planning, 
while a Technical Model appears to be more acceptable to the Environment and Transport 
Ministries. Although more research is needed to confirm such a linkage, the 'institutional 
context' (i.e. the prevailing ideologies, priorities and biases) within the counterpart institution 
would likely have a bearing on the relative acceptability of ideas put forth by EIA capacity-
building programmes. Such a context is known to be a major determinant of project 
operations and successes (Gow and Morss 1988). Since counterparts have usually been 
involved in earlier stages of programme design, their priorities and biases are likely reflected 
in the eventual programme operations. 
in VietNam 
F11nding Agencies 
• Multilateral development aid agencies 
• Bilateral development aid agencies 
Programme Designers and Implementing Agencies 
• Private sector- international consultants 
• Academic institutions 
• Multilateral development aid agency staff 
• International non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
Programme Counterparts (Vietnamese counterparts) 
• Government agencies: environmental, planning and transportation ministries 
• Vietnamese academic institutions: environmental and geography departments 
• Private sector: individual Vietnamese environmental consultants and trainers 
59 Although bilateral or multilateral aid agencies provided broad programme design guidelines to consulting firms and 
funded such programmes. ultimately each had significant design inputs. and was carried out. by private consulting firms. 
4.3.4 The Vietnamese Context: Environmental Planning Resources. Ideologies and 
Institutions 
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Development aid programmes, including those with an EIA capacity-building focus, 
are "neither designed nor implemented in a vacuum: they are a product of the broader context 
of which they form a part" (Gow and Morss 1988, 1400). There is a significant body of 
literature suggestio& that environmental planning procedures such as EIA are strongly 
affected by a host of cultural, social, political, administrative and ecological factors 
comprising the overall "development planning context" of a country or region (Tester 1981, 
Mayda 1985, Adams 1990, Henry 1990, Rickson et. at. 1990, Edwards 1993, Lawrence 
1994a, Malik 1995). Thus, the Vietnamese context in which capacity-building programmes 
operate was explored as a potential influence on the EIA models promoted. Examining Viet 
Nam's development planning context, four main areas of influence were identified: L) a 
desire to begin EIA practice using a simple or 'stripped-down' form of EIA, 2) hesitancy in 
promoting social and participatory aspects of EIA, 3) a tendency to view EIA's predictive 
abilities as overly accurate, and; 4) the political realities of development planning decision-
making. Each of these will be outlined below. 
4.3.4.1 Desire to Use Simple Fonn of EIA 
The majority of Vietnamese and foreign key informants were of the opinion that the 
Vietnamese development context dictated the most pragmatic way to introduce EIA was to 
use a limited or 'stripped-down' form of EIA in the earliest stages, and later, add refinements 
and sophistication as practical capacity and expertise grew (Informant #22 1995, Informant 
#30 1995, Informant #50 1998). As one expatriate consultant observed: 
" ... the Vietnamese tendency is to say "no" first when new capacity-building 
ideas are considered to be outside what already exists, with gradual 
acceptance possible at a later date" 
(Informant #42 1998). 
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Furthermore, although many key informants recognised EIA studies completed over the five 
years since the NLEP was enacted (using a limited technical model of EIA) were of low 
quality, these were still considered to be important in building up indigenous capacity for 
future, more credible EIA applications. Therefore, 'learning to do by doing' is seen as an 
important capacity-building strategy emerging from the Vietnamese context of limited 
resources, personnel and time. This context is reflected in a senior UNDP official's comment 
that one of the "huge problems" with Viet Nam's EIA process was the need to strengthen all 
supporting mechanisms (e.g. monitoring systems, legal bases, data collection and storage 
capacities) at the same time (Informant #9 1994). Another important contextual element 
which has prevented more sophisticated forms of EIA taking hold is the constant pressure 
from powerful individuals and institutions outside MOSTE to speed up the EIA process so it 
does not pose an investment disincentive (Informant #30 1995). 
Such a context has dictated that a complex planning model of EIA (for example, 
incorporating adaptive planning approaches, significant public involvement and addressing 
all levels of development proposals) is not seen by aid officials or Vietnamese counterparts 
as desirable for the earliest years of EIA practice. As one senior expatriate aid official 
commented, " ... the EIA model used is very simple: only after the basic concept and process 
is understood will more elaborate processes be introduced" (Informant #47 1998). Capacity-
building programmes have responded accordingly with efforts to build initial capacity for 
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limited, technical-model applications of EIA, and only recently, to add more sophisticated 
components such as SEA and areawide assessment. 
4.3.4.2 Resistance to Public Involvement and Social Impact Assessment 
One clear influence of the Vietnamese context on EIA capacity-building programmes 
has been the high degree of resistance, among Vietnamese planners and government officials, 
to the idea of increased public involvement and attention to social impacts in EIA and 
development planning. At present, governmental EIA appraisal panels are most likely to be 
composed of technical and environmental science experts rather than social science or gender 
specialists (Informant #44 1998). Even when public participation is agreed by Vietnamese 
counterparts as a necessary component of EIA, the meaning behind this concept may be quite 
different to the meaning ascribed by expatriate aid officials and consultants. As an expatriate 
social impact assessment specialist observed: 
" ... what the Vietnamese mean by participation and what (expatriate aid 
officials) mean by participation is very different. Presently in Viet Nam the 
style of planning is~ far from participatory. The concept that the only way 
to know what people need is to ask them is such a big step". 
(Informant #60 1998) 
Even though public involvement and spontaneous protest has played a positive role in 
affecting environmental development planning decisions in Viet Nam60, most key 
informants indicated the expansion of public involvement in official planning processes was 
60 One senior aid programme leader estimated that 20-30% of all industrial pollution inspections in Viet Nam are the result 
of public complaints (Informant #57 1998). Another aid official commented that public participation through letter writing 
campaigns and protests to local People's Committees is still a vibrant tradition, particularly among urban and older segments 
of the population (Informant #17 1994). In one example. 14 000 signatures of local residents opposing a proposed coal 
washing plant in the centre of Ha Long City were sent to National Assembly members. resulting in a decision to relocate the 
plant (Sinh 1998). 
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still too sensitive an issue for foreign aid programmes to address (Informant #48 1998, 
Informant #53 1998). One key informant was especially clear on this issue: 
Environmental impact assessment capacity-building does not address social or 
participation issues because these are new issues and concerns for Viet 
Nam .... social issues within EIA are more sensitive than the physical 
environment, which has less ambiguity and is less politically sensitive. 
(Informant #62, 1 998). 
When faced with this context of reticence, most capacity-building programmes have 
responded by continuing to mention social impact assessment and public involvement as 
important, but not pressing these as priorities or creating associated capacity-building 
activities (Informant #52 1998, Informant #56 1998, Informant #59 1998). However, the lack 
of development aid programme activities targeted at strengthening social impact assessment 
and public participation capacities has created concern among some Vietnamese 
counterparts, prompting some to call for aid agencies to bridge the gap between rhetoric and 
action (Informant #52 1998, Informant #55 1998). 
Although much of the reticence about incorporating public involvement and social 
impact assessment in EIA likely stems from a desire to avoid facilitating public conflict, 
there is also a measure of confusion over the messy, non-scientific nature of the information 
gathered in such studies. One senior Vietnamese researcher suggested that this is due, in part, 
to the fact that Vietnamese government officials are mostly trained in the hard sciences or 
engineering traditions, and thus find it difficult to deal with such information (Informant #30 
1995). As well, when aid agencies first design capacity-building programmes they often 
consult Vietnamese counterparts on programme priorities or components. Their answers, and 
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thus aid agency programmes, often reflect the hard science and engineering priorities of 
counterpart backgrounds rather than social perspectives (Informant #59 1998). The basic 
environmental legislation in Viet Nam contains little reference to social aspects of EIA or 
public participation (Sinh 1998) and there is pressure from some Vietnamese counterparts to 
"stick to the law" when aid agencies design capacity-building programmes (Informant #40 
1998). Added to this is the widespread observation of the generally low status of Vietnamese 
social scientists, and their lack of capacity or status to address applied social science 
concerns (Informant #15 1994, Informant #28 1995, Informant #48 1998, Informant #56 
1998, Informant #59 1998). For all these reasons, many actors involved in Vietnamese 
capacity-building programmes are hesitant to include programme activities related to public 
involvement or social impact assessment. 
4.3.4.3 Downplaying Uncertainty as a Planning Issue 
The third area where the Vietnamese context has affected capacity-building 
programme design has been the sociocultural tendency to view development planning 
processes such as EIA as predictively accurate, and to downplay uncertainty as a 
environmental planning issue. This, in part, is linked to ecological teachings in the country 
and the environmental planning processes that flow from such teachings. Ecological theories 
and planning processes incorporating uncertainty, such as complex systems behaviour, chaos 
theory and adaptive assessment and management, has not yet been incorporated into 
Vietnamese curricula (Informant #48 1998). As well, as suggested previously there is little 
interest at this stage of EIA application to apply a more complex model of EIA which could 
address uncertainty. Although most EIA studies submitted to MOSTE have no discussion of 
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uncertainty or risk (Informant #59 1998), such studies are routinely approved. For these 
reasons, EIA capacity-building programmes have stressed EIA's predictive abilities and 
accuracy, and have not yet incorporated uncertainty or its implications for impact assessment. 
4.3.4.4 Tlze Political Context of Development Planning Decision-Making 
The fourth aspect of the Vietnamese context is arguably the most influential and most 
difficult for EIA capacity-building programmes to transcend: the political context of 
decision-making processes governing development in Viet Nam. As one senior aid agency 
official commented: 
"In a country like Viet Nam or other similar countries such as China or Laos, 
you have two decision-making processes (for development investment): one is 
the official government agencies, line ministries, regulations and planning 
procedures, and the other is the political (powerful individuals, patron/client 
relationships, and influence exerted by the National Assembly and Communist 
Party). If you don't understand this you cannot understand the obstacles (to 
EIA capacity-building) .... 
(Informant #51 1998) 
Such a context routinely includes firm decisions to proceed with projects before EIA studies 
have begun, conflicts of interest, and bribery. 
With EIA commonly "ordered after the decision makers have decided the project's a 
good idea" (Informant #48 1998), capacity-building projects have stressed a mitigatory and 
monitoring role for EIA, rather than as a confrontational process which may lead to a 
project's abandonment. Examples abound of development projects which are considered to 
be of such national importance to VietNam that firm decisions to proceed are made long 
before EIA processes begin. The $3.5 billion USD Son La hydro scheme and the $1.3 billion 
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USD Dung Quat refinery project6l are but two examples of this tendency. It is also common 
for projects to be approved even though EIA studies have judged them to be highly damaging 
to individuals living in a particular area, since such projects are seen by decision-makers as in 
the nation's, and therefore every individual's, best interest (Informant #48 1998}. In response 
to such a decision-making environment, capacity-building programmes have chosen the 
strategic path of promoting EIA as a process which concentrates on damage mitigation. 
Conflicts of interest within the Vietnamese development planning and development 
decision-making process are relatively common, and two key informants offered specific 
examples of this. In the first example, provincial DOSTE offices responsible for the 
coordination of provincial-level EIA processes and the review of EIA reports, were identified 
as "often form(ing) EIA consulting companies even though this is a clear conflict of interest" 
(Informant #35 1997). In the second example, a foreign key informant (Informant #49 1998) 
suggested that MTC officials were motivated to form an environmental management unit 
within the ministry, in part, because of the expectation that senior staff within this unit would 
then be selected by MOSTE as technical experts for EIA review panels assessing 
transportation projects (see Box 4.2). In part, such conflicts of interest emerge from 
traditional power structures which allow personal connections to dominate EIA decisions 
(Informant #35 1997). However, these also emerge from the lack of human resource capacity 
within Vietnamese development planning systems. Educated Vietnamese professionals are 
encouraged and expected to take on multiple roles within the EIA process, some of which are 
61 One senior MPI official commented "the best location for the refinery project. from a technical and environmental sense. 
was in the southern Viet Nam city of Vung Tau. next to the source of the oil. but for political and developmental reasons. 
Dung Quat in Central VietNam was chosen" (Informant #61 1998). The project had no EIA conducted up until July 1998. 
although half of the 250 hectare site had been cleared and over 300 families relocated (VietNam Courier July 5-11. 10). 
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conflicting. To date, there have been no independent EIA-producing institutes set up in Viet 
Nam (Informant #48 1998, Sinh 1998), and all personnel carrying out EIA studies usually 
also have strong links to Vietnamese universities or government departments. 
Another area of the Vietnamese political context affecting capacity-building 
programmes is the common influence of bribery and corruption62 on development planning 
decision-making. Three specific examples of this affecting EIA decisions were mentioned by 
key informants. The first example involved a small scale provincial-level hazardous waste-
producing project63 which was approved by the provincial MPI office (DPI) without an EIA, 
and without notification to environmental authorities, simply to ensure DPI officials received 
their "cut of approval money" (Informant #51 1998). In the second example, Vietnamese EIA 
consultants were convinced by district officials, through bribery payments and the influence 
of well-placed individuals, to avoid mentioning the environmental impacts of rock quarrying 
for an ADB-funded highway project (Informant #49 1998). In doing so, financial benefits 
flowed to district officials from the eventual quarrying operations. In the third example. on 
several occasions an EIA-producing institute was known to telephone the EIA appraisal 
committee chairperson and "agree upon some form of financial solution (in return for a 
favourable review)" (Informant #51 1998). In such a context. capacity-building programmes 
have not stressed improvement of EIA study quality as a top priority issue, although most 
programmes suggest that it is an issue to be worked on consistently over the longer term. 
62 Irvin (l995. 742) concluded that corruption was wendemicw in VietNam due mainly to an overdeveloped government 
bureaucracy. leading to low salaries and low salary differentials between the junior and most senior staff. Staff with a 
capacity to rise in a bureaucracy are driven to seek supplementary sources of money to augment civil service salaries. or 
leave the civil service entirely to enter private industry. 
63 The Vietnamese EIA process is often triggered. and responsibilities defined. by the scale of a proposed project. Thus. 
wprovincial-lever projects are deemed too small to attract the attention of the national MOSTE office. yet are large enough 
to require a provincial-level EIA study to be submitted to the appropriate OOSTE office. 
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In reaction to such a political decision-making context, some EIA capacity-building 
programmes have limited the model of EIA promoted in the short-term, while over the longer 
term, planning to promote more powerful forms which can contribute more directly to 
progress on sustainability goals (Informant #49 1998). Some capacity-building programmes 
have focussed on creating indigenous capacities to mitigate the worst impacts of damaging 
projects, and to monitor projects once in operation, rather than raising expectations that EIA 
should challenge and stop poorly designed projects (Informant #50 1998). In a political 
decision-making context where the Vietnamese EIA consultant for a project is also on the 
review committee. it is perhaps not surprising that such a role has been adopted by capacity-
building programmes. 
4.3.5 Lack of Aid Coordination 
Analysis of capacity-building programme documents and key informant interviews 
documented in sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.7 revealed a significant variation between the EIA 
models promoted by different aid agencies, in part, due to a lack of development aid 
coordination in Viet Nam. Unintentional overlap between EIA capacity building programmes 
was recognised following the inception mission of the ADB project where it was 
acknowledged many of the ADB's proposed activities were "found in other foreign assisted 
projects, and coordination among donors has been limited to date" (RCG/Hagler-Bailly 1995, 
4). Experiences where project personnel arrive in country to begin their activities, only to 
find that a previously unknown capacity-building programme has already carried out a very 
similar programme of action, are not uncommon. In one case, staff of the Netherlands 
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Embassy capacity-building programme eliminated approximately 25% of potential 
programme content during the project inception meeting when Vietnamese counterparts and 
other capacity-building programme staff made clear which activities were already going on 
(Field Notes 1998). One senior Vietnamese official who has been involved with EIA research 
in the country for over 20 years summarised EIA capacity-building efforts as "very timely, 
very positive, but not systematic or well coordinated" (Informant #59 1998). 
Many in the Vietnamese development aid community cite the UNDP as having 
adopted the role of attempting to coordinate and harmonise aid efforts in Viet Nam 
(Informant #32 1995, Informant #41 1998, Informant #46 1998, Informant #48 1998), 
however to date, the UNDP has not established a mechanism which can address such specific 
development concerns. The annual Donor Consultative Group' chaired by the UNDP in Viet 
Nam is primarily concerned with broad issues of the direction and funding level of overseas 
development aid to Viet Nam, and does not address specific thematic concerns such as EIA. 
As well, informal meetings, in which a particular theme linked to environmental aid is 
explored (e.g. small-scale industry, forestry or urban planning), are held each month between 
UNDP and other members of the Viet Nam aid community. However, such meetings are 
"very ad hoc" (Informant #57 1998), and are still too broadly focused to address themes as 
specific as EIA capacity-building (Informant #49 1998, Informant #58 1998). In recognition 
of this, in mid-1998 the World Bank and Canadian VCEP project attempted to develop a 
series of 'sub-sector' discussion groups (i.e. groups which form around a particular 
development sector such as Environment and which meet regularly to discuss microscale 
issues within that sector) for aid agency officials and Vietnamese counterparts (Informant 
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#58 1998). A Swedish aid project entitled Strengthe11ing Environmental Management 
Authority (SEMA), although not specifically addressing EIA capacity-building, has also 
endeavoured to coordinate aid efforts linked to MOSTE (Informant #57 1998). 
Notwithstanding these efforts, EIA capacity-building efforts still suffer from a lack of 
coordination among the donor community. Unless further action is taken, future capacity-
building efforts will continue to suffer from a lack of coordination. 
Some senior expatriates within the Viet Nam aid community see the lack of 
coordination between aid programmes as being fostered by Vietnamese counterparts, and 
part of a purposeful strategy of "divide and rule" (Informant #48 1998). By discouraging aid 
coordination, counterparts can request similar work from different aid programmes and then 
compare and select the best' of the resultant output (informant #51 1998). By way of 
example, EIA guidelines for hydro projects were requested by Vietnamese government 
officials from three different development aid programmes: the CIDA-VCEP programme, the 
EU programme and a joint Norwegian/Swedish project64 (Informant #38 1997, Informant 
#58 1998, Informant #64 1998). Some Vietnamese counterparts benefit financially from such 
a lack of coordination: 
Sometimes the Vietnamese make money from (the lack of aid coordination). 
Documents or information arranged for one donor is sold to the next ... they 
can earn money three times instead of one". 
(Informant #51 1998) 
The end result of aid coordination being so fragmented as to produce overlapping agendas 
and redundant outputs is a diversity of EIA models promoted within VietNam. 
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4.4 Vietnamese Responses to EIA Capacity-Building Programmes 
As part of the research, I documented the opinions and responses of Vietnamese 
participants in capacity-building programmes. For the most part, such opinions were offered 
during key informant interviews or aid agency training sessions and workshops, and 
participants were often surprisingly candid about both the positive and negative aspects of 
capacity-building activities. 
4.4.1 Positive Responses to EIA Capacity-Building 
Most Vietnamese participating in EIA capacity-building programmes spoke 
positively about the intellectual and catalytic role development aid agencies have had in 
assisting Viet Nam to place EIA and environmental planning concepts on the development 
agenda, and to assist in the comparatively rapid implementation of these. In particular, many 
key informants spoke of the 1egitimising' role capacity-building programmes played, raising 
awareness among top decision-makers of the benefits of a formal EIA process and in doing 
so, legitimising its need within the Vietnamese development planning process (Informant #52 
1998, Informant #55 1998, Informant #62 1998). This was thought to be particularly the case 
within non-environmental Ministries such as MPI "where the prestige of foreign ideas carries 
a higher weight or influence" (Informant #59 1998). 
In addition to this role, Vietnamese key informants also spoke positively about the 
role such programmes have played in facilitating exposure to international planning ideas and 
procedures new to Viet Nam. Capacity building programmes have been responsible for 
64 This project. referred to by key informants as the National Hydropower Master Plan Study. was due to stan in late 1998. 
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valuable intellectual stimulation in a country which, for many years, was cut-off from 
exchanges with a large part of the international development planning community. This has 
been particularly true in recent years with initial efforts to promote Planning Model concepts 
such as strategic environmental assessment and regional assessment: as one senior 
Vietnamese participant stated, " ... because of our involvement with capacity-building 
projects, now we think SEA is a topic that we should think about" (Informant #56 1998). It 
has also resulted in new awareness among MOSTE and NEA officials that Viet Nam's EIA 
procedures, which include the need to conduct EIA on existing projects, differ markedly 
from most other countries and must be addressed in future revisions of the regulations 
(Informant #53 1998). 
Not surprisingly, most Vietnamese key informants agreed capacity-building 
programmes had provided important benefits simply through the provision of key physical 
infrastructure and related physical resources useful in the EIA process (Informant #56 1998, 
Informant #53 1998). Examples of these include the EU programme's development of a GIS 
laboratory at the National Centre for Natural Science and Technology, and an environmental 
planning library and lecture facilities at the National University of Hanoi. Assistance with the 
computerisation of the EIA process was also seen as an important infrastructural benefit of 
capacity-building programmes, particularly those working within MOSTE (Informant #22 
1995, Informant #53 1998). Another physical resource which Vietnamese programme 
counterparts appreciated was the many sectoral EIA guidelines and case studies (e.g. 
Hydropower projects, industrial zones and transportation projects) completed by five 
different aid agencies (ADB, CIDA-VCEP, EU project, Netherlands Embassy and UNDP-
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phase m. Such resources were viewed by Vietnamese key informants as a useful form of 
practical standard toward which Vietnamese EIA consultants could aspire, and an even more 
useful training and capacity-building resource. 
Another major area where EIA capacity-building programmes were seen to benefit 
Vietnamese counterparts, particularly those working for government agencies, was in 
strengthening management capabilities for Viet Nam's growing EIA process and 
responsibilities (Informant #49 1998, Informant #53 1998). Assistance and advice was 
appreciated in such areas as the restructuring of governmental environmental assessment 
responsibilities at MOSTE, MTC and MPI, the design and implementation of an EIA 
tracking system within MOSTE (to advise staff of the status of all ongoing and completed 
EIAs), and advice on optimum staffing levels, staff recruitment and staff training 
programmes (ESSA Technologies Ltd. 1996, Informant #53 1998, Informant #61 1998). 
Vietnamese key informants acknowledged that development aid programmes had 
been responsible for the generation of new EIA capacities outside MOSTE and Hanoi-based 
university institutes, and such a decentralisation of EIA capacity was judged to be a positive 
development for the country (Informant #34 1997, Informant #53 1998). As a result of 
participation in capacity-building programmes, OOSTE staff in a series of northern Viet Nam 
provinces, and Hanoi-based staff within both MTC and MPI (see Boxes 4.2 and 4.3), were 
judged by some informants to have developed an appreciation for the EIA process and the 
capacity to implement some of its ideals (Informant #47 1998, Informant #49 1998, 
Informant #51 1998). Although much of the EIA capacity emerging outside of MOSTE has 
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been located in northern Viet Nam, a few university training institutes in southern Viet Nam 
have also benefited from exposure to development aid programmes, and by mid-1998 some 
had begun to conduct EIA shortcourses for DOSTE officials in nearby provinces (Key 
Informant #55 1998). 
One final aspect on which Vietnamese key informants commented positively was the 
relatively long-term nature of many of the EIA capacity-building programmes (Informant 
#53 1998, Informant #59 1998). Capacity-building programmes ranged in duration from 6 
months to 4 years, with the average programme lasting just over two years (see Table 4.4). 
Lengthy programmes were seen to provide important stability benefits, both financially and 
in terms of the added status or 'clout' such projects lent to fledgling environmental 
departments or university programmes. Some Vietnamese key informants suggested projects 
of "a minimum of one year" duration provided greater benefits than short-term projects, 
which were seen to be too specific and too demanding on limited counterpart resources 
(Informant #53 1998). 
Table 4.4 Duration of EIA Capacity-Building Programmes in Viet Nam 
Programme 
• Netherlands Embassy 
• UNEP-IUCN 
• Asian Development Bank 
• IDRC 
• UNDP-Phase I 
• EU Project 
• UNDP-Phase IT 
• CIDA-PIAP 
• CIDA-VCEP 












4.4.2 Negative Responses to EIA Capacity-Building 
One area where Vietnamese key informants felt capacity-building programmes could 
improve significantly was in the delivery of EIA training courses, particularly in the post-
1997 period. Negative comments about such training courses were common, and included the 
observation that, in the future, VietNam needed longer and more detailed courses related to 
EIA rather than the typical 3-LO day shortcourses many capacity-building programmes 
continued to provide (Informant #52 1998, Informant #53 1998, Informant #55 1998). Key 
informants also suggested there was a need to better screen potential trainees to ensure they 
were well placed within the development planning hierarchy to use their EIA knowledge, had 
an appropriate level of background knowledge to understand EIA concepts (Informant #33 
1997), and to ensure "the same senior government officials do not receive redundant EIA 
training from different aid donors" (Informant #55 1998). Although some key informants 
suggested EIA training courses had been strengthened in recent years by the addition of Viet 
Nam-specific content (e.g. case studies, context, and references to Vietnamese regulations 
and planning bodies) (Informant #56 1998), others felt this area could be improved further 
(Informant #33 1997, Informant #55 1998). 
Another area of potential improvement mentioned by Vietnamese key informants was 
the overly 'northern Viet Nam-centric' distribution of capacity-building activities: the 
majority of capacity-building activities have been conducted with institutions and individuals 
based in northern Viet Nam, even though much of Viet Nam's industrial development occurs 
in the south (Informant #34 1997, Informant #55 1998). Although some of the more recent 
capacity-building programmes have included linkages to provincial DOSTE offices and 
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regional planning bodies outside of Hanoi (e.g. VCEP, EU and UNDP projects), all capacity-
building programmes included in this research had their head offices in Hanoi and the 
majority of their capacity-building activities were concentrated in northern provinces of Viet 
Nam. One key informant from a southern Viet Nam environmental research centre observed 
that for a typical workshop conducted as part of a capacity-building programme, only one or 
two individuals from southern Vietnamese institutions would be invited while often 30 or 
more from the north would be in attendance (Informant #55 1998). 
A few Vietnamese key informants commented negatively on the lack of capacity-
building activities for social impact assessment and public involvement aspects of EIA, while 
recognising that these were difficult issues to deal with in the country (Informant 28 1995, 
Informant #34 1997, Informant #44 1998, Informant #55 1998). One informant specifically 
suggested that development aid agencies had raised expectations around these themes, yet 
had not followed up with action: "EIA capacity-building programmes have introduced 
concern for social impact assessment, but no specific activities have been undertaken to build 
SIA capacity" (Informant #55 1998). From these comments, I understand that capacity-
building programmes have begun to affect the VietNam context, which previously limited 
inclusion of social issues within EIA, and that SIA and public involvement issues are 
beginning to be an expected component of capacity-building actions. 
4.5 Summary: Main Findings 
This chapter has highlighted the main empirical findings of the research, derived from 
key informant interviews, participant observation and content analysis of secondary data. As 
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these findings were often not uniform across the nine EIA capacity-building programmes 
included in the research, the following section summarises the main points: 
4.5.1 EIA Models Promoted by Capacity-Building Programmes 
• Capacity-building programmes promote EIA models with a high degree of variation, 
ranging from a "strong technical model' to a 'moderate planning model'. 
• EIA concentrating on biophysical impact assessment is being promoted more strongly 
than integrated forms (i.e. biophysical, social, economic impacts). 
• All capacity-building programmes promote project-level EIA, but many also promote 
strategic assessment of policies, plans, programmes or regions. 
• Aid agencies do not strongly promote cumulative effects assessment. 
• Capacity-building programmes promote scientifically-derived knowledge as the most 
valid form for EIA: multiple forms of knowledge (e.g. science +traditional ecological 
knowledge+ public opinion) are not strongly promoted. 
• Uncertainty in EIA is not acknowledged nor factored into aid agency capacity-
building. 
• Capacity-building programmes strongly support long-term, multi-stage or continuous 
EIA rather than 'one-shot' approaches. 
• Capacity-building programmes promote public involvement and social impact 
assessment in official rhetoric, but this is not matched by capacity-building actions. 
• Most Vietnamese counterparts in capacity-building programmes are drawn from 
environmental, hard science, planning or engineering/construction institutions: very 
few are drawn from socially-themed institutions. 
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• Capacity-building programmes offer contradictory messages about the appropriate 
format for Vietnamese public involvement. 
• The dominant planning theory basis of capacity-building programmes is a modified 
version of rational comprehensive planning theory. 
4.5.2 Factors Influencing EIA Model Promoted 
• The internal goals and objectives of aid agency funding programmes influence the 
form of EIA used in capacity-building. 
• The biases and priorities of implementing agencies and Vietnamese counterparts 
influence the model of EIA promoted. 
• Aid agencies view the Vietnamese development planning context as strongly 
influencing (and limiting) the form of EIA that can be successfully promoted: simple 
EIA processes are valued more than the complex; public involvement and social 
impact assessment are seen as too sensitive to incorporate; uncertainty is not seen as 
an important environmental planning issue, and; the political context of decision-
making (including EIA beginning after firm decisions to proceed have been made, 
conflicts of interest, and bribery) reduces concerns about capacity-building to 
improve EIA quality. 
• The lack of development aid coordination contributes to the diversity of EIA models 
being promoted. 
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4.5.3. Vietnamese Responses to Capacity-Building Programmes 
• Aid agencies are recognised as having provided an essential role in stimulating 
awareness for environmental planning, and placing related capacity-building needs on 
VietNam's development agenda. 
• Aid agencies are recognised as having been critical in facilitating the rapid 
implementation of the EIA portion of Viet Nam's National Law on Environmental 
Protection. 
• Vietnamese counterparts to EIA capacity-building programmes are beginning to 
adopt as priorities new ideas first imported and promoted by aid agencies (e.g. 
Strategic Environmental Assessment). 
• Aid programmes are recognised as having provided badly needed physical 
infrastructure and resources supporting the Vietnamese EIA process. 
• Aid programmes are recognised as assisting in the under-developed area of EIA 
management (i.e. project tracking, personnel training and divisional management 
responsibilities). 
• Capacity-building programmes are recognised as having had recent success in 
building more decentralised EIA capacity, particularly in northern Viet Nam's 
provincial DOSTE offices and within MTC and MPI. 
• Vietnamese counterparts greatly appreciate long term capacity-building programmes 
(l-4 years), while viewing shorter-term programmes (6-12 months) as a drain on 
Vietnamese counterpart resources. 
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• Vietnamese counterparts view EIA training courses delivered by many aid 
programmes as too short, general and generic. 
• Training courses offered by different aid agencies are often attended by the same 
senior Vietnamese officials, leading to redundancy and inefficiency. 
• Capacity-building programmes are viewed by some Vietnamese as overly 'northern 
Viet Nam-centric'. More capacity-building activities in southern Viet Nam are 
needed. 
• Capacity-building programmes have raised Vietnamese expectations surrounding 
social impact assessment and public involvement, yet these programmes have not 
followed up with significant capacity-building actions, nor targeted Vietnamese 
institutions with a 'social' mandate. 
In the following chapter l discuss the findings of the research, tracing the influence of 
development aid programmes in VietNam's EIA system and discussing the capacity-building 
needs left unmet by such programmes. I then examine the roots of resistance to fuller 
implementation of a planning model of EIA, and suggest capacity-building programmes have 
not reached their full potential in contributing toward the achievement of Viet Nam's 
UNCED sustainable development goals. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
extent to which my research results are generalisable beyond Viet Nam. 
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Chapter Five 
CIIAPfER FIVE· INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
Findings from the empirical research traced in Chapter Four were organised around 
themes derived from both academic literature and discussions with participants in 
Vietnamese EIA capacity-building programmes. These findings are discussed and interpreted 
in the following sections. Where appropriate, case study findings are linked back to the body 
of academic literature traced in Chapter Two. 
5.1 Unmet Capacity Building Needs 
Although capacity-building programmes have undoubtedly been instrumental in 
developing the status and implementation capacity that now exists in Viet Nam, much of the 
initial work has focused institutionally on central government ministries or university 
institutes, and has stressed the scientific, technical and administrative needs of 
'environmental' impact assessment. There has been insufficient attention paid to the public 
invol~ement and 'social' aspects of EIA. In short, there are several unmet needs for EIA 
capacity-building in Viet Nam before the country can achieve full implementation of a 
planning model. 
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5.1.1 Attempting Higher-Order Assessment as a Precursor to Project-Level Assessment 
In directing EIA capacity-building primarily to project-level concerns, development 
aid agencies operating in Viet Nam may have missed a vital opportunity to leverage aid 
dollars. Instead, by first building capacity for strategic environmental assessment, agencies 
could have factored in concern for negative environmental and social impacts at policy, 
programme and regional levels before individual projects are designed. Although such an 
approach would be virtually unprecedented in development aid programming, the likelihood 
of Viet Nam achieving its sustainable development goals by this method would be far greater 
than through elaborate efforts to construct a project-oriented EIA system. Capacity-building 
programmes must decide the level at which first to address impact assessment concerns. In 
some countries, capacity building which first promotes higher-order assessment would 
provide the highest 'return' on aid spending. In other countries, a more usual focus on project-
level assessment may work better. 
5.1.2 Uncertainty in Impact Assessment and Development Planning 
There is a growing body of evidence that all impacts are not predictable, and that EIA 
processes should be constructed with the assumption there will be unanticipated outcomes of 
development projects and programmes (Black 1991). However, development aid agencies 
operating in Viet Nam have largely ignored such evidence in carrying out EIA capacity-
building efforts. In effect, aid agencies are helping the Viet Nam government to construct an 
EIA process which does not factor in the implications of uncertainty. Future development 
proposals will proceed, even though the associated EIA studies are flawed and will not 
anticipate some of the eventual environmental and social impacts. It is unclear whether aid 
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agencies consider uncertainty too unimportant or 'sensitive' for Vietnamese planners to 
consider65, or ignoring uncertainty was simply an oversight. However, for aid agencies to 
continue promoting EIA as predictively accurate is ill-advised, and potentially negligent, to 
the extent that it compromises the achievement of VietNam's sustainable development goals 
and wastes aid dollars. Uncertainty in EIA, and appropriate capacity-building responses to it 
(including adaptive environmental assessment, the precautionary principle, and phased 
development), should be incorporated into aid programmes wherever possible. My research 
revealed that aid agencies are already promoting the idea of post-development impact 
monitoring (which should assist in the realisation that predicted impacts are not always 
matched by the actual effects). Additional capacity-building stressing the existence of 
uncertainty within EIA could provide added support for such monitoring. 
5.1.3 Social Aspects in EIA: a Long Road Ahead 
Of all the capacity-building needs which have been unmet by aid agency 
programmes, none is more important or so lacking in VietNam's capacity-building activities 
as 'social aspects of EIA'. Aid agencies should routinely promote the assessment and 
mitigation of social impacts, since individuals living in developing countries are generally 
more vulnerable to development-induced change than are developed country counterparts 
(Doberstein 1994). Under-emphasising the assessment of developmental impacts on people is 
not limited to Viet Nam, and has been referred to as "the main flaw in many (developing 
country) resource policies" where there has been a simple failure to focus on human as well 
as environmental impacts (IDRC 1992, 44). Public involvement, while more of a contentious 
65 Knight (1991) suggests that uncenainty may be perceived as a central consideration of ElA. or largely dismissed. 
depending on the socio-cultural context within which it is considered. 
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issue for Viet Nam, should be further explored by aid agencies with their Vietnamese 
counterparts. Efforts could be made to test a variety of forms of public involvement on 'real-
world' Vietnamese development projects, and to determine the relative benefits of public 
involvement in the specific development planning context of VietNam. Given the low level 
of programme activity, it is likely that functional capacities in the social aspects of EIA will 
remain very low for years to come in Viet Nam, particularly since social institutions will 
likely remain marginalised in the mainstream EIA process. One important step development 
aid agencies could take would be to initiate capacity-building programmes on 'social aspects 
of environmental impact assessment'. Such programmes should initially target MOSTE and 
MPI staff, staff of socially-themed government ministries, university institutes with a 
mandate to teach or research such areas66, and NGOs or private consultants who could 
conduct social impact assessments or advise on public involvement processes. Once 
capacities at these levels have been established subsequent programmes could be developed 
to widen and extend capacities to provincial government levels. 
5.1.4 Unacknowledged Knowledge: Indigenous Knowledge Left Out of EIA Capacity-
Building 
Development aid agencies have relied on the almost exclusive promotion of scientific 
forms of knowledge as the basis for Viet Nam's EIA process, leaving unmet the need to 
promote the use of complementary forms of knowledge in EIA such as indigenous 
knowledge. Such an oversight logically leads to the construction of an EIA process which 
consolidates power in the hands of a scientific and technocratic planning elite. This will lead 
66 The National Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities (NCSSH) would be an obvious starting point. and existing 
rese:m:h institutes within NCSSH including the Centre for Human Geography. and the Ethnographic Research Institute 
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to an EIA process which does not, nor cannot, factor in the legitimate needs and desires of 
members of the Vietnamese public who do not have the technical or scientific basis to 
contribute on an equal footing. A society like VietNam's, in which values and attitudes are 
formed mainly out of an indigenous knowledge base, should logically construct an EIA 
system which legitimises and includes indigenous knowledge. The lack of capacity building 
in this area can also be seen as yet another example of the lack of attention paid by 
development aid agencies to greater public involvement in Viet Nam's EIA process. 
Although aid agency rhetoric suggests TEK and other forms of non-scientific knowledge are 
valued in the EIA process, capacity-building practices indicate that there is hesitancy in 
promoting this to Vietnamese officials or following up with specific capacity-building 
actions. 
5.1.5 Missing Actors in EIA Capacity-Building Programmes 
Development aid agencies have generally failed to work with three groups of actors 
as counterparts in capacity-building: the private sector, affected communities, and academic 
institutions located in southern Viet Nam. Although most capacity-building programmes 
have involved the quasi-private sector staff of university research centres (e.g. those faculty 
members who carry out the bulk of Viet Nam's EIA studies as consulting contracts), none 
have attempted to stimulate or strengthen stand-alone environmental consulting companies, 
nor have addressed the variety of problems facing academic research institutes as they 
attempt to operate private sector consulting subsidiaries. With the private sector carrying out 
such a key role in Viet Nam's EIA process. there is a need for aid agencies to carry out a 
private sector-focused aid programming which can provide a range of supports. This would 
would have much to contribute once capacity-building has taken place. 
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include administrative advice on the design and operation of consulting companies, means by 
which to increase the quality of consulting work, and the establishment of long-term 
mentoring relationships between Vietnamese and foreign environmental consulting firms. 
There was also almost a complete absence of EIA capacity-building targeted at 
'affected individuals or communities': those at the commune or village levels potentially 
affected by development proposals. Such a programme would most usefully be carried out as 
a 1eam-by-doing' activity based on a real-world development likely to affect particular 
communities, and would attempt to prepare villagers to contribute to EIA studies and 
participate in the EIA process. Capacity-building programme staff could expose villagers to a 
basic explanation of the EIA concept and nature of the proposed development, and could 
then facilitate the inclusion of villagers inputs (i.e. their knowledge, factual information and 
values) into the EIA process. For example, aid agency staff could demonstrate in easy-to-
understand terms the completed project (e.g. renditions of a completed project, tours to view 
similar projects, or visits to a proposed relocation area), ask villagers to consider the negative 
or positive impacts of such a project on their own family, and then ask villagers to propose 
changes which might improve the project. This approach mirrors a highly successful process 
used by Morse and Berger (1992) to gather impact input from individuals living in some 125 
villages potentially affected by the proposed World Bank Sardar Sarovar hydro project. 
Although the resulting capacity to become involved in EIA processes might be transitory for 
individual villagers, the development planning process would show an improved capacity to 
carry out basic village-level public participation in EIA, especially as more and more 
successful examples were carried out in Viet Nam. Thus, in extending EIA capacity-building 
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programmes to the village or commune level, nation-wide capacities to carry out public 
involvement in development planning would also be strengthened. 
The final group of actors largely ignored by capacity-building programmes has been 
the southern Viet Nam academic institutes responsible for EIA and environmental planning 
training. With government ministries responsible for both the EIA process (MOSTE) and 
economic investment and development planning (MPI) being located in northern Viet Nam, 
and many respected university institutes, initial capacity building has largely been 
concentrated in the north. However, with so much of Viet Nam's private sector investment 
being concentrated in the south, there is a large unmet need for an expansion of EIA 
capacities in south VietNam, particularly in training for DOSTE staff in southern provinces, 
and the stimulation and expansion of a southern Viet Nam environmental private sector. 
Thus, future development aid programmes should aim for a broader geographical balance to 
capacity building. 
5.1.6 Capacity Building Has Not Transformed Vietnamese Planning Theory 
Many of the failings of capacity-building programmes are linked to the desire of aid 
agencies to work within the existing theory base of Vietnamese planning process. Stated 
another way, EIA capacity-building has been largely conducted in order to mesh with the 
existing Vietnamese development planning process, rather than to challenge or to transform 
its theoretical base. The lack of social and public involvement aspects of EIA, alternative 
forms of knowledge in planning, higher-order impact assessment, and grassroots-level 
capacity building, all indicate that aid agencies have worked within the development 
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planning processes as currently practiced in Viet Nam. Thus, aid should consider capacity 
building which sensitises Vietnamese planners to the many alternative planning theories, and 
the benefits associated with these. Since this is likely a sensitive issue for Vietnamese 
counterparts, capacity building would be limited initially to efforts to open a dialogue with 
Vietnamese planners and academics, and to place the idea of change in planning theory on 
the Vietnamese development agenda. 
5.2 Aid Agency lnftuence in Introducing a Planning Model of EIA 
Over the last five years, the proliferation of capacity-building programmes in Viet 
Nam has been instrumental in helping the Vietnamese government to move EIA from 
concept to implemented process in a relatively short period of time. Capacity-building 
programmes have been instrumental to steady gains in EIA capacity in Viet Nam, 
particularly in boosting staff numbers and skill levels, creating needed technical guidelines, 
and supporting the development of EIA administrative capacities within MOSTE. Recent 
successes have also been achieved by moving away from exclusive concentration on MOSTE 
alone. As a result, development aid programmes have been responsible for contributing to 
EIA knowledge and skills in non-environmental ministries and sub-national development 
planning agencies. This reflects a successful strategic process of decentralising EIA capacity, 
by beginning with "core actors" in the Vietnamese EIA process and gradually moving 
outwards to involve a widening circle of institutions which strengthen and support the EIA 
process. Therefore, it can be concluded that in only five years of effort, development aid 
programmes have helped to transform the role of EIA in Viet Nam: from a training and 
awareness raising tool, EIA has become an officially mandated process which has begun to 
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influence both the design of new developments, and the wider development planning and 
decision-making process. 
Capacity-building programmes have been successful in promoting some of the 
elements which comprise a planning model of EIA, however, it must be stressed that this 
success is only partial. These include progress in moving Vietnamese thinking about EIA 
beyond an exclusive focus on projects, stimulating concern in VietNam for longer-term EIA 
processes and monitoring of impacts, and beginning to raise awareness of the need to 
broaden impact assessment beyond biophysical impacts. In addition to indicating that 
capacity-building efforts have been successful, such progress is evidence that development 
aid agencies have begun to reconsider what comprises good EIA practice, and the best EIA 
platform upon which to build overall environmental planning capacity. 
Elements of a planning model for EIA have been introduced through a variety of 
means including: 
• Education and training; 
• Learn-by-doing' activities; 
• Strategic alliances with key individuals; 
• Message repetition, and; 
• Opportunism and gradualism. 
Education and training were the most common means by which capacity-building 
programmes were able to introduce aspects of the planning model. Most capacity-building 
programmes included shortcourses, technical training or modular training packages as part of 
overall activities, and often these included planning model elements. Another highly 
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successful approach involved "learn-by-doing" EIA simulations or real-world case studies. 
Through such activities Vietnamese participants were exposed to concepts such as regional-
level assessment and planning, the assessment of social impacts of developments and the 
need for impact monitoring and post-project adjustment (Field Notes 1997 and 1998). 
Another means by which successes were achieved was through strategic alliances and long-
term capacity-building relationships with key Vietnamese officials. In one example, a 
Vietnamese professor specialising in natural resources and the environment stated that he 
knew nothing about the concept of EIA until 1983, yet was subsequently involved in six of 
the nine EIA capacity-building programmes used as case studies in this research (Informant 
#30 1995). The professor is now acknowledged as one of the key figures responsible for 
implementing EIA regulations in the country (Informant #9 1994). Development aid agencies 
have recognised that working with such respected individuals is a crucial means of 
convincing others to adopt newer and more radical aspects of EIA. including those central to 
the planning model. More simply, Vietnamese officials have also been convinced of the 
merits of the planning model through simple repetition, in which suggested changes to 
existing EIA practice are stated on multiple occasions, often by different aid programmes. 
until the message is internalised by Vietnamese counterparts (Informant #51 1998). 
Another important means of introducing aspects of the planning model has been a 
combination of opportunism and gradualism: as EIA awareness has risen in Viet Nam 
capacity-building programmes have begun to move away from a technical model and to 
promote concepts such as greater public participation and greater integration with 
development policy-making. Although structural barriers in the Vietnamese development 
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context have prevented the adoption of a full planning model of EIA in Viet Nam, capacity-
building programmes are now transforming, modifying or eliminating some of these barriers, 
sometimes by beginning with a technical model of EIA and continuing with capacity 
building activities which extend the model. In some cases there was explicit recognition by 
aid agency staff that a technical model was used strategically as a starting point or beach-
head', around which future reforms and changes would be based (Informant #47 1998, 
Informant #49 1998). As one UNDP Capacity 21 project official commented: 
Throughout Phase I, EIA was used to get across basic concepts of 
environmental forethought and the process of sustainable development, not 
because it was felt to be really effective but because EIA is now a motherhood 
issue and everyone accepts it. Once EIA is instilled, further progress in other 
areas (e.g. policy assessment, areawide assessment and integrated planning) 
can be made. 
(Informant #47 1998) 
Such observations indicate that the model of EIA promoted by aid agencies is not static. 
Through a combination of opportunism and gradualism, capacity-building efforts will likely 
move VietNam's EIA process further towards a planning model. 
5.3 Roots of Resistance to the Promotion of the Planning Model of EIA 
The research has indicated that there is currently resistance, on the part of both aid 
agencies and Vietnamese counterparts, to the full implementation of a planning model of 
EIA. There are many possible reasons for this, ranging from aid temerity to structural barriers 
to change within the Vietnamese development context. These reasons behind such resistance 
will be explored further in the following section. 
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5.3.1 Competing Planning Theories 
Ultimately, EIA capacity-building efforts rest on normative beliefs about planning 
theory and associated conceptual models of EIA. Such beliefs define the manner by which 
EIA is seen to be linked to the development planning process, and guide both capacity-
building programmes and Vietnamese counterpart behaviours. The research indicates there is 
currently a lack of harmony among the normative planning beliefs espoused by aid agencies 
(which often promote a planning model as an ideal form of EIA), the agencies which 
implement EIA capacity-building programmes, and Vietnamese counterparts involved in 
capacity-building programmes. This lack of harmony is even more evident when the 
normative beliefs of agencies and individuals in the wider development planning process are 
considered. Not surprisingly, this has also led to a diversity of conceptual models of EIA in 
the country. Variously, EIA is perceived as: an unnecessary hurdle for investors to overcome; 
an administrative and regulatory process; a technical tool to screen and mitigate projects; a 
wide-reaching means of stimulating less-damaging development projects and programmes, 
or; a potentially important means to reorient planning for sustainability. 
5.3.2 Lack of Normative Conviction in Aid Agencies 
Over the last 40 years of development aid, many agencies have been accused of 
promoting a 'donor-driven' development agenda which largely ignores the desires of intended 
recipient countries, and which undermines indigenous ownership and decision-making in 
development (Thomson 1996). In response, many agencies have recently adopted 
consultation with recipient country officials as a hallmark of aid programming, and have 
taken pains to construct aid programmes which closely match counterpart wishes. However, 
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this approach is also problemmatic if it is taken too far. In some cases, the counterpart's 
worldview may limit the scope of development planning and capacity building. As an 
example, in one EIA capacity-building workshop, aid agency officials asked over 60 
Vietnamese environmental planning and university officials to identify capacity-building 
needs to be addressed over the following three years: the group failed to mention any needs 
associated with social impact assessment or public involvement, and instead focussed most 
of their attention on perceived technical weaknesses in the EIA process such as the lack of 
available impact modeling methods, poor database development and lack of knowledge about 
industrial production and technologies (Research Notes 1997). Development aid agencies, 
while attentive to concerns that development aid should respond to recipient needs, should 
also retain normative convictions about what constitutes 'good' or 'appropriate' planning 
processes and forms of development, and should carry out capacity building in this image. 
5.3.3 Lack of Aid Coordination 
The lack of aid coordination mentioned previously (see section 4.3.5) has contributed 
to resistance to the implementation of a planning model of EIA. In initially using a simpler 
technical model to get EIA 'up-and-running', some capacity-building programmes have run 
the risk of seeing such a model solidify into standard practice. That is, if MOSTE is judged 
by the Vietnamese government to be coping with existing EIA demands under a technical 
model, there is likely to be resistance to future planning model reforms (such as the 
introduction of public involvement) which could reduce the speed of the EIA process. 
Another way in which uncoordinated aid has fostered resistance to the planning model has 
been the variety of 'mixed messages' delivered to Vietnamese counterparts. When one 
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capacity-building programme stresses the inclusion of social impacts and strategic-level 
assessment, while another downplays such concerns, there is a real risk that the simpler, 
cheaper, and faster route will prevail. Such problems are confounded by the potential for 
different EIA models to be promoted at different levels of government, and to different actors 
in the EIA process. 
With significant variation in how EIA may be conceptualised, there is a need for a 
mechanism67 in Viet Nam to reduce the level of capacity building redundancy and mixed 
messages that is currently seen. Led by aid agency representatives, and with appropriate 
representation from Vietnamese planning officials and political decision-makers, a 
coordinating mechanism for EIA capacity-building would assist greatly in reforming the 
Vietnamese development planning process. Such a mechanism would serve to stimulate 
discussion and some measure of agreement between aid officials and Vietnamese 
counterparts on the idealised role or "vision" for EIA in development planning. Once a 
measure of agreement has been reached, EIA capacity-building efforts can be coordinated 
and harmonised toward that particular vision without the risk of redundant efforts, and future 
programmes can be designed to contribute in the most appropriate manner. 
5.3.4 Structural Barriers to the Introduction of a Planning Model 
As suggested earlier, Viet Nam's existing cultural, political and developmental 
context (see section 4.3.4) has prevented fuller adoption of a planning model of EIA. Henry 
(1990) very usefully suggested that a country's development planning context can be viewed 
67 Although a number of mechanisms already exist (see section 4.3.5). none operate at the level of specificity required to 
address ELA capacity-building issues on an ongoing basis. 
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as a set of stntctural barriers limiting the type and amount of change that can be effected by 
the introduction of planning procedures such as EIA and SIA (emphasis added). The 
Vietnamese government initially adopted a technical model of EIA due to the short-term 
need on the part of government for an EIA process which, without fundamental restructuring 
or prohibitive financial commitments68, could be assimilated easily into existing planning 
processes. However, a technical model now persists, in part, because of the threat a full 
planning model poses to existing planning and decision-making power. 
In particular, efforts to promote greater public participation have been resisted by 
many individuals at all levels, many of whom have a vested interest in the status quo. Such a 
barrier reaches far beyond Viet Nam 's borders to the rest of the developing world. Rickson et. 
al (1990, 235) observed that in many if not most developing countries "public participation 
and involvement is unacceptable". Structural barriers to participatory planning are deeply 
entrenched in present-day Vietnamese society, and the changes required (e.g. changes to 
existing power holders and planning structures) to implement a full planning model of EIA 
have not yet been addressed by aid agency programmes. 
Another structural barrier to the implementation of a planning model in Viet Nam 
concerns the relevant or legitimate' knowledge base. As mentioned, most Vietnamese 
currently involved in EIA have been educated in the hard sciences, engineering or economic 
disciplines, and thus value the scientific knowledge base upon which these disciplines rest 
more highly than alternative forms, with which they have less experience. Epistemological 
68 Mayda{1985. 1019) referred to this as the principle of"realistic simplicity". This principle states that "laws. as well as 
the institutions and procedures they establish. should be implementable. i.e. simple and tailored to each nation·s needs and 
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rigidity is thus a structural barrier to the full adoption of a planning model. However, this 
barrier is further compounded by EIA capacity-building programmes which fail to promote 
other forms of useful knowledge or carry out supporting capacity-building activities. Unless 
future capacity-building programmes attempt to sensitise government officials and EIA 
practitioners to the value of knowledge forms featured in 'soft-science' disciplines (e.g. the 
traditional ecological knowledge or public opinions and values which have been the focus of 
attention in anthropology, planning and human geography disciplines), alternatives to 
scientific knowledge will continue to be overlooked in VietNam and a full planning model 
will not be implemented. 
Structural barriers such as these extend far beyond the agencies and institutions 
involved in environmental impact assessment, and in Viet Nam, as in many other developing 
countries, likely compromise development and capacity-building efforts in other areas (e.g. 
rural development, forestry and fisheries development). Research by Boyle ( 1998) 
demonstrated that structural barriers to participatory planning and EIA were widespread in 
Asian developing countries, and that capacity building in the EIA sphere alone was unlikely 
to result in significant system-wide change. Such barriers are likely to persist if addressed 
solely by small-scale EIA capacity-building programmes. Development aid agencies working 
in Viet Nam would be more likely to achieve success across a broad range of development 
themes if cross-cutting structural barriers were identified, and capacity-building approaches 
adopted for all programmes in a particular country. This would serve to address structural 
barriers in a more systematic and successful manner. 
capabilities·. 
5.4 Will the EIA Model Promoted Allow Progress on VietNam's Sustainable 
Development Goals? 
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The research examined contentions in the academic literature that identify EIA as a 
means to: A) translate sustainability principles into strategy and action (Holtz 1990, Sadler 
and Jacobs 1990, George 1999), and; B) provide a bridge between present forms of 
development and those envisaged under sustainable development ideals (Doberstein 1994). 
In a 1992 report to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), Viet Nam expressed a series of policy statements containing 'sustainable 
development goals'. Using these goals as a guideline (see Table 5.1), the researcher estimated 
both the potential for EIA capacity-building programmes to contribute to goal achievement, 
and actual contributions to date. Of the 20 sustainable development goals drawn from Viet 
Nam's UNCED submission, the researcher estimated that EIA capacity-building programmes 
had either a bigh' or 'medium' potential to contribute toward goal achievement for 17 of these 
goals. However, it was also estimated these programmes met their full potential for only two 
of the 20 goa!s. 
Of the six sustainable development goals for which a planning model of EIA was 
judged to have a bigh' potential contribution, capacity-building programmes were judged to 
have contributed a 'medium' level of support for three goals, and a low' level of support for 
the remaining three. Capacity-building programmes have been an important factor in the 
implementation of the Viet Nam National Law on Environmental Protection and, through 
training and capacity building with provincial DOSTE's, have also been contributors to the 
delegation of environmental planning power. Yet in both cases, more could be done if aid 
agencies were to promote a planning model of EIA more strongly. Although capacity-
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building programmes have assisted in helping Viet Nam reach its goal of assessing the 
environmental impacts of all proposed projects, a similar level of assistance in reaching the 
goal of assessing national, sectoral and local development plans or policies has not yet 
materialised. Continuing down the list of UNCED/Viet Nam goal statements, capacity-
building programmes have failed to make a significant contribution to the achievement of the 
next three goals: the adoption of cleaner industrial production technologies, practicing 
precautionary measures in carrying out development policies, and the adoption of a 1east 
negative environmental impact' standard for industrial developments. These goals could be 
promoted by aid agencies as 'sustainable development criteria' against which development 
projects or policies would be assessed and judged in the EIA process. However, to date aid 
agencies have not adopted such an approach. 
Of the twelve sustainable development goals which I estimated had a 'medium' 
potential contribution from a planning model of EIA, capacity-building programmes were 
judged to have reached this potential for just two of these goals: the expansion of 
environmental awareness, and changes to perceptions of environmental and resources values. 
For both goals, capacity-building programmes have provided as much support as could be 
expected through their widespread training activities, expansion of Vietnamese teaching 
capacity (i.e. the \raining-of-trainers), public awareness campaigns, and sensitisation of 
decision-makers to environmental issues. For the remaining ten goal statements, capacity-
building programmes were judged not to have reached their potential contribution. For 
example, goal statement number fourteen, to " ... decrease the use of ... fossil fuels" could 
have been more fully addressed by capacity-building programmes through the development 
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of EIA review guidelines indicating that energy-sector development projects, plans or 
policies leading to increased fossil fuel consumption would trigger a rejection or proposal 
modification. Over the past six years of EIA application, many fossil-fuel burning power 
plants, motorcycle and automobile assembly plants, and oil and gas developments have 
successfully passed through VietNam's EIA process (SRV 1996, Research Notes 1998) yet 
all contribute to an expansion in Viet Nam's fossil fuel consumption. Likewise, goal 
statement number fifteen, to "reduce deforestation" could have been more fully addressed by 
capacity-building effons. By linking the goal of limiting deforestation with the outcome of 
development proposals passing through the EIA process, hydropower projects such as the 
Son La scheme and numerous aquaculture developments situated in Viet Nam 's coastal 
mangrove forests would be rejected or would require comprehensive modifications. 
The failure of capacity-building programmes in Viet Nam to live up to their full 
potential is, in pan, due to the relative infancy of EIA processes in the country. However, the 
predominant choice of a 'modified technical model of EIA' in capacity-building activities has 
also played a pan in limiting EIA's contribution to the achievement of sustainable 
development goals. Despite these problems, the desire for and acceptance of change among 
some members of the development planning system in Viet Nam is high, posing an 
opponunity for further reforms and a fuller adoption of a planning model of EIA. However, 
explicit links between Viet Nam's sustainable development goals and EIA practice are 
needed, and capacity building which strengthens these links should be a goal of every 
development aid agency involved in building EIA capacity. 
203 
Table 5.1 Have EIA Capacity-Building Programmes Contributed to Achievement of 
VietNam's UNCED 1992 Sustainable n · 
. . , :~,0rt.\,: './· ·:_ 
.· ·~~·~:~ ' 
, UNCEJ}GG.fst.te.Dent&* 
. . .. · :~ ,:::: 
l. Enact/i1 Law on Ein<' •1 f 
2. n. more power to_l~ala~nliiii:~uill~ 
3. Conduct EIA for all development projects, and 
national, sectoral and local development plans. 
4. Adopt cleaner mdu:~u uilpa' ... ·' ·'" 
5. Use precautionary measures to prevent development 
·"··'· from caus!ng environmental"· 
6. Adopt a "least negative environmental impact" 
·t. in carrying out industrialisation. 
7. Expand environmental education and awareness 
programmes to people of all ages, panicularly 
decision-makers. 
8. Promote change to Vietnamese perceptions of 
environmental and natural resource values. 
9. Improve rural living conditions, livelihoods and 
infrastructure. 
10. Reduce variability in water supplies through 
expansion of micro, mini and medium-scale 
dams/reservoirs. 
11. Use integrated planning and management to reduce 
marine nollurion and Ll"'·,.:_;n ...... J loss. 
12. Integrate ecological and economic regulations and 
~IOllllllllj;o 
13. lntemalise all environmental impact costs into 
resource and product prices, development decisions 
and construction estimates 
14. Promote energy conservation! efficiency (decrease 
fuel wood, charcoal and fossil fuel use and increase 
hydro, rmal. bi()~ solar and wind~_._ 
15. RPrlnrP .J .• ..-_ ·'· 
16. Decrease use of chemical pesticides and fenilisers, 
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17. Improve urban living conditions through national and 
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18. Control production. import or export of hazardous 
wastes. 
19. F.xnand family r .:. ; effons. 
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5.5 To What Extent are Observed Patterns VietNam-Specific? 
Although empirical research was carried out entirely within Viet Narn, a range of Viet 
Nam-specific and more generic patterns are exposed. VietNam's context, and experience in 
establishing EIA and environmental planning processes, demonstrate both unique features 
and features which· it shares with other developing countries. This is an important observation 
since it identifies the extent to which research results may be seen to be generalisable to other 
developing countries. Ultimately, observations and conclusions drawn from Viet Narn's 
experience with EIA capacity-building are more likely to have relevance to other developing 
countries than to be considered VietNam-specific'. 
On one hand, Viet Nam's recent war history, Communist Party governance system 
and low-level of economic development (relative to neighbours such as China, Philippines, 
Thailand and Malaysia) has led to a development context uncommon in Asian developing 
countries. Unlike many other Asian countries, basic environmental planning structures such 
as EIA were virtually non-existent in Viet Narn until the early 1990s. Since then 
comparatively rapid political changes, coupled with the unique place VietNam's war history 
occupies in the collective consciousness of aid agencies, have led to sudden and intense 
development aid interest in assisting with and funding the development of environmental 
planning structures to a level likely unparalleled anywhere in the developing world. With 
such unique features, aid agencies capacity-building experiences are unlikely to be fully 
replicable in other developing countries. 
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Furthermore, as both an 'economy in transition', from a centralised to market-driven 
economy, and to a lesser extent, 'political system in transition', Viet Nam is following a 
different path from that of many other developing countries around the world. Thus, the 
establishment of EIA in the country, and the assistance of development aid capacity-building 
programmes, reflects unique elements and patterns unlikely to be found in other countries. 
As an example of this uniqueness, after almost seven years of formal EIA implementation, 
'private sector' EIA consultants have not yet emerged: most EIA consultants are government 
employees 'moonlighting' to supplement their incomes. As well, it is unlikely that VietNam's 
problems of EIA capacity-building redundancy and lack of aid coordination would be seen in 
other developing countries for the simple reason that it is unlikely that other countries would 
trigger such an intense, and in some instances, competitive 'aid stampede'. Such unique 
features ensure that Viet Nam's experiences with EIA and associated capacity building are 
unlikely to be wholly replicable in other developing countries. 
On the other hand, Viet Nam shares with other developing countries common 
developmental problems and structural barriers, and aid agencies are also likely to exhibit a 
broad range of common behaviours regardless of the country involved. Thus, research results 
indicating that structural barriers, and aid agency responses to such barriers, prevent the full 
adoption of an EIA planning model in Viet Nam are likely to have relevance to other 
developing countries. In particular, structural barriers to the acceptance of social aspects of 
EIA, including participatory planning approaches, are expected to be found in most 
developing countries (see studies by Henry 1990 and Rickson et. al 1990, Boyle 1998). 
Similarly, resistance to the idea that non-scientific forms of knowledge are valid and useful is 
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widespread among developing country planners, and to a lesser yet still significant extent, aid 
agency officials. Perhaps most importantly, my research indicated that aid agencies promoted 
an EIA model which was based on 'ease of implementation', rather than firm normative 
convictions about the 'most effective' form of EIA, and such results are relevant to many 
other developing (and developed) countries. In building capacity for environmental planning 
in other countries, aid agencies are also likely to choose to work within, rather than confront 
or attempt to transform, the development planning context. 
The following chapter summarises the implications of the research for the 
Vietnamese government, academia, and development aid agencies involved in environmental 
planning capacity building. The section concludes with the development of policy guidelines 
for EIA capacity-building programmes in Viet Nam and other developing countries. 
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Chapter Six 
CHAPTER SIX· IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter highlights the implications of the research. which are grouped into three 
main categories: l) implications for the VietNam government; 2) academic implications. and 
3) implications for development aid agencies. The chapter concludes with the development 
of guidelines for EIA capacity-building programmes in developing countries. and a call for 
aid agencies to attempt to transform the development planning processes of developing 
countries through the promotion of a planning model of EIA. 
6.1 Research Implications 
6.l.l Implications for the VietNam Government 
The research carried out for this dissertation has the potential to assist the Vietnamese 
government by clarifying ways in which development aid programmes can strengthen 
environmental planning capacities and by stimulating discussion about the reform of existing 
environmental planning processes. Research results are likely of particular use to MOSTE's 
Environmental Impact Assessment division, and to institutions involved in the wider 
development planning process, especially in the coming years as the EIA system is extended 
to further interact with VietNam's various national, regional and provincial planning bodies. 
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A number of Viet Nam-specific policy implications arise from the findings of this 
research. Firstly, the research has revealed that although EIA can make a strong contribution 
to the achievement of VietNam's sustainable development goals, stronger and more explicit 
links should be made between these goals and the outputs of an EIA process. Many questions 
remain about the most appropriate form of EIA to adopt in the country and the relative 
weight that EIA outputs should have in overall development planning decision-making. It is 
suggested here that, as one of the myriad supporting conditions for sustainable development, 
Viet Nam's EIA process could be redesigned so as harmonise with and support the 
achievement of sustainable development goals. Development aid agencies, as part of their 
capacity-building mandate, should play a lead role in demonstrating ways in which the EIA 
process can best support Viet Nam's UNCED commitments. For example, one promising 
approach would be for aid agencies to discuss with Vietnamese counterparts in MOSTE and 
MPI the development of sustainable development indicators, which would be applied to 
development proposals at the EIA review stage and which would form a baseline condition 
for proposal approval, mitigation, redesign, compensation or rejection. This approach could 
later be expanded to include the development of sustainable development guidelines for use 
in the project design and planning, project implementation (i.e during the construction phase 
of projects or the implementation phase of policies and programmes), and monitoring phases. 
A second policy implication of the research for the Viet Nam government is the 
immediate need to extend the EIA process 'upstream' to levels higher than that of the single 
project, and for aid agencies to take a lead role in assisting with this process. Existing 
Vietnamese EIA regulations stipulate that a form of regional EIA should be carried for area 
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master plans, and provincial and urban development plans (Binnie & Partners et. al. 1994, 
SRVIUNDP l995a). Thus, appropriate legislation and high-level recognition of the value of 
'upstreaming' EIA is already in place and can guide initial efforts. The Vietnamese 
government could also examine the possibility of moving beyond regional EIA, to strategic 
policy- and programme-level EIA, as a further extension of this upstreaming process. Again, 
capacity-building programmes could play a role in discussions about how best to ease into 
strategic environmental assessment. Although the Vietnamese government is unlikely to 
allow a high level of involvement by foreigners in debates about the scrutiny of internal 
development policies, development aid agencies could nonetheless be involved in promoting 
the strategic environmental assessment (SEA) concept, discussing the options for 
operationalising SEA, and assisting with the expansion of Vietnamese SEA capacities. 
Examples of possible means by which aid agencies could support this process include: 
funding study tours for Vietnamese to visit countries with an existing SEA tradition; 
organising workshops and conferences on the implementation of SEA; assisting in the 
de'lelopment of university courses on higher-order EIA, and; implementing and monitoring 
an initial round of 'training-of-trainers' in order to increase the numbers of Vietnamese 
qualified to teach SEA courses. 
A third policy implication for the Vietnamese government arises from the overlap and 
redundancy observed among EIA capacity-building programmes. With aid dollars limited, 
and uncertainty as to how long Viet Nam will remain of interest to development aid agencies, 
the Vietnamese government cannot afford to ignore the problems documented in this 
research. There are many possible ways in which the Vietnamese government could assist in 
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the coordination of aid programmes. The government could issue a clear policy statement 
indicating that government agencies and personnel must take all possible steps to reduce 
levels of EIA capacity-building overlap. In the case of government ministries such as 
MOSTE, division heads could be directed to liaise on a regular basis with aid officials to 
discuss the issue, and decide how to reduce overlap in programmes. Furthermore, 
Vietnamese officials could ask to contribute to existing development aid meetings chaired by 
UNDP and the World Bank, particularly by contributing up-to-date knowledge about past 
and current capacity-building activities. Furthermore, whenever new capacity-building 
programmes are proposed by a development aid agency, the issue of aid redundancy and 
programme overlap should be brought up by Vietnamese participants, and assurances gained 
from aid officials that overlap will be addressed and minimised at the programme design 
stage. 
The fourth policy implication stems from observations about successful EIA capacity-
building involving non-environmental ministries, including MTC and MPI: the Vietnamese 
government should consider further EIA decentralisation and capacity-building across the 
full range of line ministries. Development aid agencies would be expected to play a strong 
role in such a programme, particularly now that two successful examples can serve as case 
studies for other line ministries. Such an approach would simultaneously assist MOSTE in 
managing the workload associated with the EIA process, and stimulating the design of 
sectoral development projects and policies with fewer unintended impacts. One approach 
judged to be a success in EIA capacity-building with both MPI and MTC was the creation of 
'environmental management units': this should be considered as a replicable process across 
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all line ministries. By extending environmental capacity building to a broader range of line 
ministries, and reducing further the number of developments which have avoided 
environmental scrutiny altogether, Viet Nam is more likely to achieve its sustainable 
development goals. 
One final policy implication of the research is the need for the government to 
consider culturally-acceptable ways of increasing the level of attention paid to social 
concerns in VietNam's EIA process, primarily through heightened attention to social impact 
assessment and public involvement. Although many authors have documented the difficulties 
of integrating social aspects into the EIA systems of developing countries (Henry 1990, 
Rickson et. al 1990, Boyle 1998, Francis and Jacobs 1999), such difficulties may be reduced 
if Vietnamese planners take charge of and modify the process until it is more acceptable to 
Vietnamese society. Resistance to social aspects of EIA is also exacerbated in developing 
countries by the poor level of awareness of its benefits, particularly of the economic 
expression of such benefits (e.g. benefits of social impact assessment for a hydro project 
could be expressed as 'dollars saved by reduced resettlement costs). Perhaps most 
importantly, in building the capacity to carry out successful social impact assessment or 
public involvement, it is crucial that Vietnamese ministries, academic institutions, and mass 
organisations with a 'social' mandate become more centrally involved in the EIA process and 
EIA capacity-building programmes. The Vietnamese government could begin such a process 
by requesting aid agency support for a programme dedicated solely to the topic of capacity 
building for social aspects of the EIA process. Initially, such a programme could aim to: 
stimulate discussion about culturally-appropriate means of including social concerns (e.g. 
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through the input of social science researchers); identify institutions with existing social 
impact capacities and those requiring further strengthening, and; create and implement a 
framework guiding a long-term programme of capacity building. By expanding concern for 
social aspects in the EIA process, the Vietnamese government would also be more likely to 
succeed in meeting its UNCED sustainable goals (see Table 5.1), particularly those relating 
to livelihood enhancement of rural dwellers, expansion of integrated planning approaches, 
and the reversal of deforestation. 
6.1.2 Academic Implications 
My research also contributes to current academic knowledge on environmental 
planning in developing countries. In particular, I have extended academic understanding of 
the role of development aid in building capacity for environmental planning, and contrasted 
the concepts and procedural models guiding some of the literature with empirical research 
results from Viet Nam. 
Empirical studies on EIA in developing countries have predominantly documented 
the process of EIA implementation, the capacity deficiencies and associated 'action plans' to 
address such deficiencies, the implementation successes and failures, and to a lesser degree, 
barriers to the adoption of EIA (Lim 1985, Henry 1990, Rickson et. al. 1990, Leonen and 
Santiago 1993, Smith and Wansem 1994). Such studies often fail to analyse the form of EIA 
being implemented in a particular country or region, assuming either that EIA is a generic 
process or that any form of EIA will contribute positively to development planning and 
sustainable development. There has been a decided lack of empirical research examining aid 
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agencies as 'agents of change' in the development planning processes of developing 
countries, and even fewer examples of research examining the model of planning practice 
promoted by aid agencies. Thus, this research extends current knowledge on the contribution 
aid agencies have made in constructing environmental planning capacity and transforming 
environmental planning processes in developing countries. 
Research results suggest the continued transfer of a modified technical model of EIA 
to Viet Nam is likely to continue, and unless aid agencies change the model of EIA 
promoted, will likely accelerate under the capacity-building mandate adopted so uniformly 
among aid agencies. Although some aspects of a planning model of EIA were found to have 
been promoted by aid agencies, and Vietnamese counterparts had expressed interest in these, 
the core features of a technical model were still more common. Academic literature 
documenting the rise of planning model EIA practices (e.g. cumulative effects assessment, 
strategic assessment, acceptance of multiple forms of knowledge, participatory EIA) is 
therefore overly-optimistic for developing countries. Furthermore, the continued transfer to 
developing countries of a modified technical model of EIA suggests that the official 
pronouncements of many development aid agencies (e.g. suggesting that 'participatory 
planning, 'grassroots development', 'ecological sustainability' and •equity in development' 
are the agencies' overall guiding vision of development) are not always adhered to at the 
level of aid agency programmes. Although capacity-building programmes led to greater 
acceptance of some aspects of a planning model of EIA, a complete planning model was not 
promoted, leading to the current situation where a mixture of technical and planning model 
elements influence Viet Nam's EIA process. As shown. the reasons for this are complex, and 
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in Viet Nam's case, include a combination of host-country structural barriers, the desire by 
aid agencies to collaborate with developing countries in setting aid agendas, and the biases 
and beliefs held by implementing agencies and their host country counterparts. 
One of the central themes explored in academic literature on EIA in developing 
countries has been the effect established political and institutional frameworks within a 
country have upon the implementation of EIA (Mayda 1985, Clark and Herington 1988, 
Gamman and McCreary 1988, Rickson et. al 1990). The research has demonstrated that such 
frameworks are of great importance, both in dictating the form of EIA adopted in a particular 
developing country, and in determining the importance attached to EIA in development 
planning decision-making. This in tum has important implications for capacity-building 
programmes. The research has indicated that capacity building restricted in scope to 
individual ministries or institutions (such as a country's Ministry of Environment) is not a 
promising means by which to effect the fundamental changes to development planning 
necessary to achieve a transition to sustainability. Nor is such an approach a promising 
means by which to introduce a planning model of EIA. Thus, EIA capacity-building should 
be carried out as but a sub-programme of wider aid programming to stimulate sustainable 
development planning processes in a country. If aid agencies are serious about contributing 
to the achievement of sustainable development, and a planning model of EIA is felt to be a 
contributing factor, future capacity-building efforts must address needed changes to the 
development planning process in which EIA is housed. There are limits to the level of change 
which can be achieved by carrying out EIA capacity-building solely with the government's 
environmental agencies and teaching centres. For the fundamental changes envisaged under a 
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planning model, aid agencies must expand capacity-building efforts to work with a wider 
range of Vietnamese institutions responsible for development planning decisions, including 
MPI, provincial People's Committees, potentially affected regions or villages, the 
Vietnamese National Assembly, and line ministries responsible for the design and 
implementation of sectoral development programmes and projects. Although useful steps in 
this direction have been taken in Viet Nam by the UNDPIMPI Capacity 21 projects, such 
approaches should be widened further and other bilateral and multilateral aid agencies 
assisting in VietNam should be involved in a coordinated effort to transform the ideology of 
development planning in the country. 
Although there is a convincing and rapidly growing academic literature calling for 
environmental planning processes such as EIA to be explicitly linked to sustainability 
1ndicators', such as carrying capacities, assimilative capacities, cumulative effects or the 
conservation of natural capital (see Rees 1988, Goodland and Daly 1995, Noorbakhsh and 
Ranjan 1999), the research carried out for this dissertation has indicated that such an 
approach has not been promoted by EIA capacity-building programmes working in Viet 
Nam. There are a variety of reasons for this oversight. Firstly, such an approach would first 
require the Vietnamese government to take firm decisions legitimising the role, and power, 
of EIA to influence decisions in the development planning process. If, for example, EIA was 
promoted by aid agencies as a process determining the acceptability of a proposal (based on 
whether it contributed to or reduced sustainability), this would imply EIA has power as a 
'decision-making' tool in its own right, a role which is currently not supported by the 
Vietnamese government. Secondly, the use of such indicators would also require decisions to 
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be made about appropriate spatial scale: if sustainability is defined at the regional scale, the 
EIA process would recommend the rejection of those proposals predicted to reduce 
sustainability within the region, while the same might not be true if a different scale was 
chosen (Noorbakhsh and Ranjan 1999). In initially choosing to build capacity for project-
level EIA, most capacity-building programmes operating in Viet Nam have not yet addressed 
the ecosystem, regional or cumulative effects scales that are thought to be the starting point 
for the use of sustainability indicators in development planning (Rees 1988, Noorbakhsh and 
Ranjan 1999). 
In summary, a planning model of EIA was only a weak influence during the period 
when Viet Nam first designed and implemented its EIA process, and such a model has not 
been promoted strongly by subsequent development aid capacity-building programmes. In 
the academic literature critical of the continued transfer of a technical model to developing 
countries (see for example: Tester 1989, Appiah-Opoku 1994a, Jiggins 1995, Sankoh 1996) 
should be an acknowledgement that the technical model remains appealing for developing 
country governments, and development aid implementing agencies. This is due mainly to the 
technical model's comparative procedural simplicity, and ability to be grafted onto 
developing country planning processes without fundamental change being required. 
However, a key issue for the academic literature to confront is the question of how a 
technical model of EIA, once built, can be consciously transformed over time toward 
something closer to a planning model. Developing country EIA literature has not generally 
acknowledged the changing nature of EIA systems over time, nor the processes and 
influences which can effect change. Once EIA has been initiated in a country, patterned on a 
217 
variation of a technical model, capacity-building programmes may then attempt to 'push the 
boundaries' in developing country planning systems and over time, transform these systems 
into something which contributes more directly to the achievement of sustainability goals. By 
selectively introducing aspects of a planning model, and widening capacity building to 
address the development planning process within which EIA is housed, development aid 
agencies are more likely to see a planning model implemented over the long term and thus, 
contribute more centrally to the achievement of sustainable development goals. 
Academic research into the influence, limitations and design differences of 
environmental capacity-building programmes in developing countries is important to 
improved understanding about environmental and development planning in developing 
countries. Although the academic literature is largely bereft of such studies, the few that have 
been carried out to date have not acknowledged the significant conceptual differences (over 
the form of environmental planning promoted) among aid programmes, and the resulting 
confusion such 'mixed messages' may cause for developing country counterparts as they 
struggle to implement a workable and effective system of environmental planning. Single-
country studies on EIA capacity-building are important, allowing the researcher to work at a 
level of detail which facilitates insight into structural barriers, historical events, and political 
processes unique to a particular country. As well, my research has revealed that EIA and 
environmental planning systems are not static, and longitudinal studies within particular 
countries are needed to document the process of change. There is a need to replicate and 
extend the research carried out for this dissertation in other developing countries worldwide. 
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The research has sparked a series of additional research questions which can only be 
answered through research comparing capacity-building programmes in differing developing 
country contexts, or differing regionally-defined developing country groupings. How does 
EIA capacity-building in Viet Nam compare to that of other Southeast Asian countries? How 
does EIA capacity-building in African, South American or Pacific Island developing 
countries compare to that of Asian countries? In what way can a planning model of EIA be 
best introduced into such contexts? Research based on such questions is needed, and through 
such studies, generalised statements can be further derived on the most effective means by 
which development aid programmes in developing countries can stimulate environmental 
planning processes, and the achievement of sustainable development goals. 
6.1.3 Implications for Development Aid Agencies 
The research has its most direct implications for development aid agencies involved 
in environmental capacity building in developing countries. For these agencies, the most 
important findings are: 
• The sustainable development rhetoric adopted by so many aid agencies was not fully 
reflected in the actions of EIA capacity-building programmes in Viet Nam; 
• Social aspects ofEIA were addressed only marginally; 
• The model of EIA promoted by aid agencies did not link with sustainability indicators or 
contribute greatly to achieving sustainable development goals, and; 
• Structural barriers are likely to prevent the adoption of a full planning model of EIA 
unless capacity-building programmes also target the wider development planning process 
in which EIA is housed. 
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The research also has implications for development aid programming simply through its 
basis in empirical study: to date, most discussions of EIA capacity-building have been based 
on theoretical and conceptual conjecture rather than empirical studies. 
With their broad international perspective and the benefit of exposure to almost 30 
years of international EIA practice, development aid agencies have the potential to play a 
lead role in helping developing countries to 1earn from past mistakes', and assist in moving 
EIA beyond narrow technical and project-specific applications, to one which reaches all 
levels of development planning, and which contributes centrally to the achievement of 
sustainable development goals. In short, aid agencies are potentially powerful agents of 
change in developing countries, and are well placed to help implement a planning model of 
EIA. 
However, if development aid agency rhetoric about the need to stimulate sustainable 
development in developing countries is an accurate reflection of aid goals, greater attention 
to capacity-building under a planning model of EIA is required. Aid agencies have missed 
the opportunity to promote further some of the aspects of a planning model which have the 
strongest potential for effecting change supportive of sustainable development. In particular, 
aid agencies have not promoted strategic environmental assessment (e.g. regional 
environmental assessment and cumulative effects assessment) to a high degree, nor have they 
matched rhetoric about social and participative aspects of the EIA process with actions. Aid 
agencies are well placed, in their role as sources of funding, to introduce new concepts 
supportive of sustainable development and to redirect the Vietnamese development planning 
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process toward a more sustainable path. Aid "conditionality", in which reforms are 
introduced in return for significant aid support, is a long established tradition by which 
reforms are introduced into developing country bureaucracies. As long as such reforms are 
arrived at through consultation with Vietnamese officials, rather than imposed, additional 
capacity-building programmes under a planning model could contribute more to the 
sustainability of VietNam's development planning process. This has particular relevance to 
the many physical development projects that aid agencies fund in VietNam (e.g. fisheries, 
highways, ports, bridges). One particularly effective means by which to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of a planning model would be to apply such an approach regionally in Viet 
Nam: aid agencies would work together with Vietnamese counterparts in a long-term 
process, beginning at strategic levels and working downwards to the expression of regional 
plans and projects. At the implementation stages of such projects, aid agencies could employ 
concepts such as adaptive assessment to demonstrate the process and benefits of continuous 
monitoring69. 
A series of policy implications for development aid agencies involved in EIA 
capacity-building have been drawn from the research. Taken together, these policy 
implications form guidelines useful in implementing a planning model of EIA in Viet Nam 
and other developing countries. These guidelines are listed in Table 6.1. 
69 A smaller version of such a regional approach was adopted by the UNDP Phase II project but began at project rather than 
strategic levels. 
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Table 6.1: Towards a Planning Model of EIA: Guidelines for EIA Capacity-Building 
Prol!l"8mmes in Developine Countries 
Guideline #1: Ensure aid coordination 
Coordinate development aid within a particular cor~ntry and work toward a planning 
model of EIA as a long-tem1 'vision: 
a) Use a mixed-scanning approach to coordinate aid efforts, monitor progress and 
harmonise capacity-building. 
b) Ensure aid programme overlap and redundancy is kept to a minimum. 
c) Use mixed-scanning to transform the EIA system over time toward a planning model, 
and to ensure progress on sustainable development goals. 
Guideline #2: Enhance social aspects of EIA 
lntrodr~ce capacity-br~ilding for 'social aspects of EIA' and public involvement at the 
earliest stages. 
a) Involve social institutions in EIA process ('social' Ministries, social science 
departments of Universities, or socially-oriented NGOs). 
b) Explore with environmental ministries institutional arrangements for social impact 
assessment (e.g. setting up a 'social impact' unit or 'public involvement' office within 
environmental ministries). 
c) Discuss with counterparts the level of public involvement likely to be accepted in the 
country and begin capacity building from this level (i.e. do not 'scare off counterparts 
with immediate discussions of the need for autonomy and self-determination in EIA). 
Guideline #3: Use capacity-building processes with a history of success 
Use a range of capacity-building processes with a history of success in EIA. 
a) Use a learn-by-doing' approach using real world development proposals. 
b) Use opportunism and gradualism to transform EIA systems. 
c) Initiate and maintain strategic alliances with key developing country individuals 
(country 'experts' or influential leaders). 
d) Use education and training to expand counterpart awareness of possible EIA models. 
e) Minimise use of the 'expert'/'counterpart' model of capacity-building. 
Guideline #4: Channel funding agency inftuence 
Adjr~st development aid mission statements and fr~nding gr~idelineslprogramme parameters 
to strengthen support for EIA capacity br~ilding ltnder a planning model. 
a) Balance consultative approaches to aid programme design with programming based on 
normative planning/sustainable development principles. 
b) Use aid funding guidelines and programme parameters to steer implementing agencies 
toward a planning model, and monitor the degree of compliance. 
Guideline #5: Strengthen non-project EIA 
Introduce higher-order assessment earlier in capacity-building programmes (before 
project-level assessment wherever possible). 
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a) Link capacity-building for higher-order assessment with programmes operating at the 
b) oroject-level. . b .1d. . h . .bl &. • d 1 1· · carry out capactty- ut mg wtt agenctes responst e aor settmg eve opment po tctes, 
regional development agendas, and sectoral development programmes. 
Guideline #6: Establish links between EIA and sustainable development/sustainability 
Conduct capacity building to establish clear links between the EIA process and country 
s11stainable development goals. 
a) Promote sustainability indicators as a means by which to review and judge 
development proposals. 
Guideline #7: Promote multiple forms of knowledge in EIA 
Demonstrate to developing country counterparts the value of incorporating alternatives to 
scientifically-based knowledge in the EIA process. 
a) Involve counterparts in carrying out practical case studies and/or field studies, and 
prepare resource materials in the local language. 
b) Demonstrate the differing outcomes of EIA studies carried out using 'scientific' vs. 
'multiple forms of knowledge'. 
Guideline #8: Incorporate uncertainty 
Incorporate the concept of uncertainty into EIA capacity-b11ilding programmes. 
a) Prepare resource materials on predictive difficulties in ecological and social systems. 
b) Carry out capacity-building on 'planning in the face of uncertainty'. 
c) Promote longer-term, multi-phase or continuous EIA. 
d) Promote adaptive planning, phased implementation of developments, and the 
precautionary principle. 
Guideline #9: Transform unsustainable aspects of the planning theory base 
Conduct capacity-building for advocacy and transactive planning (for potentially affected 
comm11nities), and mired scanning. 
a) Carry out practical examples of advocacy and transactive planning with counterparts. 
b) Introduce mixed-scanning as a strategic planning tool. 
Guideline #10: Widen the scope of EIA capacity-building 
House EIA capacity-building programmes within a framework of aid agency programming 
targeting the wider development planning process, and carry ollt capacity-building with a 
broad range of actors, regions and levels in the EIA process. 
a) Do not limit EIA capacity-building to institutions centrally involved in the EIA process. 
b) Conduct analyses of 'structural barriers' to the implementation of a planning model and 
carry out capacity building widely in the development planning process to reduce the 
impact of such barriers. 
c) Carry out EIA capacity-building with line ministries as well as those directly 
responsible for the EIA process. 
d) Address the use and influence of EIA in the political process of development planning 
decision-making. 
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e) Once EIA capacity has been established within government and academic institutions, 
t) 
e~tend proJn"ammes to. private sector and 21ClS$rPOts actQrs (e.2. affected communities). 
Aim for ge't)graphtcal11alance m capactty=butldmg wtthm a ctruntry. 
g) Establish environmental business mentorship programmes to strengthen private sector 
capacities (initiated by aid but taken over on a voluntary basis by personnel from 
successful environmental consulting firms). 
Guideline #11: Extend the time-frame for EIA capacity building 
Increase estimates of the time needed for EIA capacity-building to stimulate adoption of a 
planning model of EIA. 
a) Avoid short-term capacity-building programmes. Long term programmes (i.e. greater 
than one year) are more useful and less disruptive to counterparts. 
b) View EIA systems as dynamic, and use capacity-building interventions to promote 
change over time toward a desired endpoint. 
Guideline #12: Increase EIA training course effectiveness 
Use EIA training courses as a strategic tool in effecting a planning model. 
a) Adapt EIA training course content to the stage of EIA implementation and degree of 
knowledge found within the country (e.g. short, generic courses are most useful at early 
stages of EIA implementation while longer, more detailed and targeted, courses may be 
appropriate in later stages). 
b) Screen training course trainees to ensure appropriate background knowledge and to 
screen out those who have already attended similar courses. 
The research has the potential to contribute to practical efforts by development aid 
agencies and developing country governments to work toward sustainable development 
goals, mainly through the implementation of capacity-building guidelines developed in this 
chapter. Although these guidelines are most applicable to EIA capacity-building programmes 
in Viet Nam and other developing countries with similar contexts, it is expected that the 
points raised would also stimulate discussions useful in most other developing countries. 
Thus, the research has generalisable implications for a range of development aid agencies, 
developing countries, and in some cases, developed countries. The research has also 
indicated where future research efforts are needed, and has suggested some of the academic 
questions guiding this research. 
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6.2 Conclusion 
Development aid agencies must reposition environmental planning capacity-building 
programmes if they are to be effective in transforming the development planning contexts of 
developing countries: capacity-building should not be limited to the strengthening of 
capacities within an unsustainable development planning process. Henry (1990) described 
the typical development planning context of developing countries as that of wide power 
imbalances and the routine exclusion of weaker communities from the development planning 
process. Other authors have referred to the political context of development planning in 
developing countries, in which the developmental merits of a proposal are often deemed less 
important than are its implications for national prestige, the consolidation of political power, 
or the personal gains of powerful decision-makers (Wandesforde-Smith et. al. 1985, Adams 
1990, Wood 1993, Appiah-Opoku 1994a). To this may be added the generally low state of 
knowledge and concern for ecological sustainability within the development planning 
structures of developing countries. Working within such a context will lead aid agencies to 
help entrench an undesirable status quo in development planning. For EIA capacity-building 
to work within, rather than attempt to transform, such a context would significantly reduce 
EIA 's potential to foster more equitable and sustainable forms of development in developing 
countries. Thus, although the development planning context is an important factor to be 
reflected in environmental planning processes, EIA capacity-building programmes should 
consciously act on and transform that context wherever possible. 
Future EIA capacity-building programmes will undoubtedly be put in operation in 
VietNam and a host of other developing countries. Evidence presented in Chapter Two 
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suggests that the use of a planning model of EIA has greater long-term sustainability benefits 
than does a technical model. In designing capacity-building programmes in accordance with 
the guidelines developed in this dissertation, aid agencies would be assured that the money 
invested in capacity-building would not result in an EIA process which only has the power to 
tinker at the margins of inappropriate and ill-advised project-levels of development. More 
generally, development aid agencies would also be more certain that the EIA processes 
operated in developing countries would contribute more completely to the achievement of 
that country's sustainable development goals. 
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KEY INFORMANT QUESTION THEMES 
The following question themes were used as a general "menu" from which questions 
could be formulated during the course of unstandardised key informant interviews. The 
sequence and content of each interview varied according to the informant's institutional 
allegiance, nationality (i.e. Vietnamese national vs. expatriate), level of seniority, familiarity 
with EIA capacity-building, and the type of information that came up during the interview. 
Informant's level and type of involvement with EIA capacity-building programmes 
~ Personal experiences 
,. Responsibilities/job description 
~ Level of responsibility 
,. Institutional description 
,. EIA expertise 
Vietnamese history/experience with EIA 
' Earliest EIA practice, pioneering institutions/individuals 
' Other countries as a model for Viet Nam 
~ Examples ofEIA practice (case studies) 
' Development of institutional framework for EIA 
' Key developments (fostering EIA use) 
' EIA status prior to foreign aid programmes 
' Relative importance of foreign aid programmes 
,. Current EIA regulations 
~ Current EIA applications (e.g. projects vs. policies/programmes) 
' Influence ofEIA studies in current development planning process 
Foreign EIA capacity-building programmes 
' Programme origin (actors, identification of need, and planning process) 
' Donor-recipient interactions in programme development 
~ Activities undertaken 
)- Use of case studies 
)- New ideas introduced 
)- Actors involved 
)- EIA model promoted 
)- EIA model justification 
)- EIA model appropriateness 
)- Effectiveness/impact on host institution 
~ Problems/missing elements 
~ Overlap with other programmes 
:;.. Recommendations for future EIA capacity-building programmes 
~ Change over time (i.e. emerging aid trends or changing approaches) 
)- Additional programmes still in the planning stages 
EIA and the Viet Nam development planning context 
~ Development planning structures and policy priorities 
:;.. Political structures/traditions influencing EIA application 
:;.. Central vs. regionalnocal government powers 
:;.. Influence of "traditional" decision-making structures over "official" regulations 
). Importance of technical/economic studies vs. environmental/social impact studies 
). Relative power of environmental planning regulations/institutions 
:;.. Position of social sciences vs. hard sciences 
,. Attitudes toward knowledge useful in environmental planning 
,. Attitudes toward social impact assessment 
,. Attitudes toward public participation (existing and potential) 
~ Barriers/constraints to EIA implementation 
,. Future EIA capacity-building needs 
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KEY INFORMANTS 
Informant #1. Dec. 1, 1994. Senior Environmental Specialist. multilateral aid agency. 
Informant #2. Dec. 2, 1994. Senior Economist, multilateral aid agency. 
Informant #3. Dec. 5, 1994. Economist, UN agency. 
Informant #4. Dec. 5, 1994. Research Assistant, UN agency. 
Informant #5. Dec. 5, 1994. Fisheries Expert. multilateral aid agency. 
Informant #6. Dec. 9, 1994. First Secretary, bilateral aid agency. 
lnformant#7. Dec. 9, 1994. Programme Officer. UN agency 
Informant #8. Dec. 12, 1994. Counsellor-Development. bilateral aid agency. 
Informant #9. Dec. 13, 1994. Assistant Resident Representative, UN agency. 
Informant# 10. Dec. 13, 1994. Resident, multilateral aid agency. 
Informant #11. Dec. 15, 1994. Environmental Management Advisor, international NGO. 
Informant #12. Dec. 20, 1994. Programme Officer, UN agency. 
Informant #13. Dec. 20, 1994. Programme Officer. UN agency. 
Informant #14. Dec. 20, 1994. Counsellor. bilateral aid agency. 
Informant #15. Dec. 27, 1994. Country Representative, international NGO. 
Informant #16. Dec. 27, 1994. Country Representative. international NGO. 
Informant#17. Dec. 29, 1994. Counsellor. bilateral aid agency. 
Informant #18. Dec. 30, 1994. First Secretary and Programme Officer for Forestry and 
Environment. bilateral aid agency. 
Informant #19. Dec. 30, 1994. Regional Programme Officer. bilateral aid agency. 
Informant #20. Jan. 2, 1995. Deputy Director. university environmental research institute. 
Informant #21. Jan. 3, 1995. Programme Officer. Viet Nam Ministry of Science, Technology 
and Environment. 
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Informant #22. Jan. 3, 1995. Unit Director- Viet Nam Ministry of Science. Technology and 
Environment 
Informant #23. Jan. 4, 1995. Counsellor. bilateral aid agency. 
Informant #24. Jan. 5, 1995. Management Advisor, international NGO. 
Informant #25. Jan. 10, 1995. Deputy Director. university environmental research institute. 
Informant #26. Jan. 11, 1995. Programme Officer. institute of technology environmental 
programme 
Informant #27. Jan. 11, 1995. Director. social sciences research institute. 
Informant #28. Jan. 11, 1995. Programme Assistant. social sciences research institute. 
Informant #29. Jan. 11, 1995. Country Representative. international NGO. 
Informant#30. Jan. 11, 1995. Chairman. national environmental research programme. 
Informant #31. Jan. 12, 1995. Researcher and Lecturer. university environmental research 
institute. 
Informant #32. Jan. 16, 1995. Counsellor-Development, bilateral aid agency. 
Informant #33. Oct. 20, 1997. Researcher and Lecturer, university environmental research 
institute. 
Informant #34. Oct. 20, 1997. Director, university environmental research institute. 
Informant #35. Oct. 20, 1997. Director, university environmental research institute. 
Informant #36. Oct. 20, 1997. Chief. UN agency. 
Informant #33. Oct. 20, 1997. Consultant, EIA capacity-building project. 
Informant #38. Oct. 28, 1997. Staff. EIA capacity-building project. 
Informant #39 Oct. 28, 1997. Staff, EIA capacity-building project. 
Informant #40. Jan. 12, 1998. First Secretary. bilateral aid agency. 
Informant#4l. Jan. 13 & 16, 1998. Consultant, EIA capacity-building project. 
Informant #42. Jan. 13 & 16, 1998. Consultant, EIA capacity-building project. 
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Informant #43. Jan. 13 & 16, 1998. Consultant. EIA capacity-building project. 
Informant #44. Jan 14. 1998. Deputy Director. social research institute. 
Informant #45. Jan. 23, 1998. Senior Ministry Official - Viet Nam Ministry of Science. 
Technology and Environment. 
Informant #46. Jan. 23, 1998. Professor. European University and EIA capacity-building 
project staff. 
Informant #47. Feb. 10, 1998. Chief Advisor. EIA capacity-building project. 
Informant #48. Feb. 12, 1998. Researcher. university environmental research institute. 
Informant #49. Feb.l7, 1998. Chief Advisor. EIA capacity-building project. 
Informant #50. Feb. 17. 1998. Research Associate. EIA capacity-building project. 
Informant #51. Feb. 18 & 28, 1998. Advisor. EIA capacity-building project. 
Informant #52. Feb. 24, 1998. Director. university environmental research centre. 
Informant #53. Feb. 24, 1998. Unit Officer- VietNam Ministry of Science. Technology and 
Environment. 
Informant #54. Mar. 2, 1998. Programme Officer. international NGO. 
Informant #55. Jul. 4, 1998. Director. university environmental research centre. 
Informant #56. Jul.l7, 1998. Director. University environmental research centre. 
Informant #57. Jul.23, 1998. Team Leader. environmental capacity-building project. 
Informant #58. Jul. 17, 1998. Environmental Officer. multilateral aid agency. 
Informant #59 Jul. 21, 1998. Chairman. national environmental research programme. 
Informant #60. Jul. 28, 1998. Social Impact Specialist. international NGO. 
Informant#6l. Jul. 31, 1998. Senior Official, Ministry of Planning and Investment. 
Informant #62. Aug. 4, 1998. Official, Ministry of Planning and Investment. 
Informant #63. Feb. 26, 1998. Senior Official, Ministry of Transportation. 
Informant #64. Jan. 23, 1998. Team Leader. environmental capacity-building project. 
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INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR EIA IN VIET 
There are seven main actors in the Vietnamese EIA process governing newly proposed 
projects*: 
1) Project Proponent: foreign or domestic private investors, or government agencies 
2) ETA Consultants: primarily faculty or staff of academic institutions 
3) National Environment Agency (NEA-MOSTE): for large projects 
4) Provincial DOSTE Offices: for small to medium-sized projects 
5) Vietnamese government ministries/agencies: all those concerned with potential 
impacts of a particular proposed project. In some instances (e.g. Ministry of Planning 
and Investment, Ministry of Transportation and Communication) 'in-house' 
environmental management units incorporate environmental concerns into project 
design before projects are subjected to formal EIA scrutiny by MOSTE or DOSTEs. 
6) ETA Appraisal Council: an ever-changing group of individuals convened on a project-
by-project basis by NEA (large projects) or DOSTE (small/medium projects) 
7) Vietnamese Public: those able to read technical Vietnamese, and submit written 
comments. 
The following are general steps followed in the Vietnamese EIA process. In reality, 
many government-led projects avoid the EIA process altogether, opportunities for public 
comment are highly formalised and require a level of education beyond all but the most 
highly educated in Vietnamese socity, and steps in this general process are routinely 
circumvented through 'informal' institutional and personal arrangements. 
Step 1-Determining which projects require EIA: Decree 175/CP includes a list of projects 
clearly not requiring EIA (e.g. banks, food service establishments) and those which 
may require EIA. For those projects which may require EIA, the proponent submits a 
brief lEE identifying major expected impacts. NEA then determines whether a full 
EIA study is required, and if so, whether NEAIMOSTE or provincial DOSTE offices 
will review completed EIA studies (depending mainly on the project's size). 
Step 2-Preparing the EIA report: The project proponent and hired environmental consultants 
prepare a suggested Terms of Reference for the EIA, submits this to NEA or DOSTE 
(and other concerned groups, individuals and government agencies), and incorporates 
suggestions into a revised Terms of reference. EIA studies are carried out, and 
reviewed against the Terms of Reference as a measure of sufficiency. 
Step 3-Fine-tuning the EIA report/Public comment: The project proponent submits the draft 
EIA for review by the appropriate government agency (NEA or the local DOSTE), 
which, in addition to commenting, directs the proponent on how to make the report 
available for public comment. The role of public comment is to determine whether 
any major considerations have been left out of the draft EIA report, and to provide an 
opportunity for revisions based on public concerns. Based on these review comments, 
NEA or DOSTE determine whether alterations to the draft EIA report are required. 
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Step 4-Appraising the EIA Report: NEA or DOSTE, with assistance from the EIA Appraisal 
Council, reviews the revised (final) EIA report and determines the report's 
acceptability. There are three possible categories of appraisal: 1) Reject proposal and 
do not issue an Environmental Appraisal certificate (EAC), 2) Issue an EAC subject 
to certain mitigatory or monitoring conditions, or; 3) grant an unconditional EAC. 
MOSTE or the provincial DOSTE issues EAC's, while provincial DOSTEs, in 
conjunction with the Department of Construction, monitor environmental aspects 
during site preparation and construction phases. 
*(Vietnamese EIA regulations also require existing industries and development projects to 
carry out EIA: since this is more accurately termed "environmental auditing", administrative 
and institutional requirements for existing projects are not described here). 
